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 ABSTRACT  
 
 
American Prisoner of War Policy and Practice from the Revolutionary War to the War 
on Terror.  (May 2006) 
Paul Joseph Springer, B.S., Texas A&M University; 
M.A., University of Northern Iowa 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Brian M. Linn 
 
 American prisoner of war (POW) policy consists of repeated improvisational 
efforts during wartime followed by few efforts to incorporate lessons learned.  As such, 
in every war, the United States has improvised its system of POW maintenance and 
utilization.  At no time prior to World War II was the United States military prepared to 
capture and maintain the prisoners taken in any American conflict.  The United States 
has depended upon reciprocal treatment of enemy prisoners and threatened retaliation for 
mistreatment of American captives in every war.  It has also adhered to accepted 
customs and international law regarding prisoners, providing housing, food, and medical 
care to POWs at least the equal of that given to American prisoners.  However, the U.S. 
military has often sought the most expedient methods of maintaining prisoners, a 
practice that has led to accusations of neglect.    
 In the nineteenth century, American wars were typically fought upon the North 
American continent and were limited in scope, which facilitated the maintenance of 
enemy prisoners and eased the improvisation of policy and practice.  In the twentieth 
century, the United States participated in conflicts in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, 
 
 iv
 
complicating POW issues.  World War II and subsequent conflicts show a radical 
departure from earlier wars, as the army planned for the capture of enemy troops and 
was better prepared to maintain them.  However, the War on Terror represents a return to 
improvisation, as a lack of planning and a failure to follow established policies 
contributed to allegations of mistreatment in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay.
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This dissertation follows the style of the Journal of Military History. 
CHAPTER I 
 
  INTRODUCTION:  AMERICAN POW POLICY AND PRACTICE 
 
 For over two centuries, United States prisoner of war (POW) policy has 
gradually evolved in response to wartime conditions.  American planners have typically 
struggled to react to the capture of enemy troops.  In no major conflict has the United 
States been prepared for the number of enemy prisoners taken.  As a result, American 
treatment of enemy prisoners has often been improvised.  World War II and subsequent 
conflicts show a radical departure from earlier wars, in that the U.S. Army devoted 
considerable effort to planning and preparation for POW operations.  The changing 
American concept of humanitarian behavior has guided the improvisation of American 
POW operations.  Efforts to remain economically efficient influenced policy, as did 
reactions to enemy treatment of American POWs.  Essentially, the United States has 
often conceded the initiative to the enemy in regard to POW policy.   
The U.S. military has failed to incorporate POW lessons from each conflict, and 
has thus been unprepared for an influx of prisoners in each war.  The problems have 
been compounded by the use of poorly-trained units for guarding and maintaining 
POWs, and by efforts to conserve resources used for the maintenance of prisoners.  
Typically the government has exercised little oversight over POW treatment and has 
turned over control of POWs to offices and organizations that only exist in wartime.  In 
peacetime, the military has made little effort to prepare for POW operations. 
1 
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Policy and practice are intertwined throughout the history of American treatment 
of POWs.  Policy is theoretical; it creates guidelines for practices in the field which may 
not be applicable to every battlefield situation.  It can exist without practice, as in the 
case of peacetime planning for the capture of prisoners of war or in the development of 
international law.  Examples of policy guidelines include “Instructions for the 
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field” (1863) and the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1929).  Practice is grounded 
in reality, it often does not follow prescribed policies.  In the absence of clearly defined 
policies, practice can essentially replace policy.  This was clearly demonstrated during 
the Mexican War, when generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott both commanded 
armies that captured enemies without clear directives from the War Department about 
how to treat Mexican prisoners.  At times in American history, policy and practice have 
come into conflict, when field commanders have deliberately ignored instructions 
regarding prisoner of war treatment. 
Few attempts have been made to address the entire history of POW policy within 
the United States, although hundreds of works have addressed the events of a single war, 
or the experiences of a single captive.  This approach has been misleading when applied 
to POW policy over time, because many of the authors began with the assumption that 
POW practices during a single conflict can be explained without the context of earlier 
and later wars.  While standards of treatment have evolved, many of the fundamental 
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decisions regarding the treatment of captured enemies were made over two hundred 
years ago and the underlying principles of POW treatment remain unaltered.   
Three principles of American treatment of POWs are consistent from the 
Revolutionary War to the War on Terror.  The first principle is depending upon 
reciprocal standards of POW treatment, including the threat of retaliation upon enemy 
prisoners for perceived mistreatment of American prisoners.  The United States has 
treated enemy prisoners in each war at least as well as the treatment received by 
American prisoners.  The second principle is a general attempt to adhere to accepted 
customs and international law regarding war.  The third principle is one of general 
expediency.  American treatment of enemy prisoners has often been dictated by doing 
what is quickest, simplest, or cheapest to maintain POWs at an acceptable level. 
This study is organized chronologically, with one chapter devoted to each major 
war or significant period in POW affairs.  Contained within each chapter is a review of 
the historiography of POWs for the war being discussed.  Chapter I, in addition to 
providing an introduction to the argument of the dissertation, includes a general 
literature review and a brief discussion of American POW practices prior to the 
Revolutionary War.  Chapter II discusses the American Revolution and efforts by the 
Continental Congress and Lieutenant General George Washington to create a consistent 
policy regarding POWs during the war.  Despite the internecine nature of the conflict, 
American treatment of British prisoners was surprisingly lenient, particularly when the 
British behavior toward rebellious colonists is considered.  The War of 1812, the subject 
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of Chapter III, was another war against Great Britain; it was punctuated by threats of 
reprisals against prisoners for perceived mistreatment of POWs by the enemy; the virtual 
collapse of the War Department; and the establishment of a functional exchange cartel 
for officers and enlisted personnel.   
Chapter IV discusses the Mexican War, and the difficulties faced by American 
commanders in the first war fought by the U.S. Army almost entirely on foreign soil.  
The most notable prisoner issue of the war, the execution of U.S. deserters caught 
fighting for Mexico, will receive special consideration.  Chapter V argues that the 
American Civil War was a major turning point in the history of POW treatment by the 
United States.  More than four hundred thousand prisoners were taken in the war, and 
fifty thousand died in captivity due to the neglect of Union and Confederate officials.  
The Civil War is particularly interesting because Americans were both the captors and 
the captives, and yet prisoners were treated worse in that war than in any other American 
conflict.  Chapter VI details the changes in American policy and practice from the Civil 
War until World War I, including the Spanish-American War, the Philippine War, and 
American participation in international efforts to ameliorate the conditions faced by 
prisoners of war.  In World War I, the United States fought as part of an alliance, and 
was forced to cooperate in forming POW policies.   
Chapter VII begins with a discussion of the changes wrought by the Geneva 
Convention of 1929.  This multinational agreement heavily modified international law 
regarding prisoners and the changes were reflected in some nations’ treatment of 
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prisoners during World War II.  The chapter also compares the treatment of German and 
Italian prisoners taken in the European Theater with the treatment of Japanese prisoners 
taken in the Pacific Theater.  Prisoner of war labor was the dominant issue of the war for 
American policies.  Soon after the war, the Geneva Convention of 1949 modified  
international law for the final time.  This convention governed American treatment of 
Korean and Vietnamese prisoners, discussed in Chapter VIII.  In Korea, enemy prisoners 
were confined in a huge island prison at Koje-Do and no effort was made to exchange 
the prisoners or utilize their labor potential.  In Vietnam, the U.S. military turned 
prisoners over to the government of South Vietnam for confinement, and again used 
island prisons to hold thousands of prisoners in a single location.  This system was 
repeated in the Persian Gulf War as a way of reducing the logistical difficulties of 
American units fighting overseas.  Chapter IX discusses the Gulf War of 1990-91 and 
the treatment of prisoners captured in the War on Terror and the Iraq War.  These wars 
represent a departure from the policy of adherence to international law regarding 
prisoners.  Chapter IX draws conclusions regarding American POW policy and practice, 
and offers observations about United States approaches toward the issue of POWs in 
future conflicts. 
 The issue of prisoners has had a tremendous impact upon each of the wars in 
which the United States has fought, yet prisoners are often overlooked by works 
discussing the strategy and outcome of each war.  When historians or analysts discuss 
captured troops, it is often in the context of atrocities or maltreatment allegedly 
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committed by an enemy holding American prisoners.  Rarely has any example of 
American malfeasance received more than cursory mention, with the exception of works 
discussing the experience of prisoners during the Civil War.1  There are relatively few 
works devoted to a study of prisoner of war policies, much more common are works 
describing the actual practice of keeping prisoners, typically a series of anecdotes from a 
single war or the memoirs of a former prisoner.  Quite often, prisoners’ journals and 
diaries are published long after the end of captivity, occasionally after the death of the 
author.  In most cases, the journals are valuable to understand the conditions faced by 
prisoners, and provide a way to evaluate wartime conditions.  
 In 1922, J. Fitzgerald Lee produced a brief article, “Prisoners of War,” to argue 
the proper methods that should be followed by the United States for POW treatment 
during future wars.  Lee’s work was a response to the huge armies of World War I, and 
the tremendous problems associated with the capture of tens of thousands of prisoners.  
He argued that without a well-planned system, nations would continue to be 
overwhelmed by massive captures in future wars, and needless suffering among captives 
 
1 One important exception arose in James Bacque, Other Losses: The Shocking Truth 
Behind the Mass Deaths of Disarmed German Soldiers and Civilians Under General 
Eisenhower’s Command (New York: Prima Publishing, 1991), in which Bacque accused 
Dwight D. Eisenhower of deliberately mistreating German prisoners in 1945, leading to 
the deaths of hundreds of thousands of prisoners.  This assertion was countered by 
Günter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds., Eisenhower and the German Prisoners of 
War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), and will be considered 
further in Chapter VII. 
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would be the inevitable result.2  Lee’s work was followed by Herbert C. Fooks’s 
Prisoners of War, a study of the international treatment of prisoners throughout history.  
Fooks organized his work topically, beginning with a definition of prisoners of war and 
ending with the liberation of prisoners.  His work suggested that Hague Convention of 
1907 had provided insufficient protection for prisoners during World War I, and should 
be replaced by a more comprehensive document.3  William Flory’s Prisoners of War, 
which provided a basic discussion of the evolution of international law regarding 
prisoners, focused almost entirely upon the United States and Western Europe.  Flory 
urged the Allied nations of World War II to realize the importance of POW issues and to 
plan a system capable of holding millions of captured enemies.  Like Lee, Flory believed 
that the problems faced in wartime were aggravated by the lack of planning for 
prisoners.4
 In 1955, Lieutenant Colonel George G. Lewis and Captain John Mewha 
produced History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army 1776-1945 
for the Department of the Army.  This work was the one of the first general histories of 
American POW policy, with a special emphasis upon the labor potential of captive 
enemies.  Fully two-thirds of the work was dedicated to World War II, due to the fact 
that prior to 1943 the most common use of prisoners was for exchange, not for labor.  
 
2 J. Fitzgerald Lee, “Prisoners of War,” Army Quarterly 3 (1921-22): 348-56. 
3 Herbert C. Fooks, Prisoners of War (Federalsburg, MD: J. W. Stowell, 1924), 20-21. 
4 William E. S. Flory, Prisoners of War: A Study in the Development of International 
Law (Washington, DC: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942). 
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Lewis and Mewha argued that such exchanges often proved detrimental to American 
war efforts, while the use of prisoners for labor was extremely useful and even vital to 
the national economy.  The authors concluded that American POW policy had never 
been adequately defined prior to an American conflict, and that POWs have never been 
fully utilized as a labor force.  Further, they believed that the U.S. government should 
plan an efficient labor system for prisoners of future conflicts.5
 Immediately after the Vietnam War, A. J. Barker argued that modern war, 
involving the struggle for survival of competing ideologies, had complicated the 
problems of POWs and reduced the humanitarian component of POW care.  Barker’s 
Prisoners of War noted that with the rise of total warfare, the definition of a prisoner of 
war has become a major problem for powers at war.  In Barker’s view, the participation 
of guerillas and freedom fighters had virtually nullified older definitions of POWs, and 
the perception of wars as matters of national survival ensures that attempts to regulate 
the conduct of warfare, through international agreements like the Geneva Conventions, 
became obsolete during conflicts.  Barker pointed to World War II as the watershed 
event, when wanton violations of POW agreements occurred.  He argued that the decline 
of POW treatment was simply one symptom of a general rise of barbarity during 
wartime.  One major reason for the abuse of POWs was the failure of the principle of 
reciprocity after 1941.  As Western powers have engaged Asian cultures, threats of 
 
5 George G. Lewis and John Mewha, History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the 
United States Army, 1776-1945 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1955). 
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reprisal have lost meaning, because “During World War II it became apparent that 
countries like Japan and the Soviet Union were not interested in Japanese or Russians 
who became prisoners of war.”6  In fact, these nations maintained an interest in their 
prisoners as agents of the war removed from the battlefield.  Barker’s work is extremely 
useful as a demonstration of the continuity of POW affairs.  It is organized by events 
experienced by almost every POW, such as the moment of capture, interrogation, 
relationships with guards, and repatriation.   
 Howard S. Levie’s Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict contained a 
detailed legal evaluation of POW issues.  The work included a brief discussion of the 
historical precedents of POW treatment, but focused primarily upon an examination of 
the Geneva Convention of 1949 and its applications in modern warfare.  Unlike Barker, 
who considered international agreements regarding prisoners to be virtually obsolete, 
Levie viewed the Geneva Convention as a vital document addressesing almost every 
potential POW situation to arise in modern war.  Levie’s work explained how the 
provisions of the Convention are to be put into practice.  He did not attempt to draw 
conclusions about the history of American POW policy, preferring instead to create a set 
of guidelines to drive policy in the future, in the hopes of alleviating the suffering of the 
prisoners of modern war.7
 
6 A. J. Barker, Prisoners of War (New York: Universe Books, 1974), 207. 
7 Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict, Naval War 
College International Law Studies 59 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977). 
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 Richard Garrett’s P. O. W. examined the treatment of POWs from the Hundred 
Years War to the Vietnam War, drawing conclusions about the experiences of POWs 
over the centuries.  Organized chronologically, it focused primarily upon the affairs of 
the United States and Europe, but does not present an argument about the history of 
POWs in general, save that their lot in life was and is uniformly unpleasant.  He 
described the experiences of prisoners in different wars primarily through anecdotal 
evidence, and revealed that even as the size and scope of war broadened, the nature of 
prisoner operations from the perspective of the captive remained remarkably similar.8
 The significance of this dissertation within the literature of POW history is 
twofold.  It is the first work since 1955 to present a comprehensive treatment of 
American policy and practice toward prisoners, with the goal of examining changes over 
time rather than focusing upon a single war.  It is also the first work to compare the 
stated goals of the United States regarding prisoners with the actual treatment received 
by captured enemies.  All previous works have either focused entirely upon one war or 
one aspect of POW treatment, or discussed only the experiences of a few prisoners 
without any attempt to examine the “big picture” of American policy. 
 Prior to the seventeenth century, prisoners were typically killed or sold into 
slavery, depending on the whim of the battlefield victors.  Prehistoric societies almost 
always executed captured foes, rather than spend their meager resources maintaining 
 
8 Richard Garrett, P. O. W.  (London: David & Charles, 1981). 
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enemy warriors who contributed nothing to the captors’ economy.9  Some Native 
American tribes used capture as a means of increasing tribal numbers, through the 
process of forced adoption.  Others took captives for ransoms or for ritual torture and 
execution.10  In time, practices shifted throughout the world, so that prisoners were 
typically enslaved rather than executed.  The Greeks kept physically healthy prisoners 
for the slave markets or allowed captives to ransom themselves.  The Romans used 
prisoners for labor, rowing galleys or in gladiatorial contests.  The Romans rarely 
allowed ransoms, as freed prisoners might again fight against the empire.  In the Middle 
Ages, captured common soldiers still risked death or enslavement, but knights and 
nobility protected themselves with a code of chivalry that required participants to treat 
prisoners kindly and allowed them to ransom themselves.  This behavior did not extend 
to wars fought with non-European populations; the Crusaders and their foes continued to 
kill and enslave prisoners.   
In 1625, Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius codified the rules of warfare for the benefit of 
all nations in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Laws of War and Peace), and offered a more 
humane set of principles regarding POWs.  He drew primarily upon Greek and Roman 
philosophers, with occasional references to later events and practices.  Grotius sought to 
 
9 Lawrence H. Keeley, War Before Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 83-88. 
10 June Namias, White Captives (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 
3-5; J. Norman Heard, White into Red (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1973), 1-2; 
Kathryn Zabelle Derounian-Stodola and James Arthur Levernier, The Indian Captivity 
Narrative, 1550-1900 (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1993), 2-8. 
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establish the rights of nations to make war, and the responsibilities they bear as 
belligerents.  His ideas publicized the plight of prisoners of war, but his suggestions for 
POW treatment were not universally accepted and they proved to have a limited impact 
on European practices.  Likewise, prisoners could expect few comforts from their 
captors, and had no right to expect ransom or exchange.    Grotius’ work was the first 
real codification of the customs of warfare that specified when prisoners could be taken, 
and how they should be treated if taken.11  He argued that prisoners were at the complete 
mercy of their captors, and could be killed or enslaved at will, as the act of taking 
prisoners was a kindness, not a legal requirement.  However, Grotius argued that by 
enslaving prisoners, the captor would benefit by sparing their lives.  He felt that 
Christians should not enslave other Christians, in the case of war between Christian 
nations, ransom should be the norm.  Once a prisoner was taken, he was to be protected 
from harm, severe punishment, and excessive labor.  In nations which did not allow the 
enslavement of prisoners, Grotius recommended exchanges or ransoms to free prisoners.  
The right of ransoms could be transferred between individuals or nations.12     
 The growth of national armies in the seventeenth century complicated the 
situation of POWs.  At the end of the Thirty Years War, the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648 provided that all POWs should be released and repatriated, without ransom or 
compensation.  However, the use of ransom remained a popular practice well into the 
 
11 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belle ac Pacis, trans. Francis W. Kelsey (1625; reprint, 1925), 
bk. 3, chap. 4, pt. 10-12, <http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/grotius/index.html> 
12 Ibid., chap. 7, pt. 1, 2, 5, 9; chap. 14, pt. 3-5, 9; chap. 21, pt. 25. 
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eighteenth century.  Numerous attempts were made to specify a ransom for each military 
rank to simplify the process of regaining troops through payments.  Simultaneously, 
exchanges became more common, as belligerents began to forego the ransoms of 
prisoners of equal rank.  Paroles became somewhat common during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, though they were reserved exclusively for officers.  By giving his 
parole, an officer could be released to his own lines, to await formal exchange at a later 
date.  The officer gave his oath not to participate in the conflict in any manner until 
properly exchanged.  The parole system required mutual trust, but offered the economic 
benefit of not forcing captors to maintain their prisoners until exchanges could be 
effected.   
 The ideas of Grotius were expanded and modified by French jurist Emmerich de 
Vattel, who published The Law of Nations in 1758.  Like Grotius, Vattel sought to 
codify international law, with a particular emphasis upon the laws of war.  Regarding 
POWs, Vattel disagreed with Grotius on several major points.  Vattel believed that a 
surrender must always be accepted, unless the enemy was guilty of an enormous breach 
of the laws of war.13  He provided guidelines for the proper treatment of prisoners, and 
argued prisoners should not be executed or enslaved unless guilty of a crime.  They 
could be confined, but must be well-treated; if a captor could not feed or guard them, 
they must be released on parole.  Vattel argued that the state was bound to procure the 
 
13 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law (1758), bk. 
3, chap. 8, pt. 140-41, 149-154; chap. 18, pt. 287-94, 
<http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/vattel/index.html> 
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release of its prisoners held be the enemy, either through exchange, ransom, or as an 
article in the treaty of peace.  In his discussion of rebellions and civil wars he argued all 
belligerents were bound by the laws of war as if separate nations. 
 As the concepts of exchange and parole became more common, institutions were 
created to oversee the POW system during wartime.  During the Seven Years War 
(1756-63) England and France established a series of cartels, agreements that allowed 
prisoners to be exchanged on a rank-for-rank basis.  The cartels established commissions 
of representatives from each belligerent to keep records of prisoners captured, paroled, 
and exchanged by each side.  Both sides presumed that at the end of the conflict the 
nation with the balance of prisoners remaining after all exchanges were completed 
would be paid a ransom for the remaining prisoners.  The cartel systems of the war were 
clumsy and required equal numbers of prisoners at specific ranks in order to function, 
but they demonstrated that enlisted personnel as well as officers could be exchanged 
during a conflict.  Not surprisingly, the priority for exchange remained with officers, 
privates were often an afterthought within the cartel system. 
European ideas about the treatment of POWs were transplanted to the New 
World by the colonial powers.  The cartels created in Europe during the Seven Years 
War were applied to fighting in North America, although with less regularity.  Warfare 
in the colonial era did not closely resemble the European style of war, and the roles of 
colonial militias and native allies often complicated matters.  The native allies recruited 
by European powers did not adhere to the rules of European warfare, and refused to be 
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bound by the European system.  Likewise, Europeans and colonists did not view native 
enemies as equal opponents, and rarely treated them as POWs.   
 The distinction between civilized and savage warfare is important to any 
discussion of American POW policy and practice.  Grotius and Vattel each argued that 
the rules of warfare only applied to conflicts between civilized enemies.  If an enemy did 
not follow the accepted rules and traditions of war, European armies did not feel 
restrained in their methods of warfare.  Generally, the accepted rules of POW treatment 
were only applied between forces of European descent.  Europeans who surrendered to 
native allies could not expect quarter, even when the allies were commanded by 
European officers.14  Members of colonial militias, when captured by fellow Europeans, 
were often not considered worth holding for exchange, and were often paroled to return 
to their homes and remain out of the fighting.   
 The legacy of European POW practice is clearly visible in the American 
Revolutionary War.  During that conflict, American commanders operated under the 
assumption that POWs should be protected from the ravages of war, and maintained in 
anticipation of exchange with the enemy.  Although Americans fighting for the cause of 
independence were not immediately viewed as legal combatants by the British, the 
 
14 For a discussion of the colonial unwillingness to take prisoners, and to kill 
noncombatants as well as enemy warriors, see John Grenier, The First Way of War: 
American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 29-52, 128-30; Douglas Edward Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk: New 
England in King Philip’s War (New York: MacMillan, 1958), 224-26; Robert Rogers, 
Journals of Major Robert Rogers (London: J. Millan, 1765), 40-46. 
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existing system of POW captures, paroles, and exchanges was eventually applied to the 
war by both sides.  This created a precedent that has impacted American POW policy for 
over two centuries.  The practice of implementing POW policies has changed, as should 
be expected with the changes in technology and society, but the underlying principles of 
American policy have remained consistent, striking a balance between humanitarian 
principles and political expediency.
 17
CHAPTER II 
  STRUGGLING INTO EXISTENCE: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
American prisoner of war policy during the Revolutionary War changed 
constantly throughout the conflict.  Congress issued contradictory orders which were 
often ignored by field commanders and state governments.  This created a poorly 
functioning system that made no attempt to utilize the labor or intelligence value of 
prisoners.  Exchanges remained limited, unequal, and tedious throughout the war, and 
often involved efforts by individual states to redeem their own captives for British 
POWs, regardless of Congressional wishes.  Enemy prisoners became victims of the 
system, although the situation faced by American prisoners remained at least equally 
unpleasant.  The plight of prisoners influenced the outcome of the war, and was a factor 
in the British decision to seek a treaty and conclude the conflict. 
American policy toward British prisoners of war consisted of a series of 
improvised measures created by Congress, influenced by the commander in chief of the 
Continental Army and individual state governments.  Although Congress was not 
regarded as the supreme authority within the confines of each individual state, it served 
as a unifying body, attempting to create a coherent POW policy that coincided with the 
war aims of the individual states.  Lieutenant General George Washington was under the 
command of Congress, but was given great leeway in the daily operations of POW 
policies.  His role was vital, particularly because he remained in command for the entire 
war, while the membership of Congress changed.   
The improvisational nature of American prisoner of war policy during the war is 
unsurprising, given that the Continental Army did not exist prior to the outbreak of 
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fighting, and that Congress was ill-prepared to direct a war against Great Britain.  
Although specific policies and practices were improvised during the war, a few guiding 
principles consistently influenced American treatment of British prisoners.  Congress 
emphasized frugality in regard to POWs while adhering to the “recognized principles of 
humanity.”1  Congress gave repeated instructions to Washington to seek an exchange 
cartel for prisoners based on British recognition of U. S. sovereignty.  For most of the 
war, the British refused to create a general cartel, precisely to avoid this recognition.  
Thus the actual practice of prisoner exchange relied upon negotiations for specific 
exchanges, not on a set of mutually recognized policies.   
The issue of prisoners received scant attention from Congress in the early years of 
the war because no true Congressional military force existed to govern prisoners.  
Further, colonial militia forces had almost no history of taking prisoners and maintaining 
them for the duration of a conflict.2  Colonial units facing the British Army were much 
more likely to feel bound by the laws and customs of war between civilized armies than 
when facing Native Americans in the field, and Washington mandated humane treatment 
of prisoners by American forces. 
 A wide variety of American units took enemy prisoners during the war.  The 
skirmishing of land forces and by the naval forces in service of the United States 
provided a steady stream of prisoners.  Private American vessels (privateers) accounted 
                                                 
1 The first Congressional mention of the importance of economy when caring for enemy 
prisoners came on 4 January 1776, in reference to prisoners held in Trenton, New Jersey.  
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, ed. Worthington C. Ford et al. 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904-37), 4:30-32.  (Hereafter cited as 
JCC) 
2 For a discussion of colonial approaches to warfare with Native American populations, 
see Grenier, First Way of War, 1-52. 
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for a great number of prisoners, particularly after Congress enacted bounties for enemy 
captives.  The major American mass captures of enemy forces occurred at Saratoga, 17 
October 1777, and Yorktown, 19 October 1781.  In these two campaigns, thousands of 
POWs were taken, rapidly taxing the ability of the Americans to supply and maintain 
them.  Naturally, the British also took prisoners on a consistent basis, including captures 
at sea.  The majority of Americans captured at sea were privateers, not members of the 
Continental Navy.  Like the American forces, the British took large numbers of prisoners 
on two occasions, once during the series of battles near New York in 1776 and secondly 
at the surrender of Charleston on 12 May 1780.  Although exact numbers are unreliable, 
it is likely that the British maintained a favorable balance of prisoners during the first 
year of the conflict and for a brief period in 1780-81.  At all other times, the Americans 
probably held more enemy captives.3   
    Most of the works discussing the Revolutionary War contain at least some 
mention of POW issues, though few pay significant attention to prisoner affairs.4  The 
most common topic is the treatment of American POWs, with particular emphasis given 
to the prison hulks that housed naval personnel and civilians.  Herbert Aptheker argued 
that hundreds of Americans died because “the notorious corruption of 18th century British 
                                                 
3 George Adams Boyd, Elias Boudinot: Patriot and Statesman, 1740-1821 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1952), 34, 45-46.  If civilians and privateers are counted, the 
British held more captives than the Americans for almost the entire war.  However, 
during the war, the term “prisoner of war” was understood to refer only to individuals 
captured while fighting with land forces.  “Marine prisoners,” as naval captures were 
called, were accorded an entirely different status by both the British and the Americans. 
4 Among the works which summarize the POW situation are Carl Berger, Broadsides & 
Bayonets: The Propaganda War of the American Revolution (San Rafael, CA: Presidio 
Press, 1976); John Tebbel, Turning the World Upside Down: Inside the American 
Revolution (New York: Orion Books, 1993); and Henry Steele Commager and Richard 
B. Morris, eds., The Spirit of Seventy-Six: The Story of the Revolution as Told by 
Participants (1958; reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1995). 
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officialdom combined with typical aristocratic contempt and hatred for rebellious 
provincials to produce an inferno for the victims.”5  A common theme of the numerous 
prison narratives of Americans held by the British is the accusation of deliberate poor 
treatment.6  Biographies of individuals associated with POW operations, such as Elias 
Boudinot, who served as the American commissary of prisoners for twelve months, have 
also provided an interesting view of the creation of POW policy.7   
 Most of the secondary works dealing exclusively with POWs during the 
Revolution argue that American treatment of British prisoners was better than that given 
to American POWs, but they typically utilize only American sources.8  Often, the authors 
analyze only a single aspect of the POW experience, without a discussion of the “big 
                                                 
5 Herbert Aptheker, The American Revolution, 1763-1783 (New York: International 
Publishers, 1960), 115. 
6 Some of the more well-written narratives include Ethan Allen, A Narrative of Colonel 
Ethan Allen’s Captivity  (1779; reprint, Burlington, VT: H. Johnson, 1838); John 
Blatchford, The Narrative of John Blatchford  (1865; reprint, New York: New York 
Times, 1971); Christopher Hawkins, The Adventures of Christopher Hawkins  (1864; 
reprint, New York: New York Times, 1968); Charles Herbert, A Relic of the Revolution  
(1847; reprint, New York: New York Times, 1968); and Israel R. Potter, The Life and 
Remarkable Adventures of Israel R. Potter  (1824; reprint, New York: Corinth Books, 
1962).  Works discussing the prison narratives of the Revolution include Larry G. 
Bowman, Captive Americans: Prisoners During the American Revolution (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 1976); Francis D. Cogliano, American Maritime Prisoners in the 
Revolutionary War: The Captivity of William Russell  (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2001); Sheldon S. Cohen, Yankee Sailors in British Gaols: Prisoners of War at 
Forton and Mill, 1777-1783  (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1995); and Robert 
John Denn, “Prison Narratives of the American Revolution” (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State 
University, 1980).  
7 Adams, Elias Boudinot, 33.  Washington to Boudinot, 1 April 1777, The Writings of 
George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799, ed. John C. 
Fitzpatrick, 39 vols (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1931-44), 7:343.  
8 Gerald O. Haffner, “The Treatment of Prisoners of War by the Americans During the 
War of Independence” (Ph.D. diss., University of Indiana, 1952); Charles H. Metzger, 
The Prisoner in the American Revolution (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1971). 
 
 21
picture,” or discuss Americans held by the British without mention of British prisoners.9  
The primary exceptions concern British prisoners taken at Saratoga and held in captivity 
for years despite a surrender agreement that promised them the opportunity to return to 
England immediately.10
 Of works devoted to the general history of prisoner of war affairs, Lewis and 
Mewha argue that prisoners during the Revolutionary War were primarily used for 
exchange purposes, but that they also served as potential tools of retaliation.11  Barker 
and Levie provide a brief overviews of the major events but do not attempt to analyze the 
war or the policies created.  Garrett focuses most of his chapter on the war to the 
experiences of a few Americans held by the British, and argues that British and German 
prisoners lived in “a far from intolerable situation,” establishing a virtually autonomous 
thriving community in Virginia and Maryland.12   
 The British treatment of prisoners was a determining factor in the treatment of 
prisoners by American captors.  In addition to their usefulness for exchange purposes, 
British prisoners taken during the Revolutionary War were often viewed as a tool of 
retaliation, to prevent British commanders from treating captured Americans as 
treasonous subjects of the crown.  Washington first threatened retaliation in an 11 August 
                                                 
9 Betsy Knight, “Prisoner Exchange and Parole in the American Revolution,” William 
and Mary Quarterly 48 (April, 1991): 201-22; Rembert Patrick, “British Prisoners of 
War in the American Revolution” (M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina, 1934). 
10 Richard Sampson, Escape in America:  The British Convention Prisoners, 1777-1783  
(Chippenham: Picton Publishing, 1995); Harry M. Ward, Between the Lines: Banditti of 
the American Revolution (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); George W. Knepper, “The 
Convention Army, 1777-1783”  (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1954); William M. 
Dabney, “After Saratoga: The Story of the Convention Army”  (Ph.D. diss., University of 
New Mexico, 1954).   
11 Lewis and Mewha, Prisoner of War Utilization. 
12 Barker, Prisoners of War, 10-12; Levie, Prisoners of War, 5-6; Garrett, P.O.W., 48. 
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1775 letter to General Thomas Gage, in which he noted that “I shall regulate my Conduct 
towards those Gentlemen, who are or may be in our Possession, exactly by the Rule you 
shall observe towards those of ours, now in your custody.”13  This letter, dated shortly 
after Washington assumed command, showed that he would base his initial POW policy 
decisions upon the behavior of the British toward American prisoners, but also leave all 
blame for mistreatment with the enemy.  He soon wrote to Congress, requesting 
instructions for the care and subsistence of captured enemy soldiers, because he believed 
their numbers would rise quickly.  In the same communication, Washington 
recommended moving prisoners inland, away from the centers of British power in the 
colonies.14  Much of Washington’s knowledge of the British treatment of prisoners was 
provided by Elias Boudinot, who conducted an extensive investigation and tour of the 
confinement facilities in New York.15
 Although the United States naturally had an interest in regaining its citizens made 
prisoners by the enemy, there was a certain reluctance by both sides to actually agree to 
exchanges.  The majority of prisoners held by the British had been captured aboard 
privateering vessels, and while American citizens, these prisoners were not in the direct 
service of the Continental forces.  Also, enlisted personnel of the Continental Army 
captured by the British had often enrolled for a short period of service.  In comparison, 
most army prisoners held by the United States were British regulars who served for an 
                                                 
13 Washington to Gage, 11 August 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings, 3:416-17.  
14 Washington to the President of Congress, 17 November 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings, 
4:73. 
15 For a discussion of Boudinot’s findings, consult David L. Sterling, “American 
Prisoners of War in New York: A Report by Elias Boudinot,” William and Mary 
Quarterly 13 (July 1956): 376-93. 
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indefinite period, typically for life.16  Because both sides agreed that all exchanges 
should be on a rank-for-rank basis for officers, and a man-for-man basis for enlisted 
personnel, the British would gain much more from any exchange.  Any British prisoners 
sent back to the British army were likely to return to service within North America.  
Conversely, any American privates freed by exchange would most likely be near the end 
of their enlistment, or would return to privateering.  Unlike the enlisted ranks, American 
officers did not join the military for a fixed period, therefore Congress placed great 
emphasis upon the exchange of officers, and avoided the discussion of exchanging 
privates whenever possible.  The problems of exchange were exacerbated by 
Washington’s insistence that American prisoners should be exchanged by date of capture, 
so that those held longest would be released first.  Officially, he based this policy upon 
humanitarian principles, but there was a very practical component as well.  If Washington 
agreed to seek the exchange of specific individuals regardless of the duration of captivity, 
he would be inundated with requests for special exchanges and privileged treatment.  
Instead, he quickly made it known that he would refuse all requests for prisoners to be 
exchanged out of order.17
 The relationship between Congress and the states caused serious difficulties.  On 
9 April 1776, Congress requested that each state make lists of all prisoners they held and 
                                                 
16 For a discussion of British recruitment practices during the war, see Edward E. Curtis, 
The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution (1926; reprint, New 
York: AMS Press, 1969), 54-60.  All recruits, voluntary or impressed, served for a period 
of three years or the duration of the war, at the discretion of the crown. 
17 Washington still received dozens of such requests, but each was rejected out of fairness 
to all prisoners held by the enemy.  For Washington’s explanation, see Washington to 
Joseph Spencer, 2 September 1777, 9:161; Washington to John Beatty, 23 December 
1779, 17:306-07, both in Fitzpatrick, Writings. 
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also that suppliers be paid on a regular basis for rations given to POWs.18  Congress 
asked individual states to cease exchanging POWs within their power, as individual state 
exchanges undermined the power of Congressional representatives to negotiate a general 
exchange cartel.  For the most part, individual states ignored Congress, and exchanged 
prisoners captured by their state militia forces for their citizens held by the British.  
These exchanges were often very unequal, with the British almost always receiving more 
prisoners.  Washington repeatedly requested that all prisoners be considered as a group to 
be exchanged against all American prisoners by date of capture, but he did not have the 
power to prevent the states’ exchanges.19  Many of the state exchanges included a desire 
to regain politically well-connected officers. 
 On 21 May 1776, at the request of Washington, Congress created a set of general 
POW regulations.  These rules were modified over the course of the war, but the spirit 
behind them remained fairly consistent.  All prisoners held by the United States received 
rations equal to those issued to American troops.  This policy departed from the British 
practice of issuing a two-thirds ration.  Camp commanders segregated officers from 
privates, and all officers received parole unless specific orders were given for 
confinement.  All American units under Congressional control were to strictly observe 
surrender terms.  Where possible, a British agent supplied British POWS, although any 
prisoners out of the reach of a British agent were to be supplied by Congressional funds.  
The families of any British prisoners could live with the POWs, and received food and 
supplies in the same manner as the prisoners.  Enemy prisoners could hire themselves out 
                                                 
18 JCC 4 (1776), 264. 
19 Washington to Nicholas Cooke, 3 March 1777, 6:242; Washington to Israel Putnam, 
25 January 1778, 10:348-49; Washington to John Beatty, 29 December 1779, 17:306-07; 
Washington to Thomas Sim Lee, 4 May 1780, 18:328-29; all in Fitzpatrick, Writings. 
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to private citizens within the locale of their confinement to support their families.  No 
enemy POWs or deserters could enlist into American service.20  Congress provided a 
standard form for paroles and reimbursement for the cost of lodging officers.   
Despite Washington’s request to appoint a commissary of prisoners, Congress left 
the day-to-day operations of POW care to the Continental Army and the states. David 
Franks was approved as the British agent for prisoners and tasked with obtaining supplies 
for British prisoners at the expense of their government.  Given the Congressional desire 
for economic frugality, it is surprising that Washington’s request, on the grounds of both 
improving prisoner treatment and saving expenses, was not acceded to until 1777, when 
Washington was able to offer the position to Elias Boudinot.  Boudinot, a former member 
of Congress, was given the power to appoint deputies to provide necessary assistance, 
and granted control of all British prisoners regardless of location.21   
 In May and June of 1776, Congress issued regulations designed to increase the 
number of British prisoners in American hands.  There were simply not enough British 
prisoners to compel the British commanders to exchange captured Americans or to 
improve the treatment of American prisoners.  Congress mandated that any individual 
taken in arms upon a prize vessel, regardless of what vessel made the capture, was to be 
considered a POW.  These prisoners were to be delivered to a U. S. marshal in any state, 
where they were held on an equal basis with other prisoners.  Also, Washington was to 
employ native allies as he saw fit, and Congress offered a bounty of one hundred dollars 
for British officers and thirty dollars for a private upon delivery to the Continental Army.  
                                                 
20 JCC 4 (1776), 370-73. 
21 Washington to the President of Congress, 11 May 1776, 5:35;  Washington to 
Boudinot, 1 April 1777, 7:343; both in Fitzpatrick, Writings.  JCC 7 (1777), 289; JCC 8 
(1777), 491-92. 
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Washington was not allowed to exchange any prisoners without permission from 
Congress, which still held hope of a general cartel.22  After the  number of naval captures 
increased, on 5 August 1776, Congress voted to allow the navy and individual privateers 
to enlist any naval prisoners held by any state.  Remaining naval prisoners were to be 
held by the states and exchanged for American prisoners from privateering vessels or the 
Continental Navy.  British and German soldiers were still not allowed to join the 
Continental Army, and exchange of American seamen for British land prisoners was 
prohibited.  On this last point Congress would maintain its resolve for most of the war.23   
 On 30 July 1776, Washington requested a definition from Congress of who 
should be considered a POW, including the status of sailors on merchant vessels flying 
the British flag.  Initially, naval prisoners were only accorded POW status if captured on 
an enemy war vessel.  In 1777, Congress declared any British subject serving as an 
officer, master, or mariner on any vessel, including merchant ships, to be a POW if taken 
by any American vessel.  As with the decree of 21 May 1776, these prisoners could be 
delivered to any state as ordinary POWs.  In 1781 Washington redefined prisoners of war 
to include only individuals taken in arms, and never civilians or members of militia 
captured unarmed.  He wished to ensure that British commanders could not kidnap 
unarmed militiamen for the purpose of exchanging them for British POWs.24
                                                 
22 JCC 5 (1776), 452-58. 
23 JCC 5 (1776), 630-32.  Washington considered the possibility of enlisting enemy 
prisoners to be of dubious value, Washington to Pennsylvania Council of Safety, 12 
January 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings, 6:504. 
24 Washington to the President of Congress, 30 July 1776, 5:355; Washington to 
Abraham Skiner, 17 February 1781, 21:236-37; both in Fitzpatrick, Writings.  JCC 9 
(1777), 776-77. 
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 On 17 October 1777, Lieutenant General John Burgoyne surrendered his forces to 
Major General Horatio Gates.  At the stroke of a pen, the United States gained nearly 
6,000 prisoners, almost half of them German mercenaries.25  The Articles of Convention 
signed by Burgoyne and Gates specified that the prisoners were to be immediately 
marched to Boston, where British transports would be allowed to embark them for Great 
Britain.  On the march, the enemy soldiers would be provisioned by the Continental 
Army, at the same ration received by American soldiers.  All expenses for the subsistence 
of prisoners would be paid by Britain prior to the embarkation of the Convention troops.  
After reaching Europe, the Convention troops would not be eligible to serve in North 
America for the remainder of the war, unless exchanged for American POWs.26
 The improvisational nature of Congressional POW policy can be seen in the fate 
of the so-called “Convention Army.”  Congress was immediately critical of the terms 
granted to Burgoyne, and soon accused the British of breaking the Convention because 
they did not surrender all of the weapons and supplies mentioned in the agreement.  No 
regimental colors had been surrendered, and the muskets turned over to American forces 
                                                 
25 Paul Nelson puts the exact number at 5,791 prisoners, including 3,379 British and 
Canadian troops and 2,412 German troops, Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates: A 
Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976), 142.  Harry M. Ward 
claims the actual number of Germans was 2,492, for a total of 5,871 POWs, Harry M. 
Ward, The American Revolution: Nationhood Achieved, 1763-1788 (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1995), 251.  Sampson points out that four different returns exist for the British 
prisoners, with the numbers ranging from 2,923 to 3,198 soldiers, Sampson, Escape in 
America, 192.  According to Washington, the total number of prisoners was 5,740, see 
Washington to Landon Carter, 27 October 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings, 9:451-55.  
Washington put the total losses caused the British by Burgoyne’s campaign at 9,583 
killed, captured, or deserted. 
26 Samuel White Patterson, Horatio Gates: Defender of American Liberties (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1941), 175-83; Nelson, Horatio Gates, 142-52. 
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were both few in number and unfit for service.27  Washington informed Congress and 
Gates that the departure of the prisoners should be delayed, if possible, to prevent the 
troops from reaching England before spring.  If the troops were allowed to depart before 
the end of the year, they might replace garrisons which could then be sent to America in 
time for the campaign season of 1778.  On 8 January 1778, Congress voted to prevent the 
Convention Army from embarkation on the grounds that it had not received notification 
of the ratification of the Convention by Great Britain.  On this point, Congress could not 
be budged, for a ratification of the agreement by the British government would implicitly 
recognize the United States as a sovereign power.  Britain steadfastly refused to provide a 
ratification, and Congress was provided with a convenient excuse to keep the Convention 
prisoners within America.28
 On 6 December 1777, Congress discussed the response of General William Howe 
to Washington’s request for exchanges to commence.  Howe insisted on a distinction 
between military prisoners and civilians held by the British authorities, allowing major 
differences in the treatment of each group. Congress wished all captives to be treated in 
the same humane fashion.  In the preliminary negotiations at Amboy, New Jersey, 
Washington indicated his willingness to enter into an exchange in any format Howe 
desired.  Two months later, Washington reported to Congress that a man-for-man and 
rank-for-rank exchange system had been created, later called the Amboy Convention.  
Negotiators created a composition system, allowing the exchange of officers and enlisted 
                                                 
27 JCC 9 (1777), 948-52, 1059-64; JCC 10 (1778), 44-45, 52-21. 
28 Sampson, Escape in America, 82-88.  On page 86, Sampson argues that “Congress had 
no sound or honest case for their action, and the ‘stain’ on their history remains.”  For 
Washington’s argument, see Washington to Horatio Gates, 14 November 1777, 
Fitzpatrick, Writings, 10:61-63. 
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men of different ranks through a table of equivalencies.  On 26 February 1778, Congress 
announced its eagerness for an exchange, yet blocked the ratification of the agreement 
until Britain agreed to pay all outstanding costs of upkeep for British prisoners.  Congress 
ordered all states to forward accounts for prisoner upkeep, and also demanded receipts 
from the quartermasters, provost marshals, and commissaries of prisons.  The deadline 
for the receipt varied by location, with the latest deadline set at 1 June 1778.  Even if the 
British agreed to the Congressional demands, no exchange would occur prior to the 
summer of 1778.  By delaying exchanges, Congress kept exchanged British troops from 
augmenting the forces already in North America in time for any summer offensives.  For 
the next two years, Congress insisted upon a general settlement of debts prior to the 
exchange of prisoners.29  
 When British commissioners refused to give in to the Congressional demands for 
payment of prisoners’ expenses, the exchange negotiations halted.  Further complicating 
the issue, Congress demanded that any payments be made in specie, to prevent inflated 
continental currency from being used to discharge the debts, and removed David Franks 
as agent for British POWs, as he “has abused the confidence reposed in him by 
Congress” by attempting to pass information across British lines.30  Britain refused to 
appoint a different agent, and the lack of an agent caused great suffering among the 
British POW population.  On 7 November 1778, Congress ordered that the Commissary 
General of Prisons reduce the rations issued to British prisoners to match the rations 
given to American prisoners held by the British at New York.  Without an advocate in 
                                                 
29 Washington to William Howe, 10 February 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings, 10: 444-46.  
JCC 10 (1778), 197-98, 203, JCC 12 (1778), 1240; JCC 18 (1780), 1028-31. 
30 JCC 12 (1778), 1032-33.   
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Congress, the prisoners and their needs were ignored in the ongoing diplomatic 
struggle.31   
 In the same resolution blocking the exchange, Congress again forbade the 
Continental Army from enlisting or drafting any British prisoners or deserters.  Many 
states ignored Congressional prohibitions and enlisted enemy prisoners in state regiments 
destined for continental service.  In Washington’s opinion, deserters were unlikely to 
remain more loyal in American service, and prisoners of war would return to the British 
at the earliest opportunity.  In a letter to William Heath, Washington observed, “If we 
would wish to reinforce the Enemy with the whole of Mr. Burgoyne’s Army, we can not 
pursue a mode that will be more effectual or more certain, than to enlist it into our 
service; but it may be done with less injury by sending them the Men, unarmed, without 
clothes and without paying them an exorbitant bounty.”  To prevent the practice, he 
recommended that recruiters be forced to pay for the losses caused by the desertion of 
any POWs they enlisted.32
 Prisoner negotiations also revealed the need for Congress to change POW policies 
during the war.  Through the end of 1779, British negotiators continued to refuse to even 
discuss the payment of outstanding prisoner upkeep debts and Congress continued to 
withhold permission for a general exchange.  But in November of 1779, the Board of 
War reported that individual states were exchanging prisoners without the sanction of 
Congress.  The Board requested that states stop these exchanges, on the grounds that each 
                                                 
31 JCC 12 (1778), 1111-12. 
32 Washington to Heath, 29 April 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings, 11:320-22.  Heath was the 
senior officer in Massachusetts, where the practice was especially prevalent.  Washington 
also wrote to government officials in the state, attempting to end the practice.  
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 31
local exchange undercut American repayment demands.  The states ignored the 
Congressional request, and continued to negotiate exchanges for their own citizens.33  In 
early 1780, Congress was finally forced to drop the demand for payment of debts prior to 
exchange, and on 13 January 1780, it renewed Washington’s power to exchange 
prisoners as he saw fit.  To assist him, it called for a new series of prisoner lists to be 
prepared by each state, to facilitate a general exchange of prisoners.  To stop the 
individual state exchanges, Congress ordered all POWs delivered to the control of the 
Commissary General of Prisoners.  In return, Congress agreed to allow any prisoners 
captured by militia forces to be exchanged for American prisoners from the same state, 
when possible.  To augment its claim to enemy prisoners, Congress agreed to pay all 
upkeep, transport, and delivery costs for enemy POWs, by reimbursing states for any 
expenditures made.  All exchanges were still required to be soldier-for-soldier and sailor-
for-sailor; no interservice exchanges were allowed.  Because the British government 
refused to discuss debts incurred by British prisoners, Congress ordered that all prisoners 
allowed on parole had to pay their own personal upkeep costs before being exchanged.  If 
the British government refused to pay for its prisoners en masse, perhaps individual 
soldiers would pay their own debts in the hope of exchange.34
 On 12 June 1780, the city of Charleston, South Carolina was surrendered to the 
British by Major General Benjamin Lincoln, and 245 officers and 2,326 enlisted 
personnel were made prisoners, radically altering the POW balance.  Prior to the fall of 
Charleston, British prisons in New York and Long Island held only 270 officers and 450 
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privates from the Continental Army.  After the fall of Charleston, British commanders 
began to press the issue of general exchange, with the balance of prisoners no longer in 
favor of the Americans, Washington informed Congress that he opposed a general 
exchange.35
 Washington’s aversion to exchange was primarily related to the possible return of 
enlisted men to the British army.  On 10 July 1780, he explained his opinion of prisoner 
exchanges to Congress.  An exchange of officers, he believed, was worth pursuing 
because both sides would gain equally from the exchange, and the officers would no 
longer suffer in captivity.  An exchange of privates, however, while sparing the prisoners 
further hardship, would damage the American military position because he anticipated 
taking the offensive.  Because the United States could not afford to augment British 
manpower, Washington recommended sending supplies through the lines to Americans 
prisoners and halting exchange negotiations until after the campaign season.  Congress, 
after considering the issue, instructed Washington to attempt a rank-for-rank general 
exchange of officers on 7 August 1780.  After further consideration, Congress informed 
Washington that he could exchange officers by rank or by composition as he saw fit.  
Exchange was to be limited to officers only, chosen by length of captivity, and the first 
offer should be to exchange officers of the Convention Army, not militia officers.  
Washington immediately ordered Abraham Skinner, a deputy commissary of prisoners, to 
agree to a British request to a general exchange of officers.  To delay any exchange of 
privates, Skinner requested a complete list of American enlisted personnel held by the 
British, including their corps and regiment.  In response, the British insisted that any 
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 33
exchange include both officers and enlisted personnel, a proposition which Washington 
regarded as completely unprecedented and unwarranted.36   
 On 7 November 1780, Congress ordered Washington to exchange all Americans 
held by the British, including parolees, parole violators, captured militia, Canadian 
hostages, and all American forces captured at Charleston for members of the Convention 
Army and any other British prisoners available, rank-for-rank and man-for-man.  When 
equal exchanges were not possible, the system of composition negotiated at Amboy in 
March of 1778 could be employed.  Congress ordered that all expenses associated with 
British prisoners again be tallied, with the cost of upkeep for American prisoners in 
British hands deducted from the total, and the remaining debt to be presented to British 
commissioners.  If the British still refused to pay, Washington could offer exchange with 
the retention of British hostages to guarantee eventual repayment of the debt.  If 
necessary, Washington could offer an exchange of hostages as surety that Convention 
troops and their exchanges would not be used in the field prior to 1 May 1781.  The 
British commissioners argued that the Convention troops had never been prisoners of war 
and should have been returned four years prior, they saw no reason to trade Americans 
for troops unlawfully held.37
 Despite the differences in opinions, the negotiations resulted in substantial 
exchanges, and on 7 November 1780, Washington was able to report to Congress that 
almost every American prisoner held in New York City had been exchanged, primarily 
for officers of the Convention Army.  The British government had concluded that the 
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Convention Army would never be sent to England without an exchange of prisoners, and 
decided to make the necessary agreements to regain their forces.  Of the American POWs 
held at New York, every private and all but 50 officers were exchanged.   
Regardless of Congressional orders, Washington refused to exchange Convention 
privates for Americans captured at Charleston before ascertaining the total number of 
prisoners held by the British in the South.  Instead, he suggested trading all of the 
remaining American officers at New York for John Burgoyne, who remained on parole in 
England, and allowing Nathanael Greene handle any negotiations involving the 
Charleston prisoners.  Washington, alarmed by reports that Burgoyne was in ill health, 
noted that “his death would deprive us in exchanges of the value of 1040 private men or 
officers equivalent, according to the tariff which as been settled.”  Washington ordered 
Skinner to seek the exchange of Burgoyne, as the British were unlikely to offer much in 
exchange for a corpse.  The British refused to exchange Burgoyne by composition, and 
because they did not hold an American of equivalent rank, Burgoyne could not be 
exchanged.38   
 The Congressional argument for exchanging the Convention prisoners stated that 
Burgoyne broke the Convention immediately after it was signed, and therefore the United 
States was not bound to release the prisoners.  Congress wished Washington to quickly 
exchange the Convention troops because Convention prisoners were constantly escaping 
their confinement, traveling to New York, and being re-drafted into new regiments to 
face American troops in the field.  Officially, such behavior was forbidden by the second, 
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third, and ninth articles of the Convention, but in practice, neither side had faithfully 
adhered to the spirit or the letter of the document, and thus the British had few qualms 
about using escaped Convention prisoners within their ranks.  To prevent such duplicity, 
Congress ordered all Convention prisoners to be placed in close confinement to prevent 
desertions and escapes.  British officers of the Convention Army, whether on parole or 
not, were ordered to Simsbury, Connecticut, with the implied threat of imprisonment 
within abandoned mines, previously a form of confinement almost exclusively reserved 
for Loyalists.  German members of the Convention Army were allowed to stay in 
Virginia, with officers allowed parole within Frederick County, and privates confined to 
barracks near Winchester.39
 On 28 July 1781, a Congressional Committee reported that American prisoners in 
New York, primarily seamen captured aboard privateering vessels, continued to languish 
in terrible conditions.  The British intent, according to the report, was to encourage 
enlistments in the Royal Navy.  Congress considered such conditions tantamount to 
murder, and threatened reprisals against British prisoners if the conditions were not 
alleviated.40  To prevent American deserters from joining the enemy, Washington 
announced on 4 October 1781 that any captured in enemy lines at Yorktown would be 
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immediately hanged.41  Two weeks later, Congressional threats of POW reprisals gained 
new weight with the surrender at Yorktown of over seven thousand British and German 
prisoners under Lord Cornwallis.  Shortly after the surrender, Washington noted that the 
United States held a balance of prisoners sufficient to free all POWs held by the British, 
and recommended to Congress that the new supply of prisoners not be squandered on 
exchange for American privateers.42  He became annoyed when Congress publicly 
ordered him to create a full, general exchange of all prisoners, after secretly ordering that 
Cornwallis be held back from exchange.  This order forced Washington to either reveal a 
secret decision of Congress to the enemy or be accused of treating falsely regarding 
prisoner exchanges.43   
 Despite frequent threats of retaliation, actually punishing enemy prisoners for 
mistreatment of American prisoners proved extremely rare.  One exception was ordered 
on 3 December 1781, after the British authorities had ignored numerous complaints about 
the treatment accorded Henry Laurens, a former president of Congress.  After his capture 
at sea, Laurens was imprisoned in the Tower of London and threatened with execution 
for treason.  Congress was further infuriated by reports of American prisoners being 
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imprisoned in English dungeons.  The secretary of war was ordered to imprison British 
officers of high rank, including those on parole, and to send British prisoners to 
confinement in the notorious Simsbury mines, abandoned shafts used to house prisoners 
in horrid conditions.  All officers allowed to return to England on parole, Burgoyne 
included, were recalled to North America immediately.  Secretary of War Benjamin 
Lincoln also ordered all British enlisted POWs in America sent to Lancaster and 
Pennsylvania, to be placed in close confinement for the prevention of desertions and 
escapes.  German prisoners were allowed to remain in frontier towns, as they were 
considered much less of a security risk, and had proven much more tractable to their 
captors.44
 Congress ordered the massive retaliatory efforts to compel the British to exchange 
Laurens for Burgoyne.  Britain did not consider Burgoyne to be a prisoner of war, under 
the terms of the Convention of Saratoga, and in any event, Burgoyne had been allowed to 
return to England on parole.  Instead, the British government offered to exchange 
Cornwallis, still on parole in New York, for Laurens.  When the offer of Burgoyne for 
Laurens was rejected, Congress exempted Cornwallis from exchange in any form.45  It 
was unlikely that the British would ever agree to the Burgoyne-Laurens offer, because 
such an agreement would essentially force Britain to release Laurens and receive nothing 
in return.  Laurens assured his captors that Congress would agree to the offer of 
Cornwallis, and he was released from the Tower and allowed to assume ambassadorial 
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duties in London.  On 25 September 1782, Congress was notified that Laurens had 
negotiated for his own release, in exchange for Cornwallis, despite the express wishes of 
Congress.  Further, Benjamin Franklin, while serving as Minister to France, had agreed 
to the exchange, forcing Congress to choose between disavowing the power of its most 
famous citizen and reversing its threat to hold Cornwallis indefinitely.  Washington 
became incensed by the behavior of Congress, and demanded to know why Laurens had 
been released in Britain and allowed to resume his duties, while Cornwallis was expected 
to remain on parole.  In response, Congress asserted its authority to approve exchanges, 
but allowed the matter to drop, and Cornwallis was duly exchanged.46
 While the Laurens situation was being negotiated, Washington was again given 
the power to negotiate a cartel regarding prisoners, on 18 February 1782.  In this 
instance, Congress ordered Washington to seek a cartel of exchange which would include 
provisions regarding the safekeeping and treatment of all prisoners, land or sea, and to 
exchange captured citizens.  Naturally, Congress expected Washington to make another 
attempt to settle past POW accounts for the upkeep of enemy prisoners, however, all 
previous resolutions regarding exchange were repealed, meaning that Congress would no 
longer formally insist upon the payment of prisoner accounts before any general 
exchange.  In fact, Washington had virtually universal control over prisoner negotiations, 
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with the lone exception that Cornwallis could not be exchanged.  Political pressure 
regarding exchange continued to mount, with states clamoring for Congress to make a 
general exchange agreement, even if not on optimal terms.  To assist in the exchange 
negotiations, Congress announced a bounty of eight dollars for captured enemy deserters 
delivered to state control, to increase the available number of prisoners for exchange. 
States would pay the bounty to individuals, along with reasonable charges for upkeep and 
transportation, and secure the prisoners until reimbursed by Congress.  Washington asked 
Congress whether he should agree to exchange American sailors for British soldiers if 
doing so would cause Britain to settle past debts for prisoner upkeep.  He remained 
uncertain of the relative importance of financial concerns compared to rescuing 
Americans from captivity, in part because Congress seemed to shift its focus often.47
 To increase the efficiency of prisoner affairs, the activities of the commissary of 
prisoners and all his deputies were placed under the control of the secretary of war, who 
was also given direct control over the security and safekeeping of enemy prisoners.  This 
reassignment of the commissariat was necessary because other departments often failed 
to respond to requests made on behalf of prisoners.  In an effort to save expenses, 
Congress repealed all resolutions and appointments regarding the commissary prisoners 
in July, 1782, effectively disbanding the department altogether, although Washington was 
empowered to appoint a temporary commissary as necessary.48    
 Throughout 1782, Congress returned to the matter of American prisoners enlisting 
in the enemy’s forces.  In particular, a large number of American naval prisoners had 
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enlisted in the Royal Navy.  In a similar situation, many German prisoners had expressed 
a desire to enlist in the Continental Army, or at least remain within the United States after 
the war, and in the meantime hire themselves out as laborers near their confinement 
locations.  Washington felt German prisoners could prove useful to the army, and he 
urged the secretary of war to allow German prisoners to enlist for three years.  For their 
service, on 15 May 1782, Washington recommended a bounty of one hundred acres, 
received at the end of enlistment, and a guarantee of American citizenship.49  On 5 June 
1782, the secretary of war was authorized to recruit among German prisoners, with a 
bounty of eight dollars given to any new recruit.  The former prisoners were to be treated 
as any new recruit in all respects, and would be counted against state recruiting quota.  
Washington was given direct control of any prisoners successfully recruited, to place 
them as he saw fit.  While Germans were being granted new opportunities, on 7 June 
1782, the secretary of war was ordered to call in all British prisoners working with 
American citizens, and to cancel all future work permits.  Congress believed that the 
work program offered too many opportunities for escape.  Most German prisoners had 
proven disinterested in returning to British service, but many British escapees had 
successfully reached their lines and joined new regiments.50
 After canceling the work permits of all British prisoners, Congress again pressed 
demands for payment for POW upkeep costs.  If Britain refused to pay past subsistence 
bills, the secretary of war was authorized to reduce rations given to enemy prisoners, 
although prisoners were to be kept healthy.  Congress also planned to reduce any other 
costs associated with enemy prisoners, where possible.  Washington was ordered to make 
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a final demand for payment to Sir Guy Carleton, in New York, although Congress 
considered it unlikely that Britain would reverse its course and pay the demanded sums.  
Washington was re-authorized to make any partial exchanges, but no general officers 
were to be exchanged by composition.51
 Just two weeks after revoking the parole of all prisoners and canceling work 
permits, Congress reversed itself and again opened the possibility of employing British 
prisoners.  On 21 June 1782, Congress created a new POW labor system, designed to 
reduce escapes by relying upon the financial interests of employers.  Any British prisoner 
could be hired, if the prospective employer deposited twenty French guineas into the 
Bank of North America.  At the end of six months, the POW could sign an oath of 
allegiance and become a citizen of the state of his choice.  Any prisoner who wished to 
labor but not obtain citizenship could hire himself out for a duration of one year, with a 
bond of forty French guineas paid by the employer.  Congress hoped to reduce the costs 
of prisoners by allowing them to hire themselves out and provide for their own upkeep, 
while using the employers to maintain the security of the prisoners.  By insisting on 
foreign currency, Congress could avoid the problems associated with wartime inflation, 
and increase the supply of specie available for Congressional expenditures.52
 In many locations, employers ignored prohibitions against hiring enemy 
prisoners.  Deputy commissaries of prisoners were court-martialed in York, Lancaster, 
and Reading, Pennsylvania for allowing British prisoners to work without a bounty paid 
by the employers.  On 3 July 1782, Congress concluded that any work programs would 
lead to additional enemy escapes, but no plan existed to reduce the problem.  For this 
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reason, the secretary of war was again ordered to recall all British prisoners and place 
them in close confinement.  On 11 December 1782, another new labor policy was 
created, requiring a bond of one hundred pounds in Pennsylvania currency for any 
prisoner to be employed.  Employers were also required to pay four dollars per month to 
the government, in addition to any wages paid to the prisoner, for the privilege of hiring 
any enemy POWs.53   
 Through the end of 1782 and the first half of 1783, Congress considered the idea 
of a general exchange of prisoners.  In July 1782, Congress announced it was always 
prepared for a general exchange on just terms.  At that time, the United States held more 
prisoners than the enemy, and thus a complete exchange could be an appealing 
proposition for the British.  However, the legislature undertook negotiations to free all 
American prisoners on a man-for-man basis, rather than a complete exchange of all 
prisoners.  Congressmen blamed the failure of negotiations for complete exchange on 
“the predetermination of Sir Henry Clinton to regain his captive soldiers, without regard 
to the enormous debt which had accrued and is daily increasing for their subsistence.”  
Congressional negotiators also recognized that Britain “is now disabled by the loss of a 
veteran army which cannot easily be replaced.”  By retaining the extra British prisoners, 
Congress might force a British payment for the subsistence of prisoners.54     
After exchanging all American land forces in British hands for British soldiers, 
Washington proposed to Carleton an exchange of British soldiers for American sailors, 
with the caveat that British soldiers exchanged for sailors would not be eligible to serve 
in any capacity for twelve months.  Washington argued that captured privateers in British 
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hands were not directly engaged in the public service, and would not necessarily return to 
their previous activities.  On the other hand, British soldiers, if exchanged, could be 
employed immediately in North America, or sent to aid operations in the West Indies, 
hurting the interests of American allies.  Naturally, Washington attached a demand for 
subsistence repayments prior to the repatriation of British prisoners.  Not surprisingly, 
Carleton refused the conditions offered by Washington, but did agree to appoint 
commissioners to negotiate a general cartel.55   
  Washington named representatives to meet with the British emissaries, but the 
general cartel meeting was a dismal failure, in large part because the British 
commissioners were not given the power to bind Great Britain to any agreement beyond 
equal exchanges of prisoners, and again refused to even discuss the matter of subsistence 
accounts.  As a result, on 16 October 1782, Congress again ordered all partial exchanges 
to cease, and directed the secretary of war to further reduce the costs of upkeep for enemy 
prisoners in any way possible.56  Rather than a general cartel providing for the exchange 
for all prisoners, the commission could only agree to release all captured medical and 
clerical personnel, and make them exempt from capture in the future.57  Shortly after the 
failure of the cartel commission, Congress ignored its own dictates, and asked 
Washington to obtain the exchange of two American officers on 5 November.58  Carleton 
was displeased by the failure of the cartel commission, and blamed the failure on the 
American negotiators’ insistence upon repayment of subsistence debts.  Washington 
described Carleton’s response of 3 November as having “used an asperity of language so 
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much the reverse of his preceding correspondence that many regard it as portending a 
revival of the war against the U.S.”  He forwarded Carleton’s letter to Congress, and 
included the suggestion that the United States should be more flexible in its demands.59 
On 18 February 1783, Congress relented and renewed Washington’s power to effect 
exchanges when convenient.  For the first time in the war, Congress also granted the 
power to make exchanges to the secretary of war, in the belief that a different 
representative might have greater success in negotiations with Britain.60
 In March of 1783, the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania petitioned 
Congress to liberate all Pennsylvanians held by the British.  The Congressional response 
pointed out the logistical complications, particularly given the American practice of 
exchanging prisoners by date of capture rather than by state of origin.61  Despite the 
practical difficulties, in April of 1783 Congress extensive debated a proposal to free all 
enemy prisoners without exchanging them for Americans.  Certain members of Congress 
believed the war was effectively over, and that housing and feeding enemy prisoners was 
a waste of funds.  They argued that the ratification of the provisional peace treaty, which 
included the release of prisoners by each side, mandated that the United States release its 
captives.  Other representatives pointed out the potential security hazards inherent in a 
proposal to release thousands of enemy troops with no conditions upon the release.  After 
two days, Congress decided that releasing all enemy POWs was premature and 
inadvisable.  The primary argument against a general release of prisoners was economic:  
releasing the prisoners would probably reduce the impact of reimbursement demands 
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presented to the British peace commissioners.62  With the ratification of the Treaty of 
Paris, all prisoners held by both sides were freed.  In an incident that summarizes the 
entire POW experience of the war, on 1 July 1783, Washington wrote an extensive 
apology to Lieutenant Theodore Gebhard of Brunswick, explaining that Gebhard and the 
prisoners under his command had been liberated months earlier, but not notified of the 
change in their status.63  Gebhard’s situation illustrates the fact that even after all of the 
negotiations for exchange and demands for POW lists, the American system was still so 
disorganized that it could overlook an entire unit of enemy prisoners. 
 The American prisoner of war policy of the Revolutionary War was a constantly 
changing series of orders from Congress, often completely ignored by the individuals and 
states tasked with their implementation.  The system often functioned poorly, and any 
efforts made to utilize prisoners for any purpose other than exchange proved mostly 
counterproductive.  Throughout the war, humanitarian and economic concerns clashed, 
and together worked to ensure that exchanges were limited, unequal, and extremely time-
consuming.  Enemy prisoners endured difficult conditions while in captivity, but were 
not subjected to worse circumstances than the members of the American military in the 
field.  There were certainly inequalities in the system, but for the most part, enemies were 
well treated.  The United States had lived up to Washington’s decision to treat prisoners 
with decency and humanity, and at no time did the conditions employed by the United 
States approach the horrors of captivity reported by prisoners of the British.  Although 
the methods were improvised, all of the goals of Congress and Washington with regard to 
POW policy were eventually achieved, at least in part due to the influence of prisoner 
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negotiations, and while the prisoner issue did not determine the outcome of the war, the 
sheer number of prisoners taken by the United States influenced the British decision to 
end the war.  The American military almost completely forgot the lessons learned about 
POW policy, including how to house, feed, and maintain the health of prisoners.  In the 
three decades between the Treaty of Paris and the new outbreak of war with Britain in 
1812, the experiences of prisoners during the Revolution were left behind.  The result 
was that at the beginning of the War of 1812, POW policies had to again be created 
anew, and in many cases the early mistakes of the Revolution were repeated in the later 
war.   
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CHAPTER III 
THE FIRST DECLARED WAR:  THE WAR OF 1812 
As the first declared war fought by the United States, the War of 1812 forced the 
creation of a cohesive policy for dealing with captured enemies.  Prior to the outbreak of 
war, no formal international law existed that governed the capture and maintenance of 
prisoners of war.1  Rather, most nations formed their prisoner policies based primarily 
upon expediency or arrangements created after the outbreak of hostilities.  The conduct 
of American military forces was governed by articles of war approved 10 April 1806, but 
the articles made no mention of POW treatment.2  Anthony Dietz argued that the greatest 
significance of the War of 1812 regarding prisoners was the fact that both the British and 
American governments tailored their policies to fit agreements made during the war.3  In 
reality, the United States improvised practices throughout the war with little thought to 
international law, beyond the threat of retaliation for the mistreatment of American 
POWs. 
Like earlier and subsequent American conflicts, POW practice during the war was 
largely improvised by the federal government and the army.  Participants in the war were 
too far removed from the Revolution to personally remember the practices of the earlier 
war, and the virtual dissolution of the peacetime army in the intervening decades meant 
that the lessons of the Revolutionary War would have to be relearned in the latter 
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conflict.  One of the most rapid and important changes during the war was the 
centralizing of POW operations.  Other issues included the  employment of prisoner of 
war labor, the concentration of prisoners, and the refusal to repatriate POWs against their 
will at the end of the war.  Local American commanders created a strict policy of 
retaliation for the mistreatment of American prisoners held by enemy forces.  Each of 
these topics played an important role in shaping American POW policy for the next two 
centuries.   
British practice in the War of 1812 was similar to the Revolution, and Great 
Britain, which had been engaged in war on the European continent for much of the 
preceding decade, was able to incorporate American prisoners into a prison system that 
already held seventy thousand French prisoners by 1812.  During the war, American 
policy developed to address many specific issues, including the use of native allies, the 
role of captured privateers, and the status of slaves taken by the enemy.   
Despite the large number of prisoners taken relative to the size of the armies 
engaged, and the importance of the POW question to the eventual peace treaty, most 
works discussing the War of 1812 see the POW problem as a minor issue, if it is 
discussed at all.  Often, prisoner issues are lumped into discussions of the British practice 
of impressments, despite the fact that impressed seamen were not considered prisoners of 
war, and captured enemies were never impressed into the Royal Navy.4  Many of the 
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standard works on the war completely ignore POW issues.  One significant exception is 
Donald Hickey’s The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, which devotes nearly a chapter 
to POW issues, and provides a detailed summary of major events in prisoner negotiations 
and retaliatory measures, but does not address the overall American policy regarding 
captured enemies.5   
One of the problems faced by the United States in the War of 1812 was the 
sizeable percentage of Americans in 1812 who had been born in Great Britain.  Just as 
many Americans during the Revolution had maintained loyalty to the British crown, 
American leaders were faced with the possibility of a large “fifth column” within the 
United States.  A system was quickly instituted to keep track of the numerous “British 
subjects,” loosely defined as any recent immigrant to the United States, or any individual 
who had not renounced British citizenship.  United States Marshals of every military 
district received orders to complete pre-printed forms, sent for the same purpose, to 
individually identify and maintain a watch over these potentially disloyal citizens.  The 
forms, serving as a rudimentary form of visa, included a physical description of each 
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subject, his or her location, and a provision that the document required renewal on a 
monthly basis for the duration of the war.6
 According to English common law in 1812, all individuals born as British 
subjects remained so for the duration of their lifetime, regardless of residence or any 
naturalization processes in other territories.  Thus allegiance was set at birth, and could 
not be changed under any circumstances.  By this reasoning, any Irish immigrants to the 
United States who took an active part in the war were guilty of treason against the crown.  
The American position was that a naturalized citizen was equal to the same legal 
protections as a native-born citizen, and all naturalized Americans were free of any legal 
obligations to their birthplace.7  The issue was certainly important, given the large 
number of sailors upon American vessels who were not born within the United States.8
Impressment presented a significant problem for U.S. merchant shipping prior to 
the war.  The Royal Navy sought to reclaim British deserters serving on American ships 
by stopping and searching American vessels at will.  As many as 25,000 British citizens 
served on American merchant ships in the early 19th century.  Estimates of impressments 
suggest that up to 6,000 sailors were removed from U.S. merchant ships in the decade 
                                                 
6 Both unused and used forms of this type can be found in Box 18, Entry 127, RG 94, 
National Archives.  The forms were used with varying success by individual marshals, 
some of whom took no interest in the matter, while others kept very meticulous records. 
7 For a more thorough discussion of the British argument, and the American legal 
response, see Ralph Robinson, “Retaliation for the Treatment of Prisoners in the War of 
1812,” American Historical Review 49 (October 1943): 65-70; Rising Lake Morrow, 
“The Early American Attitude Toward Naturalized Americans Abroad,” American 
Journal of International Law 30 (October 1936): 647-63. 
8 In a case study of naval vessels at New York Station, Christopher McKee has found that 
more than half of the enlisted personnel in January of 1808 were not born in the United 
States.  Christopher McKee, “Foreign Seamen in the United States Navy: A Census of 
1808,” William and Mary Quarterly 42 (July 1985): 383-93. 
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prior to the war.9  It is certain that some American sailors were mistaken for deserters 
and forcibly taken into the Royal Navy.  The most notorious incident regarding 
impressments occurred on 22 June 1807, when the HMS Leopard demanded to search the 
USS Chesapeake.  When the Chesapeake refused to submit to the search, the Leopard 
opened fire, forcing the American ship to surrender.  After a thorough search of the ship, 
four sailors were taken from the Chesapeake as deserters.  In 1811, two of the sailors 
were returned to the U.S. after almost four years of captivity.  Of the other two sailors 
taken, one, a British sailor, was executed for desertion, and the other, an American, died 
in a hospital in Halifax.  The Chesapeake-Leopard Affair incited popular support for a 
war against Britain, and was a major precipitating factor in the conflict.10
 Prior to the outbreak of war, sailors from the U.S. and Britain often shifted 
allegiances.  During the war, they were routinely offered the opportunity to switch sides 
rather than become a prisoner of war.  On May 17, 1813, Colonel Thomas Barclay, 
British agent for prisoners of war, complained to Stephen Decatur that some British 
                                                 
9 Hickey, War of 1812, 11-16.  For a discussion of the diplomatic importance of the 
affair, see Anthony Steel, “Impressment in the Monroe-Pinkney Negotiation, 1806-
1807,” American Historical Review 57 (January 1952): 352-69.  See also Lawrence S. 
Kaplan, “Jefferson, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Balance of Power,” William and Mary 
Quarterly 14 (April 1957): 196-217. 
10 For more detailed discussions of impressments and the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, 
consult Daniel A. Frater, “Impressment in the 18th Century Anglo-American World” 
(Master’s thesis, Queens College, New York, 1995); Scott Thomas Jackson, 
“Impressment and Anglo-American Discord, 1787-1818” (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Michigan, 1976); David Scott Thompson, “‘This Crying Enormity’: Impressment as a 
Factor in Anglo-American Foreign Relations” (Master’s thesis, Portland State University, 
1993); and James F. Zimmerman, Impressment of American Seamen (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1966).  Bradford Perkins has argued that the actual number 
of British sailors aboard the Chesapeake may have been as high as 150.  Bradford 
Perkins, “George Canning, Great Britain, and the United States, 1807-1809,” American 
Historical Review 63 (October 1957): 4; Anthony Steel, “Anthony Merry and the Anglo-
American Dispute about Impressment, 1803-6,” Cambridge Historical Journal 9, no. 3 
(1949): 331-51. 
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prisoners had taken service upon American ships.  Barclay remarked, “It is unnecessary, I 
feel assured, for me to make any remarks on the impropriety of one nation taking the 
prisoners of war, subjects of another nation into its service.”11 Decatur’s somewhat 
bemused reply noted that this was not within his jurisdiction but he also pointed out 
“after the crew of the United States late Brig Nautilus were on board the Africa as 
prisoners of war many of them were tampered with & solicited to enter the British service 
& that five of them were actually entered & employed.”12  Decatur then referred Barclay 
to the offices of John Mason, the American Commissary General of Prisons and 
Prisoners. 
During the War of 1812 American forces captured a total of 15,508 British 
prisoners.  Only 5,765 of these prisoners were taken on land, most of them by the United 
States Army and the militia which supported it.  The great majority of the land captives 
were taken on the Canadian frontier, although a substantial number of prisoners were 
taken at Fort George, New York in 1813 and at New Orleans in 1815.  The remaining 
9,743 prisoners were captured aboard ships: 1,485 on the Great Lakes; 2,905 at sea by 
public vessels; and 4,842 by privateers.  A remarkable number of British prisoners were 
described in naval records as “retaken in Am. ship,” suggesting that they were captured 
while manning prizes taken by British ships.  Of particular interest was the decision to 
turn all naval prisoners over to the control of the army.13  Although the War Department 
                                                 
11 Thomas Barclay to Stephen Decatur, 17 May 1813, Doct. # 4, Box 12, Entry 127, RG 
94.  Barclay complained that British prisoners served aboard several American ships, 
some of which were vessels of war. 
12 Stephen Decatur to Thomas Barclay, New York, 21 May 1813, Doct. #4, Box 12, 
Entry 127, RG 94. 
13 Although all prisoners were delivered to the control of the War Department, 
specifically the Commissary General of Prisons and Prisoners, some of the most detailed 
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maintained less detailed records of prisoners captured, a compilation of prisoners 
captured at sea and on land near the Canadian frontier is still in existence.  This roster 
contains less individualized information than the final Navy version, but it serves the 
useful purpose of confirming much of the data from the naval records.14
 After the disastrous Battle of Queenston Heights on 13 October 1812, a large 
number of American personnel were taken prisoner, including then-Lieutenant Colonel 
Winfield Scott.  The men were placed upon boats to Halifax, the central British prisoner 
of war depot in Canada.  During the trip, British officers mingled with the American 
captives and singled out those with a distinct Irish accent.  Twenty-three men were pulled 
from the American prisoners, to be sent to England to face trial for treason.  Arguments 
and appeals to the contrary were useless, including those presented by the ranking 
American, Scott.  The plight of these “Irish traitors” occupied Scott’s thoughts for the 
remainder of the war, and he used all of his influence in an attempt to win their freedom, 
or at the very least save them from the gallows.15  Scott was released on parole, and 
immediately informed Secretary of War John Armstrong of the plight of the prisoners.  
                                                                                                                                                 
records of British prisoners taken during the war can be found in records maintained by 
the Navy Department.  Unlike the Army, the Navy preserved a complete list of all British 
POWs held in the United States, compiled in 1818 using the scattered records which 
existed at the time.  A two-volume list of prisoners was created, organized by the first 
letter of the prisoner’s last name.  Each entry contained the prisoner’s full name, when 
and where the prisoner was captured, where the prisoner was held, his rank and unit, the 
capturing unit, and the date and method of disposal.  Navy Department, “Register of 
British POWs in the United States, July 1812—March 1815, v. 1,” Entry 402, RG 45, 
National Archives. 
14 Navy Department, “Military & Naval Prisoners Canadian Frontier,” Doct. # 300, Box 
18, Entry 127, RG 94.  This roster contains the name, rank, unit, capturing party, date of 
capture, custody location, and manner of disposal for each prisoner, and is organized in a 
vaguely alphabetical fashion. 
15 Winfield Scott to the Secretary of War, 30 January 1813, Doct. # 10, Box 1, Entry 
127A, RG 94. 
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On 2 July 1813, Sergeant Henry Kelly, one of the Irish-Americans singled out, 
complained to Armstrong about the mistreatment the twenty-three men had suffered and 
included a list of grievances held by the prisoners and a roster of the men involved.16  
 On 1 May 1813, Armstrong ordered Major General John Dearborn, commanding 
American forces on the Niagara frontier, to hold twenty-three British soldiers as hostages 
for the safety of the accused Irish traitors.  These prisoners were confined at Greenbush 
Cantonment, New York.  A list of the hostages was quickly forwarded to the British, in 
the interest of preserving the safety of any prisoners belonging to American forces.17  
The predictable British response was to place forty-six American officers in close 
confinement against the safety of British officers held as hostages.  In an almost comical 
series of events, each side escalated, placing more officers and enlisted personnel into 
confinement as hostages.18  Neither the United States nor Great Britain showed any sign 
of compromise about the being held as hostages until the American agent for prisoners in 
                                                 
16 Henry Kelly to John Armstrong, 2 July 1813, Doct. # 24, Box 1, Entry 127B, RG 94. 
17 Navy Department, “List of 23 British Soldiers held by the United States of America, as 
Hostages for 23 American Soldiers sent to England for trial,” n.d, Doct. # 298, Box 18, 
Entry 127, RG 94.  See also Navy Department, “List of 39 British officers, Prisoners of 
War,” 28 February 1814, Doct. # 299, Box 18, Entry 127, RG 94.  By the time this list 
had been made, four officers had already escaped custody.  Navy Department, 
“Descriptive List of Twenty Three Hostages, British Prisoners of War to the United 
States,” 12 August 1814, no doct. #, Box 18, Entry 127, RG 94.  This contains physical 
descriptions and biographical data for each hostage prisoner. 
18 One such confinement order issued by the British is found in George Glasgow to 
Winchester, 29 October 1813, no doct. #, Box 19, Entry 127, RG 94.  This particular 
order placed 46 officers and NCOs into close confinement as hostages against the safety 
of 23 British soldiers in similar confinement.  Not all of the hostages were forced to 
remain in close confinement.  Officers of both sides were often allowed to give their 
parole in exchange for a certain degree of liberty, most commonly remaining under house 
arrest.  “Sworn statement of Brigadier General William H. Winder to remain in a certain 
house and area of Beaufort,” 17 December 1813, Doct. # 295, Box 18, Entry 127, RG 94.  
Other such statements exist for officers of lower ranks at the same location, and were 
usually dependent upon the attitude of the confining officer.  Similar considerations were 
given to British officers held by American captors. 
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London, Reuben G. Beasley, informed Secretary of State James Monroe that the Irish 
captives were treated in the same manner as all other American prisoners.  Beasley’s 
letter was received 27 June 1814, and prompted Monroe to send Colonel Tobias Lear to 
meet with Colonel Edward Baynes to finalize a new exchange agreement, by which the 
hostages held by each side were returned to their normal POW status, eventually paroled 
and returned to their homelands.19  Twenty-one Irish captives returned to the United 
States on 9 July 1815; the remaining two prisoners died while in captivity.20
 Despite the mutual decision to release hostages from close confinement, some 
prisoners remained held in such a manner.  On 9 August 1814, Barclay informed Mason 
that several British officers still held as hostages were expected to be made available for 
exchange.  Barclay warned that “double the number of American Prisoners will once 
more be placed in a similar state of confinement in retaliation for these men” if they were 
not made immediately available.21  Despite efforts by both sides to ameliorate the 
conditions of captivity, the threat of retaliation remained constant for both sides.  
 On 28 September 1814, Mason wrote James Prince, the marshal of Massachusetts 
charged with maintaining British prisoners in that state, that 100 American seamen and 
59 American soldiers had been deported to England from Canadian prisons on the charge 
                                                 
19 American State Papers: Foreign Relations, 3:726-30.  Well after the conclusion of the 
war, the issue of the “Irish traitors” remained unsettled.  In a brief letter to Winfield 
Scott, Stephen Pleasanton of the Treasury Department vowed that if the men taken for 
trial by Great Britain had not received the rations due to all prisoners by the Cartel of 12 
May, the Treasury Department would seek redress for the prisoners in question from the 
government of Great Britain.  General Scott was assured that the topic would be 
introduced at the upcoming conference to discuss the costs associated with prisoner 
upkeep on each side.  Stephen Pleasanton to Winfield Scott, 11 July 1817, Doct. # 185, 
Box 10, Entry 127, RG 94. 
20 Robinson, “Retaliation,” 69-70. 
21 Thomas Barclay to John Mason, 9 August 1814, Doct. # 3, Box 12, Entry 127, RG 94. 
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of being English subjects.  In the same letter, Mason ordered Prince to place six British 
naval officers and ten sailors into extremely close confinement in retaliation for British 
confinement of the officers and crew of a privateering vessel.22    
 Near the end of the first year of war, British and American representatives met to 
discuss prisoners of war.  Both sides argued that the conditions faced by prisoners of war 
would be best ameliorated by a policy of rapid exchange of prisoners.  American and 
British representatives held a conference at Halifax to discuss an exchange of captured 
naval personnel.  The agreement was signed 28 November 1812, and allowed a complete 
exchange of all prisoners captured at sea.  The Halifax negotiations served as the basis 
for a broader agreement.  In early 1813, representatives of each government met again, at 
American insistence, to discuss prisoners taken in land engagements.  The American 
representative at the meeting was Commissary General of Prisons and Prisoners Jon 
Mason, while Great Britain was represented by Barclay.  Because of the success of the 
naval exchange, the new discussions were expected to rapidly conclude. 
 After weeks of negotiation, the Cartel for the Exchange of Prisoners of War, often 
called the Cartel of 12 May 1813, was signed by Barclay and Mason.  The simple 
provisions of the Cartel concerned only the welfare of prisoners of war.  The first article 
stated that all prisoners, regardless of where captured, would be treated “with humanity 
conformable to the usage and practise of the most civilized nations during war.”  All 
prisoners were to be exchanged on a rank-for-rank or equivalency basis without delay.  
                                                 
22 John Mason to James Prince, 28 September 1814, Doct. # 34, Box 19, Entry 127, RG 
94. 
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Rank equivalencies were provided for all conceivable prisoners held by either side.23  
The system was adapted for naval use, and it was considered acceptable to exchange 
naval personnel for land forces, a major departure from Revolutionary War practices.24  
The estimated values of personnel greatly differ from the Revolutionary War, with the 
values given to high-ranking officers significantly reduced.  These alterations made 
exchanges considerably easier. 
 In theory, the new exchange equivalency system should have worked extremely 
well, particularly when compared to the older practice of rank-for-rank exchanges.25  The 
emphasis upon exchange within the Cartel of 12 May should have created a system 
capable of returning captured troops in a short period of time.  In reality, however, the 
system proved unworkable, largely due to the inefficiency of the men appointed as agents 
of exchange, and the slow bureaucratic methods of keeping accurate records of each 
prisoner and his exchange.   
Despite its functional problems, the table of equivalencies remained an unchanged 
part of American prisoner of war policy through the Civil War, when the last non-
battlefield, routine exchanges of prisoners involving the United States occurred.  Records 
pertaining to the War of 1812 contain hundreds of exchange accounts, typified by the 
                                                 
23 “Cartel for the exchange of prisoners of war between Great Britain and the United 
States of America,” 12 May 1813, Doct. # 190, Box 10, Entry 127, RG 94.The rank 
equivalencies established by the Cartel were as follows:  Commanding General, 60 
enlisted men; Major General, 40 men; Brigadier General, 20 men; Colonel, 15 men; 
Lieutenant Colonel, 10 men; Major, 8 men; Captain, 6 men; Lieutenant, 4 men; NCO’s, 2 
men, and enlisted personnel on a man-for-man basis. 
24 “Equivalent Rank according the the Cartel of the 12th of May,” Doct. # 43, Box 18, 
Entry 127, RG 94.  This item, a small card, appears to have been a reference sheet for 
American officers who might be in a situation allowing an exchange. 
25 Captures at sea, Detroit, and Queenston quickly gave the British a numerical advantage 
in prisoners held which was maintained throughout the war.  Annals of Congress, 13th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1804-07. 
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exchange of Scott and twenty-one other American officers, on 22 December, 1812 for 
three British officers, 15 non-commissioned officers, and 141 privates.26  Scott’s 
exchange demonstrated the utility of converting the value of each rank to a single 
commodity.  Small-scale exchanges were common, but mass paroles of regulars were 
unusual during the war, as each side typically held prisoners for exchange via a formal 
cartel.  The slow speed of communications, coupled with the large number of prisoners 
and considerable variety of locations in which they were kept led to great difficulty in 
maintaining accurate records of British prisoners of war.  Further complicating the issue 
was the number of individuals released at sea, and those who were never properly 
registered with a district marshal or a British sub-agent for prisoners of war.27
 According to the Cartel, any warship commander could approach a prisoner depot 
under flag of truce and demand an exchange of prisoners.  If a certain prisoner was 
demanded, he could not be held back without good and sufficient cause for such 
detention.  Lists of prisoners were to be prepared and exchanged by the agents for 
prisoners at each depot, to facilitate the exchange process.28  The only provision for 
                                                 
26 John Graham, “Account of the Exchange,” 22 December 1812, Doct. # 322, Box 19, 
Entry 127, RG 94.  In the exchange, the Americans consisted of one brigadier general, 
three colonels, four lieutenant colonels, one major, ten captains, one lieutenant, and two 
second lieutenants, for a total rank equivalency of 185 privates.  The exchanged British 
consisted of three lieutenants, nine sergeants, six corporals, two drummers, and 139 
privates, for an equal exchange value.  
27 George Barton to John Mason, 10 December 1814, no doct. #, Box 2, Entry 127, RG 
94.  Barton, an appointed agent of the British government, requested that Mason loan his 
office the returns of all district marshals under Mason to create a master list of all 
prisoners taken throughout the war.  Such a master list was not finished until May 9, 
1818, and was completed under the direction of the Navy Department.  For orders 
regarding the creation of the list, see T. T. Gantle, “Copy of Circular to the Marshals of 
the United States,” 22 August 1815, Doct. # 38, Box 1, Entry 127A, RG 94, and R. Rush, 
“Circular,” 8 May 1817, Doct. # 40, Box 1, Entry 127A, RG 94. 
28 “Cartel for the exchange of prisoners,” Articles 8-13, quotation is from Article 8. 
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stopping exchanges was in Article 14, which stated, “If either nation shall at any time 
have delivered more prisoners than it has received, it is optional with such nation to stop 
sending any more prisoners on credit until a return shall be made equal in number to the 
balance so in advance.”29   
 Specific exchange locations were agreed upon by each side, and cartel ships 
flying flags of truce were to be allowed into the designated harbors for the purpose of 
exchanges.  The expenses of cartel ships were generally shared between the American 
and British governments.  The standard rule of conflict was that the nation receiving its 
captured soldiers would bear the costs of their return, although the actual practice often 
relied upon agreements for individual ships.  One example was a proposal from Mason to 
Barclay to exchange via cartel all American prisoners at Halifax taken in Quebec for an 
equivalent number of British prisoners taken in Canada.  The British were to outfit a 
vessel and transport the Americans to Salem, Massachusetts, where the British vessel 
would receive British prisoners and supplies at the expense of the American government.  
In the same letter, Mason suggested an exchange of prisoners from the vicinity of New 
Orleans for those held by the British in Nassau, with the two governments equally 
splitting all of the expenses incurred.30
 Cartel ships required a great deal of preparation prior to embarkation, 
consequently each side was well aware of when and where a cartel was due.  Individuals 
used this knowledge to request the inclusion of certain individuals on board particular 
cartel ships.  The motivation and reasoning behind each request varied greatly, but almost 
                                                 
29 “Cartel for the exchange of prisoners,” Article 14. 
30 John Mason to Thomas Barclay, 10 November 1813, Doct. # 88, Box 17, Entry 127, 
RG 94. 
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all were granted “in the spirit of decency and common humanity.”31  At times, each side 
attempted to keep certain individuals, usually officers considered exceptionally effective.  
Sir George Prevost’s subordinates advised him not to exchange William Winder, an 
extraordinarily skilled commander whose services to the United States would prove 
invaluable.   
Officers received preferential treatment for exchange.  Dozens of letters were 
exchanged between Mason and Barclay proposing individual exchanges of certain 
officers.  Typically, one or the other would send a list of officers he wished exchanged, 
and ask for the demands of the other side in exchange.  By the end of 1813, the system 
had engendered sufficient trust that Mason felt comfortable requesting the release of 
Samuel Cooper Hixon from his parole without providing an exchange.  On December 22, 
1813, Mason asked Barclay “simply to discharge from parole a released man on 
credit.”32     
 The Cartel carefully defined prisoners and the manner of their confinement.  Only 
combatants in the direct service of the enemy nation could be held as prisoners of war.  
All non-combatants, including medical and religious personnel, as well as passengers on 
merchant ships, all females, and boys under twelve years of age were to be released 
immediately without any exchange value.  Early in the war, captures of vessels at sea 
                                                 
31 Thomas William Moore to John Graham, 17 February 1813, Doct. # 77, Box 18, Entry 
127, RG 94, has an example of such a request, in this case hoping that Lieutenant 
Heyman, confined in Petersbugh, Virginia, could be sent to Bermuda via a the cartel ship 
Bostock, recently arrived in New York with 400 American prisoners for exchange.  
Another example is found in Thomas Barclay to John Mason, 7 December 1813, Doct. # 
82, Box 6, Entry 127, RG 94.  For a more uncommon example, see Joseph Bloomfield to 
Richard Bache, no doct. #, Box 5, Entry 127, RG 94, in which President Madison ordered 
the release of certain British officers to the nearest British outpost on Lake Champlain. 
32 John Mason to Thomas Barclay, 22 December 1813, Doct. # 93, Box 17, Entry 127, 
RG 94. 
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often included sailors from neutral nations, who were often released under the condition 
that they no longer serve in the enemy’s forces.33  In future captures, noncombatants 
were not to be imprisoned, but rather released as soon as possible.  Lawful prisoners were 
to be held at designated prisoner of war depots, limited to six locations in British territory 
and seven locations in the United States.34   
The Cartel also specified that each nation was to provide its captives a daily ration 
of one pound of beef or twelve ounces of pork, one pound of bread, and four ounces of 
peas, six ounces of rice, or a pound of potatoes to each man.  Each prisoner was also to 
receive a small allowance of vinegar and salt.  Each government was to clothe its own 
prisoners by appointing agents to oversee the needs of prisoners held by the enemy.35  A 
system of parole was included in the agreement, and each side swore that paroled 
prisoners would not be allowed to serve again in any capacity until a proper exchange 
had been completed.   
 To increase the number of British POWs, the U.S. offered a cash bounty for all 
prisoners of war brought in by privateers.  Prior to that time, most privateers released 
their captives on a neutral shore rather than bear the burden of their sustenance.  The 
bounty was first approved 3 August, 1813, and was for $25 per prisoner.  On 19 March, 
1814, the bounty was increased to $100 per prisoner, as the lower bounty had proven 
                                                 
33 In one interesting case, James Monroe wrote to the marshal of Boston requesting the 
discharge of five Russian sailors, who were taken on board the British merchant vessel 
the Mary and held captive in Boston.  Monroe ordered the marshal to deliver these 
unnamed sailors to the Russian Consul in exchange for a declaration of Russian 
citizenship for the men, to avoid any unpleasant consequences from the Russian empire.  
James Monroe to the Marshall of the U.S., 17 September 1812, Doct. # 4, Box 20, Entry 
127, RG 94. 
34 “Cartel for the exchange of prisoners,” Article 3. 
35 “Cartel for the exchange of prisoners,” Articles 5-7. 
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ineffective in producing substantial numbers of new captives.  The prisoners were to be 
delivered to a district marshal, whose receipt allowed the privateer captain to apply for 
the federal bounty.  Privateers applied to numerous offices in the hopes of obtaining 
bounties, but the most common recipient of bounty applications was Mason.36  Bounties 
were to be paid for any British sailors held as prisoners of war, but were expressly 
forbidden for any captured slaves, who were to be sold for the benefit of the privateer’s 
crew.37  Once a bounty was applied for, the application could not be withdrawn, as the 
United States was desperate for prisoners to balance the number taken by Great Britain.  
After applying for a bounty, privateers could not agree to a private ransom offer from 
their captives, and were thus encouraged to deliver as many prisoners as possible to the 
district marshals.38
 While the increased bounty turned captured British sailors into a valuable 
commodity, the bounty offer made no mention of standards of treatment.  The original 
bounty of $25 was not sufficient to offset the cost of maintaining prisoners on 
privateering vessels.  The $100 bounty made it fiscally possible for a privateering crew to 
profit by keeping prisoners.  The authority of the U.S. Navy and its regulations did not 
                                                 
36 For an example of such an application, see Winslow Lewis to John Mason, 23 
November 1814, no doct. #, Box 611, Entry 464A, RG 45, National Archives.  Lewis 
served in the capacity of “Agent for the private armed schooner David Porter,” in this 
case demanding $200 for the delivery of two prisoners.  See also J. Pleasonton to John 
Mason, 3 December 1814, no doct. #, Box 611, E 464A, RG 45, referring to receipts for 
nine prisoners delivered to different marshals, all captured by the privateer Sabine. 
37 John Mason to the Secretary of the Treasury, 17 December 1814, no doct. #, Box 611, 
Entry 464A, RG 45. 
38 John Mason to John Gooding, 6 December 1814, no doct. #, Box 611, Entry 464A, RG 
45.  Gooding, a lawyer, had requested Mason to release the brother of his client, David 
McCaughan, after having the vessel Sabine relinquish its claim to a bounty.  Mason 
refused the request, on the grounds that to grant it would force an American citizen to 
remain in captivity who could be exchanged for the prisoner. 
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extend over private vessels, and the treatment of British sailors by privateers varied 
widely and prompted numerous allegations of mistreatment.  One of the most notorious 
incidents, according to British prisoners confined aboard the prison ship at Charleston, 
occurred at the hands of the crew of the Decatur.  Upon capturing the Dominica, 
American sailors abused the crew of the British ship, confining them in irons on deck 
during many days of “wet weather,” refusing calls for quarter, and attacking individuals 
who had surrendered their arms.  The marshal of South Carolina investigated the affair, 
and many prisoners alleged inhumane treatment.  Interestingly, one prisoner testified that 
he could not have received better treatment at the hands of the Americans, “except to the 
plundering of the best part of my cloths [sic], money, my watch, gold chain, and 4 seals I 
have nothing to complain for.”  No record exists as to the results of the investigation, but 
it is unlikely that the alleged perpetrators received any punishment.39
 The great majority of British prisoners were held in camps scattered throughout 
the various states.  However, in a practice dating back to well before the American 
Revolution, both the British and the Americans also used prison ships.  The advantage of 
shipboard prisons revolved upon the ease of preventing escapes.  The United States relied 
primarily upon privately owned vessels for prison ships, leasing the ships on a daily or 
monthly basis.  As late as February, 1814, Michael McClary, the Marshal of New 
Hampshire, asked Mason if the prison ship at Portsmouth should be rented at two dollars 
                                                 
39 The allegations of mistreatment are found in Thomas Wake to William J. P. Nicholls, 
19 October 1813, Doct. # 311, Box 19, Entry 127, RG 94.  The positive testimony is 
found in the testimonial of E. K. Lindo, Charleston, 27 October 1813, no doct. #, Box 19, 
Entry 127, RG 94. 
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per day, or simply bought outright for the sum of $1200.40  Conditions on the ships 
varied: McClary noted that prisoners under his care had received bedding but not 
blankets, as he was unsure of his responsibilities for prisoner comforts.41   
 By sending prisoners to many locations, the United States prevented a British 
attempt to free a large number of prisoners with a single attack.  However, dispersing 
captives to a number of holding sites vastly increased the problem of security.  Prisoner 
escapes were often attempted, with varied results.  In one interesting case at Camp 
Scioto, Ohio, two British prisoners attacked a sentinel while attempting to escape their 
prison compound.  The sentinel shot and killed one of the attackers, and stabbed the other 
with his bayonet.  A court of inquiry was convened to investigate the death, hoping to 
forestall any British retaliation.  After two days of testimony the court determined that 
the sentinel had committed no offense by shooting James Price during an escape attempt.  
A copy of the trial record was forwarded to Mason, “that you may with the greater 
facility, be able to justify the act, if necessary to the British Government.”42   
 A particularly thorny problem arose due to the differing views held by Britain and 
the United States regarding slavery and the service of soldiers and sailors of African 
descent.  Although slavery remained legal in both Britain and the United States, the 
nature of slavery in each location was quite different.  Many sailors of African descent 
served in the Royal Navy, and as a result, no small number were captured by American 
forces.  The 124 men of African descent captured with British ships at sea were 
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maintained on separate lists from white sailors.  On the lists, 47 were noted as slaves and 
3 were specified as “mullattoes.”43   
Simultaneously, the British routinely raided the coastline of the United States, 
often capturing and retaining slaves.  Frequently slaves were offered an opportunity to 
serve in the Royal Navy, especially when slaves were captured by the British while 
taking an American vessel.  This de facto freeing of slaves by British captains infuriated 
slaveowners.  Furthermore, “the British officers in command at Halifax had separated 
from other prisoners, and refused to give up or exchange as prisoners of war, Slaves 
captured on the high seas in one of our vessels.”44  Mason charged that the British 
captains on the coastline of the United States “were in the constant habit of receiving the 
slaves of our citizens on board British ships of war.”45  These captains refused to return 
American “property” and tended to either employ the slaves aboard ship or transport 
them elsewhere in the British territories.  As a result, Mason ordered all deputy marshals 
to retain any slaves captured at sea, regardless of ownership, to hold back from exchange 
against the return of American-owned slaves.  Slaves captured by privateers, however, 
were ruled by Southern courts to be the property of the capturing vessel, and were sold as 
prizes for the enrichment of the crew.46
 To the eternal frustration of Mason and other American officials, slaves taken by 
the British were almost never returned, even after the end of hostilities.  According to 
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English law, slaves who set foot in England were immediately made free.  British 
authorities were unwilling to return freedmen to the status of slavery, regardless of 
American views on the matter.  Despite the inclusion in the Treaty of Ghent of a 
provision forbidding the carrying off of private property, slaves were not returned to 
American custody.  Eventually, the tsar of Russia offered to mediate the issue, and the 
final decision about slaves taken in the War of 1812 was made on 11 September 1822.  A 
claims board decided the average value of the slaves taken and a definitive list of missing 
slaves was made by American and British representatives.  Negotiations over reparations 
dragged on for several more years, with the British government agreeing to pay 
$1,204,960 by 1 August 1827, rather than return the freed slaves.  This amount was 
considerably less than that sought by American negotiators.47
Specific complaints regarding captured black seamen can be found in a letter 
from Barclay to Mason referring to earlier messages sent to Mason requesting the release 
of “16 Black men captured by the Holkar American Privateer and carried into New 
London.”48  Barclay also mentioned “some Black Persons, Passengers in the British 
Sloop Hussar, captured by an American Privateer, and then, and still Prisoners in 
Savannah, these are also Non-Combatants.”49  In Barclay’s opinion, each of the above 
groups of captives should have been freed by the Cartel of 12 May and allowed to leave 
American captivity at their earliest convenience.  After two weeks of inaction, Barclay 
again wrote to Mason, requesting the release of non-combatants, including “the four 
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black men who were manumitted by Mr. Dugan, and captured with Mr. Caruthers, 
particularly when you consider that a very large proportion of the American prisoners 
brought here in the Magnet were people of colour.”50
 Undoubtedly, the location where black prisoners were confined had a certain 
effect upon their treatment.  The Marshal of South Carolina, Morton Waring, was 
accused by a British agent for prisoners of war, James Dick, of treating black prisoners 
inhumanely.  In his own defense, Waring argued that the white British prisoners were the 
main source of difficulty in the prison, not the conduct of himself or the guards.  In 
Waring’s opinion, prisoners were to be kept “stirring as much as possible, this I knew 
would contribute to their health, Negroes in general are slothfully disposed,” thus the 
prisoners were ordered to undertake a number of mundane tasks, including cleaning the 
prison itself.  Furthermore, Waring stated, “Since the release of the white Prisoners of 
war, I have never had any communication with Mr. Dick as British Sub Agent.”  
Waring’s defense proved effective in court, as the Judge of the District of South Carolina, 
John Drayton, stated that Waring “is too much of a gentleman to use any such [harsh 
treatment] towards them [the prisoners].”51
 Another important aspect of the War of 1812 was the nature of the enemy forces.  
The United States and Great Britain each employed Native American allies in a form of 
quasi-coalition warfare.  However, the Indian allies had a much harsher view of how 
prisoners of war should be treated.  Those who survived to be taken prisoner by native 
                                                 
50 Thomas Barclay to John Mason, 19 July 1813, no doct. #, Box 6, Entry 127, RG 94. 
51 James Dick to Anthony Thomas Baker, 17 July 1815, Doct. # 30, Box 8, Entry 127, 
RG 94, and Morton A. Waring to John Mason, 24 August 1815, which includes South 
Carolina District Court finding of John Drayton, 24 August 1815, Doct. #31, Box 8, 
Entry 127, RG 94.   
 
 68
allies could expect harsh treatment: nine soldiers taken prisoner at Fort Dearborn on 15 
August 1812 complained they had “remained prisoners with the Indians upwards of nine 
months, suffering every hardship that human beings do endure from Cold, Hunger & 
Fatigue.”52  Robert Quimby notes that a group of American soldiers surrendered at the 
River Raisin near Frenchtown on 22 January 1813, with the understanding that all 
American POWs would be held by the British.  The non-ambulatory POWs were left 
under the “guard” of British native allies.  Some of these prisoners were killed outright, 
while others were placed in the Frenchtown villagers’ homes, which were subsequently 
set on fire by the native allies.  Approximately sixty American prisoners were killed in 
the “River Raisin Massacre.”53  Other Americans captured at the River Raisin proved 
more fortunate, and were ransomed from their Native American captors by the United 
States government.  Still other individuals were purchased by local inhabitants, with the 
intention of reimbursement.54     
Not surprisingly, the British and American forces chose to treat captured Native 
Americans differently than captured Caucasian troops of the enemy.  Even after the 
formal acceptance of the Cartel, the prisoner situation in the west depended upon the 
independent decisions of commanding officers.  In one interesting case, a white British 
army captain was captured while fighting with a unit of Native Americans.  Captain 
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Lorimier, who was held with the other members of his unit, announced to his captors that 
he was “un savage,” causing Brigadier General John Boyd, commander of Fort George, 
to decide “his treatment should be the same as the others.”55  Major General Francis 
Rottenburgh, the commanding general of the British Army of the Centre, complained that 
confining a British officer with his Native American troops was not an act of civilized 
warfare.  After Rottenburgh’s protest, Lorimier was moved to confinement with other 
British officers.56  
 Lorimer’s case was a small part of a series of letters between Boyd and 
Rottenburgh, in which Rottenburgh wished to exchange American and Indian prisoners 
for British soldiers and Indian ally prisoners held in the area.  However, Boyd notified 
Rottenburgh on 4 September 1813, “The powers with which I am vested do not extend to 
the exchange of prisoners of war.”57  The question of exchange rested with the President, 
the Secretary of State, or the commander of American forces in the field.  In the same 
letter, Boyd noted in regard to Indian prisoners, “They receive such treatment as the 
customs of war & the feelings of humanity dictate; and I cannot for one moment believe 
that any Americans in your possession will be placed in a situation likely to subject them 
to an usage that shall be in violation of both, & may lead to the most painful 
retaliation.”58  The ever-present threat of retaliation remained in the letters between 
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Rottenburgh and Boyd, and also certainly resonated in the minds of all officers and 
enlisted personnel so unfortunate as to be captured by the enemy.     
 The two men with the greatest impact upon American POW policy during the war 
were John Mason and Thomas Barclay.  Mason was the American Commissary General 
of Prisoners for almost the entire war, Barclay served as an agent for British prisoners for 
the first two years of the war.  They maintained a steady correspondence throughout the 
war, discussing issues of mutual importance in regard to the British troops confined 
within the United States.  The letters remained polite, but the men disagreed on virtually 
every aspect of POW treatment.  In particular, Barclay was infuriated by the American 
decision to spread captives to a very large number of locations, a decision which 
inevitably made his duties more difficult.  In a scathing letter to Mason, Barclay argued, 
regarding British prisoners, “they should be placed in regular established places, and not 
scattered over the whole United States, or permitted to go at large, or seduced into the 
American service.”59
 On 1 February 1814, Barclay submitted to Mason a list of proposed amendments 
to the Cartel of 12 May.  A major portion of the amendments revolved around the 
question of rations issued to prisoners of war by the capturing nation.  In his letter, 
Barclay reminded the United States of both the superior experience of Great Britain 
regarding prisoners of war, and also of the fact that the majority of British attention 
remained in Europe.  Barclay also accused the United States of moving too slowly to 
fulfill its commitments under the cartel. 60  Barclay stated that the British government had 
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shipped American prisoners to the United States in good faith immediately after signing 
the document, while the United States had used the same time to attempt the recruitment 
of British prisoners held in prison camps.61
Although Barclay and Mason’s relationship was for the most part amicable, 
American officials viewed the British agent with some suspicion throughout the war, 
quite possibly with good reason.  He was ordered to move from Harlem to Bladensburg 
in early 1814, to speed communications with the American government.  His home in 
Bladensburg was visited by a number of British officers during the Chesapeake 
campaign, and numerous sources have suggested that he provided whatever intelligence 
he possessed, in violation of his duties as agent for prisoners of war.  After being forced 
to move to Bladensburg, Barclay tendered his resignation as British Agent for Prisoners 
of War.  He was promptly replaced by George Barton, whose correspondence with 
Mason remained extremely cordial throughout the remainder of the war.  Barton 
remained in his position for only a few months, and the final situation requiring his direct 
intervention was the disposal of prisoners held after the Battle of New Orleans.  These 
prisoners, taken after the Treaty of Ghent had officially ended the war, remained in a 
form of diplomatic limbo for months, awaiting the decision of where and how they 
should be sent away from the United States.  Barton showed a great deal of concern for 
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the welfare of prisoners under his care, and remained calm in his letters to Mason, in 
spite of the extremely slow workings of American bureaucracy.62
 At all American prisoner depots, agents were appointed by the British to oversee 
the care of British POWs within the United States.  Similar positions were created to 
ensure the safety and good health of captured American troops held by the British.  These 
agents drew upon the capturing government for funds to clothe and provision their 
charges.  Each nation expected that the costs for prisoners would be included within any 
peace negotiations at the close of the war.  In reality, British agents often drew loans 
from individual Americans serving as marshals of posts holding prisoners.  These 
marshals were authorized to charge the U.S. government a commission of 2.5 percent on 
any sums advanced to British prisoners, an option used almost exclusively by officers.   
The government paid James Prince, the marshal of prisoners in Massachusetts, a net 
profit of over $4,800 from 1812 to 1814 for what amounted to a part-time career.  It 
requires very little imagination to understand why the secretary of war was inundated 
with requests for appointments to the position.  The most important qualification for the 
post was the ability to loan large sums of money to the bankrupt American government, 
which was often slow in repaying its debts.  According to the final accounting maintained 
in the records of the Treasury Department, as of 1 September 1815, Prince was due 
$92,674.52.63   
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Exacting payment from the United States government could become a very 
frustrating process for many of the marshals.  W. B. Irish, the marshal of Pittsburgh, 
repeatedly complained that he had received no money for the upkeep of British prisoners 
in his care, and noted that he had “frequently had to borrow 4 & 5 hundred dollars of my 
friends,” in addition to building a barracks for the guards and prisoners.64  The system for 
payment remained quite unclear, with marshals requesting payment from many sources, 
including Mason, Monroe, Armstrong, and occasionally President James Madison.  As 
Marshal Michael McClary of New Hampshire noted in one letter, “as the prisoners are 
now delivered over the cost of their maintenance and all other charges it is expected will 
be paid.”65  Not only had the marshal advanced funds to feed and house the prisoners, he 
had also paid the bounty authorized to privateer vessels to obtain the prisoners captured 
at sea and brought to Portsmouth.  This letter, like many others of its kind, went 
unanswered by Monroe or his staff.  By 30 April 1813, the owner of the ship, who had 
still not been paid, threatened to remove the ship from Portsmouth.  McClary’s financial 
woes continued for years, as late as 1817 he wrote to Stephen Pleasonton requesting 
payment for his services regarding British POWs.  Pleasonton disallowed half of the 
accounts forwarded by McClary, largely on the grounds that they represented double 
charges.  According to McClary, after the double charges were removed the government 
remained in his debt for over $865, almost three years after the end of the war.66
                                                 
64 W. B. Irish to John Mason, 10 April 1814, no doct. #, Box 8, Entry 127, RG 94. 
65 Michael McClary to James Monroe, 15 October 1812.  Doct. # 42; and Michael 
McClary to James Monroe, 27 November 1812; both in Box 15, Entry 127, RG 94. 
66 Michael McClary to Stephen Pleasonton, 17 November 1817, no doct. #, Box 15, Entry 
127, RG 94. 
 
 74
 Prince, McClary, Melville, and the other marshals illustrate a number of 
important points within the American prisoner of war policy.  The system of maintaining 
prisoners through the use of civilian agents allowed the military establishment to utilize 
its manpower on the battlefield rather than at the prison compound.  Prisoners in the War 
of 1812 were held in a number of different locations, preventing the possibility of a 
single swift British raid to free prisoners from American control.  However, at each 
location for prisoners, the POWs were held in a fairly close concentration.  This 
“concentrated dispersal” allowed American leaders to minimize the number of United 
States personnel needed to guard prisoners and lessened the impact upon local 
economies, while still spreading the British prisoners to a number of locations.67
 The requirements of confinement regarding British prisoners were fairly 
straightforward.  A list of “Rules and Regulations” posted at Frederick Town, Maryland 
on 14 September 1814 contained a list of guarantees by the American government, 
particularly that “The prisoners will receive kind treatment.”  In exchange, each prisoner 
was prohibited to “pass the limits prescribed him, but by permission of an officer of the 
guards.”  Furthermore, prisoners were banned the use of “abusive language, obscenity, 
disobedience of orders, drunkenness, fighting...and other acts of insubordination.”  The 
prisoners were ordered to rise daily at sunrise, to wash themselves and clean their 
barracks before breakfast.  The dinner meal was served daily at one o’clock, and the 
prisoners were to be in bed by seven o’clock.  The prisoners were allowed a certain 
degree of self-regulation, as they were allowed to “divide themselves into messes, as may 
be convenient and agreeable to them and shall designate one person as head of each 
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mess.”  Spiritous liquors were specifically forbidden to the prisoners without the explicit 
permission of the marshal.  Other regulations included a daily sick call, a provision that 
the prisoners would launder their own clothes twice per week, and a promise that “The 
Ear of the Marshal will be open to all reasonable complaints and remedy promptly 
afforded. . . . The unreasonable will be disappointed.”68
 Guard regulations at Frederick Town were also clearly enumerated.  The 
necessary force was determined to be two commissioned officers, two corporals, and 
forty privates, with half of the force on duty at all times.  The guards’ orders allowed 
only four prisoners to be allowed out of confinement at any given time, to be guarded at 
all times by an armed soldier.  Of particular interest is the final order, that “No soldier 
must leave camp, but with leave of a Commissioned Officer, nor must any man abuse a 
Prisoner or strike him on any occasion, but such as the Laws will justify, as in the 
defense of his person, the prevention of escapes & preservation of the peace.”69
 An attached note to the commander at Frederick Town established the rations to 
be given to the prisoners on a daily basis.  Each prisoner was to receive one half pound of 
fresh or salted meat; one and one half pounds of wheaten bread; one half pint of peas or 
one pound of potatoes; and one tablespoon of salt per day.  Disorderly prisoners were 
subject to confinement or two-thirds ration for no more than ten days.  The commander 
of the prison was to furnish clothing, blankets, beds, wines, spirits (despite their 
prohibition), sugar, molasses, tea, coffee, and camp kettles to the prisoners, with the 
eventual cost of the items to be paid by the British government.  The regulations were in 
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strict compliance with the Cartel of 12 May, although actual practice may have varied 
somewhat from the prescribed regulations.70
 The conduct of American captors toward British prisoners of war varied by 
locale, and depended primarily upon the disposition of individual American commanders 
of POW locations.  Overall, POW treatment appears to have been fairly lenient, and 
British officers in particular were pleased by the conditions of their captivity.71  The 
commander at Pittsfield, Major Thomas Melville, announced in a letter to Prevost that 
“the American Government will pride itself on giving the examples of liberality to its 
enemy.”  Melville complained that the British decision to ship all American forces 
captured in North America to Halifax, resulting in serious overcrowding and poor living 
conditions, was an inhumane decision which could prompt American retaliation against 
British prisoners.72
 Due to Melville’s compassion and leadership, the prison at Pittsfield was 
probably one of the best locations at which a British prisoner could hope to be held.  
Melville’s recordkeeping was very meticulous, as shown by a list of expenditures made 
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by the prison for the upkeep of the hundreds of British POWs held in 1814.  For the 
months of September through November, Melville spent almost $15,000 on rations for 
924 British prisoners, and close to $20,000 to clothe the same prisoners in preparation for 
the winter.73  Melville acted as both warden of the prison and agent for the prisoners kept 
within Pittsfield, appealing directly to Prevost for payment, in specie, of debts assumed 
while caring for POWs.74  The “Pittsfield Cantonment,” consisted of two barracks, each 
with twelve rooms and two stories.  Each room was designed to house twenty prisoners, 
with individual bunks provided.  Officers were housed in ten double rooms in the 
officers’ quarters, with two mess rooms and a separate kitchen.  A hospital and guard 
house completed the buildings of the compound, which was located a few hundred yards 
from the village of Pittsfield.75   
The Pittsfield location was fairly typical of the prison compounds utilized by the 
United States during the war, and could not hold more than several hundred prisoners at 
any time.  Colonel Elisha Jenkins, who inspected a number of such compounds in 1813, 
notified Armstrong that the prisons were adequate to the provisions of the Cartel of 12 
May, and recommended that the regulations to be observed regarding prisoners of war be 
formally furnished to the officers at each camp.  Jenkins was critical of the decision to 
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house prisoners at Greenbush, New York, as “the inhabitants . . . are whigs, almost to a 
man,” and might prove quite sympathetic to the British prisoners confined in the area.76
 British practice, in contrast with that of the United States, was to consolidate 
American prisoners at a few locations.  The British maintained thousands of prisoners 
taken in Europe during the Napoleonic Wars, and thus American prisoners were only a 
small minority of the total prisoners in custody from 1812 until 1815.  Halifax was the 
most common destination for American prisoners, particularly those captured upon the 
Canadian frontier.  As late as January 1, 1815, Halifax held almost 2000 American 
prisoners.  By March 26 of the same year, this number had dwindled to 420, with the 
difference caused almost entirely by prisoner exchange.77   
 According to most reports, both British and American prisoners received for the 
most part, ample food, adequate clothing, and enough blankets for at least a minimum of 
comfort while detained as prisoners of war.  However, in the fall of 1814 a very 
disturbing report surfaced concerning prisoners held by the British at Melville Island.  
The American Agent for Prisoner of War, John Mitchell, notified John Cochet, a British 
captain at Halifax, that prisoners had found tobacco, dirt, and ground glass in their bread 
rations.  After a number of communications, Cochet informed Mitchell that the foreign 
substances had been removed from the bread ration, but that the prisoners could not 
expect any better treatment until officially exchanged, suggesting that the British wished 
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to exert all possible pressure for exchanges.78  Donald Hickey has argued that the British 
made captivity deliberately hard upon maritime prisoners, in the hopes that captured 
Americans would enlist in the Royal Navy in exchange for their release from prison.79
Prisoner exchanges during the War of 1812, begun in 1812 and officially 
sanctioned by the Halifax agreement and the Cartel of 12 May, were in practice 
extremely complex and slow-moving affairs.  British attempts to facilitate exchanges 
continued throughout the duration of the war, but were often stymied by the United 
States.  On 25 January 1814, Prevost proposed a general exchange of all non-hostage 
prisoners.80  Prevost’s suggestion was almost a complete reversal of the Cartel of 12 
May, and a great departure from previous British policies.81  The willingness to meet at 
any place upon the lines is of special interest, as it signified a compromise from the 
previous British insistence upon cartel ships for the delivery of prisoners of war to 
exchange depots. 
 An exchange agreement was created according to Prevost’s suggestions, and was 
signed on 16 April 1814 by Brigadier General William H. Winder and Colonel Edward 
Baynes.  This agreement included provisions to release all prisoners held by each side, 
regardless of rank, and to hold neither side responsible for any financial obligations to the 
other.  All prisoners released by the agreement were to be considered exchanged and 
available for duty on 15 May 1814.  The agreement, as negotiated by Winder, who was in 
fact a former prisoner of the British, was rejected by President Madison, on the grounds 
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that the hostages should all go free as well, and modifications to the agreement were 
made and approved on 16 July 1814.  Although each side had formally agreed to 
exchange all prisoners of war, the actual practice of exchange was an extremely time-
consuming and difficult business.  There was virtually no possibility that the prisoners 
would all return to their respective homes in less than one month.82  According to the 
convention, all prisoners with the exception of the twenty-three “Irish traitors,” twenty-
three British soldiers initially held as hostages, and forty-six American officers and non-
commissioned officers held as hostages at Halifax were to be released.83
 One of the most fundamental uses of prisoners of war is as a potential source of 
intelligence regarding the enemy’s location, intent, and armament.  The War of 1812 was 
certainly no exception to the ages-old custom of questioning prisoners of war.  During 
the war, the most useful sources of information often proved to be British deserters rather 
than members of units captured on battlefields.  For obvious reasons, officers were a 
much more valuable source of information than enlisted personnel.  However, the 
military leaders of the United States did not neglect the possibility of extracting useful 
information from individual soldiers, and regular reports of interrogations flowed into the 
hands of the commissary general of prisoners, the secretary of war, individual 
commanders, and the secretary of state.  An excellent example of the interrogation of 
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prisoners comes from the “Examination of British Deserters” received by American 
commanders shortly after the burning of Washington.  In this brief document, Robert 
Gardner detailed the size of the British force, its origins, its intentions, and the general 
condition of the men within the force, all garnered from the brief interrogation of a 
number of British soldiers who deserted the British Army.84  
 After the Battle of New Orleans, Major General Andrew Jackson arranged a 
battlefield exchange of prisoners with the British Commander, General John Lambert, but 
this agreement was sent to Washington for authorization prior to the release of the 
captives.  Four hundred sixty six men were returned to the British, in exchange for 
Americans held throughout the Caribbean, primarily at Nassau.85   
 Despite the focus upon the rapid exchange of prisoners, cartel ships continued to 
sail for several months after the end of the war, with prisoners becoming increasingly 
anxious to return to their homes.  In one incident, prisoners aboard an American cartel 
ship, the Mary Ann, mutinied while returning from Plymouth, England to Norfolk, 
Virginia.  The prisoners revolted due to the poor rations provided for their voyage, and 
refused to continue until their situation was improved.  Further angering the passengers, 
the number of prisoners placed upon the Mary Ann was lower than the number intended 
for exchange, without explanation from the British captors.86  Possibly the worst aspect 
of the journey for the returning prisoners was the destination, almost none of the 
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prisoners were from Virginia.  According to testimony from the master of the Mary Ann, 
on 2 June 1815, the prisoners seized control of the ship and set a new course for New 
York.  Upon arrival, the American crew discovered many small articles missing from the 
ship after the prisoners disembarked.87
 Although exchange policies were designed to send prisoners back to their home 
countries as rapidly as possible, the actual practice of the War of 1812 was to hold 
prisoners for a fairly long duration, with the exception of immediate battlefield 
exchanges.  As has been noted, hundreds of prisoners were still held by each side for 
months after the signing of the Treaty of Ghent.  The result of this prolonged captivity 
was occasionally deadly, as shown in the case of the Dartmoor Prison riot of April 6, 
1815, in which five American prisoners were killed and thirty four were wounded by 
British guards.88  Dubbed the “Dartmoor massacre” in the United States, this unfortunate 
incident marked the last significant event in the prisoner of war history of the War of 
1812.   
 Retaliatory measures by the United States primarily consisted of holding British 
prisoners as hostages against the safe treatment of American citizens.  These hostages 
were typically confined in city or county jails, rather than in specially constructed federal 
prisons.  This lessened the expense of maintaining the hostage prisoners, but also 
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presented a potential conflict of interest between individual states and the federal 
government.  This conflict erupted in Massachusetts in early 1814, when the state 
legislature passed a law ordering all British POWs held in city or county jails to be freed 
unless removed by the president within ten days.  This law was not well received by the 
marshal of Massachusetts, James Prince, who protested that the British prisoners had 
never been placed into a county jail “without first ascertaining from the County Officer 
that the interest of the county will not be impacted by their confinement therein.”  Prince 
advised Mason that the United States should consider removing prisoners altogether from 
state control, although he did not offer any suggestions of practical alternatives.89
 British troops placed in close confinement complained to Barclay that their health 
was in great danger due to their situation, in which they were not provided soap, clean 
clothes, or the necessities of life.  Particular emphasis was placed upon the lack of 
tobacco in their confinement.  The prisoners noted, “we at all times consider it not 
consistent with the character of a British Soldier to complain, we cannot help it at this 
time,” and expressed the belief that the fault lay not with the United States, but rather 
with the British government, which had not maintained enough interest in the prisoners to 
see to their needs. 90  According to the letter, no British agent had been seen by the 
prisoners for four months, and during the previous visit, each prisoner had been given a 
single dollar to use for purchasing their necessary supplies beyond rations. 
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 In one of strangest incidents of the war pertaining to prisoners, John Smith, the 
marshal of Pennsylvania, was forced to write a letter to Mason, dated 29 April 1814, 
explaining the escape of nineteen officers held in close confinement in Philadelphia.  
These officers were part of the series of retaliatory measures adopted by Britain and the 
United States, and should have received extra attention from their captors.91  Despite the 
obvious importance of maintaining a close watch on men held in close confinement, the 
guard complement for the prison was reduced to four men, apparently without notifying 
the marshal.  The officers were able to procure a saw in some unknown manner to cut the 
iron bars covering the third story mess window.  The men then created a rope ladder from 
bed sheets and climbed to the ground on the night of 24 April 1814.92
 During the War of 1812, the United States made a deliberate effort to utilize POW 
labor.  Individual British prisoners were allowed on an infrequent basis to practice some 
form of trade or craft, often for their own financial benefit.  This practice allowed vital 
skills to be utilized by local areas, while also motivating prisoners to contribute their 
labor to the enemy.  At times, American captors compelled prisoner labor, rather than 
simply allowing it to occur.  Barclay’s letter of 26 May 1814 asked Mason to investigate 
the case of two British prisoners taken from the prison at Pittsfield, Massachusetts by 
Melville, the deputy marshal of the post.  Barclay complained that Melville removed the 
two prisoners and “either employed them himself, or suffered them to be employed by 
some of his friends as Servants or laborers.”93  The crux of the matter, to Barclay, was 
whether or not the prisoners had been returned to their regiment to be exchanged 
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together.  The notion that employing prisoners for labor was not allowed by international 
law did not seem to occur to Barclay, who was quick to complain of any real or perceived 
insult to the honor of captives under his nominal care.  Although no international law 
specifically allowed the use of prisoner of war labor, it can be inferred that the use of 
captives for labor was acceptable, provided that the labor force was not withheld from 
exchange with other prisoners, and that officers were not forced to work.  
The prisoner of war bureaucracy established by the United States was hindered by 
the slow speed of communications, and the unwillingness of individual commanders to 
overstep their responsibilities.  As of 25 February 1815, a number of British officers 
remained confined in Raleigh, North Carolina, despite the end of the war and the nearby 
presence of their own ships, immediately off the American coastline.  George Barton was 
forced to ask Mason to direct the Marshal of North Carolina “to permit all British officers 
in his custody to avail themselves of any opportunity to join their ships, which may 
present itself prior to the sailing of a cartel from Wilmington.”94  The United States 
adopted a system of maintaining prisoner agreements to a very strict interpretation, even 
when simpler and more humane solutions were presented.  The policy of returning all 
prisoners through proper channels remained in force for over one century, through the 
end of World War II, and was not ended until the armistice talks of the Korean War. 
 At the end of the war, the Commissary General of Prisoners was required by the 
Treasury Department to create a final account of all appropriations for the care and 
safekeeping of British prisoners.  The United States Congress had appropriated $100,000 
on 6 July 1812, for the Commissary General.  This was followed by an appropriation of 
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$150,000 on 3 March 1813, an additional $400,000 on 24 March 1814, and a final 
$500,000 on 16 February 1815.  When other expenses were added to the initial 
appropriations, the total bill for prisoner of war maintenance amounted to $1,194,425.32, 
submitted for payment to the government of Great Britain.95  This bill was 
counterbalanced by British costs for the upkeep of American prisoners of war, and would 
remain the subject of diplomatic negotiations for years to come. 
 The legacy of the prisoner of war decisions made during the War of 1812 lasted 
through World War II.  The most important decisions made during the war, and 
consequently the longest lasting effects of the war with regard to POWs, were the 
decisions to practice strict retaliation for the actions of the enemy; the collective dispersal 
of prison compounds; the use of prisoner labor; and the creation of a single POW 
command structure to house and care for all prisoners, whether captured on land or at 
sea.  These aspects of prisoner policy, with modernization and some modifications, 
remained the foundation of American prisoner of war practice for over a century.   
 The prisoner of war decisions of the War of 1812 had proved to have a great 
impact upon the Civil War and the World Wars of the twentieth century.  However, these 
decisions did not have a significant effect upon the prisoner of war policy implemented in 
the first conflict involving the United States to follow the War of 1812.  In the Mexican 
War, the United States radically altered its policy to suit the needs of a small army on 
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foreign soil, surrounded by a hostile population.  The lessons of the War of 1812 would 
not be truly implemented by the War Department for another fifty years.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
PRISONERS ON FOREIGN SOIL:  THE WAR AGAINST MEXICO 
 
 Between the end of the War of 1812 and the beginning of the Mexican War, 
American military planners devoted little or no time to learning the lessons of the War of 
1812 about POWs.  The wartime army was rapidly reduced in size, and most army 
regulars were sent westward for frontier duty.  Officers educated at the United States 
Military Academy received scant training in the laws of war, and what they learned 
revolved around the definition of a just war, not ethical battlefield behavior.1  Cadets 
read excerpts from Grotius and Vattel, and discussed the customs of civilized warfare, 
but received no practical training regarding the capture and maintenance of prisoners of 
war.   
 International law on prisoners did not change significantly during the first half of 
the nineteenth century, although practices in Europe became less humane during the 
Napoleonic Wars, when the sheer number of prisoners led to deplorable conditions in 
England and on the continent.  At the beginning of the wars, in September 1793 and May 
1794, the French revolutionary government “prohibited ransoming of prisoners, and 
ordered that all émigré prisoners, and later British, Hanoverian, and Spanish captives as 
well, be shot as an ‘example of the vengeance of an outraged nation.’”2  Some 
commanders on each side maintained earlier customs, refusing to execute prisoners, but 
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the number of prisoners taken on each side overwhelmed the systems designed to 
maintain them.3  Prisoner exchanges rarely occurred, and no exchange cartels were used 
during the conflict.  Most enlisted captives were forced to wait for an end to the conflict.  
In the decades after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when the wars officially ended, very 
little effort was made by any of the belligerents to evaluate prisoner practices.   
 American prisoner of war policy during the Mexican War differed significantly 
from previous experiences.  No single POW policy governed the behavior of American 
commanders in the field-each commander established his own policy.  The problems 
associated with holding prisoners while occupying foreign territory with a relatively 
small military force caused Major Generals Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor to release 
captured enemies on parole.  This policy saved the personnel and expense associated with 
maintaining prisoners, but on numerous occasions paroled individuals were found again 
fighting against American troops.  Occasionally, high ranking officers were detained, or 
even shipped to the United States to prevent their return to the battlefield, but for the 
most part American troops quickly released any prisoners taken.  Related to the question 
of prisoners of war in Mexico was the problem of desertion from the American army, and 
how to handle deserters caught fighting for the enemy.  Near the end of combat 
operations, American policy underwent a radical change, as President James K. Polk 
ordered Scott to end mass paroles, and American troops began to hold significant 
numbers for a protracted period.   
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 Pinpointing the exact number of prisoners taken in the war is virtually impossible, 
due to the lack of accurate record-keeping by the American forces, and the decision to 
release almost all of the prisoners on parole.  However, it is certain that the armies under 
Taylor and Scott each captured a sizeable number of prisoners in several battles.  By 
comparison, the Mexican Army captured a relatively small number of American troops.  
At no time in the war did Mexico have more than a few hundred American POWs, and 
American prisoners were quickly freed through the use of battlefield exchanges.  Unlike 
the War of 1812, the United States maintained a positive balance of captures in Mexico. 
Many of the standard works discussing the war give no mention of prisoners, 
despite the capture of thousands of Mexican soldiers in both the northern and southern 
theaters of the war.  Often, prisoners are simply dismissed within lists of enemy 
casualties at specific battles, with no reference to the disposition of Mexican POWs.4  
The only captives to generate a significant body of literature were the San Patricio 
Battalion, comprised largely of deserters from the U.S. Army.  Most historians who 
mention Mexican prisoners argue they were insignificant to the outcome of the war, and 
did not represent a substantial percentage of the forces engaged.  Individual diaries and 
memoirs occasionally mention prisoners, but do not consider them a central theme of the 
                                                 
4 Works that ignore or marginalize POWs during the Mexican War include Otis A. 
Singletary, The Mexican War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); Horatio O. 
Ladd, History of the War With Mexico (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1882); John 
Edward Weems, To Conquer a Peace: The War between the United States and Mexico 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974); Cadmus M. Wilcox, History of the Mexican War 
(Washington, DC: Church News Publishing Co., 1892); Philip Berry, A Review of the 
Mexican War on Christian Principles (New York: J. S. Ozer, 1849); John Porter Bloom, 
“With the American Army Into Mexico, 1846-1848” (Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 
1956); Robert S. Ripley, The War with Mexico, 2 vols (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1849); Lewis and Mewha, Prisoner of War Utilization, 25-26. 
 
 91
war.5  One rare exception is George Wilkins Kendall’s Dispatches from the Mexican 
War, which often refers to POWs, including lists of captured officers.  Kendall was 
frequently critical of the POW decisions made by Scott in his advance upon Mexico City, 
particularly when discussing the fate of the San Patricio Battalion.6  Unit histories also 
rarely discuss POW issues, unless the unit being described had a specific connection to 
prisoners.7  
 Some of the issues of prisoner of war treatment followed precedents created 
during the War of Texas’ Independence (1835-36) and the skirmishes that followed 
between the Republic of Texas and Mexico.  Texan leaders considered Mexican soldiers 
taken prisoner to be hostages rather than POWs, useful bargaining chips in the political 
fight for independence.  By December 1835, the Texan forces held over one thousand 
POWs, most taken at the siege of San Antonio.  These captives were freed, without 
giving their parole, when the Texan forces were unable to guard and feed them.  The 
Mexican treatment of captured Texans was radically different: Santa Anna ordered that 
no prisoners be taken at the Alamo on 6 March 1836.  On 27 March, he ordered the 
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execution of all prisoners taken at Goliad: of the 445 prisoners, 342 were executed.  The 
remainder escaped by running away at the commencement of the executions.  The Texans 
took their revenge at San Jacinto on 21 April 1836, where they “clubbed, knifed, and shot 
the wounded.”8  After the executions, Sam Houston retained 730 Mexican prisoners, 
including President Santa Anna.  The prisoners were sent to Galveston to work on 
fortifications, or were assigned to individual citizens as laborers.  Negotiations to 
exchange prisoners dragged on for months, and the last Mexican prisoners did not leave 
Texas until May 1837.9   
 In the five years following its War of Independence, Texan forces launched two 
major excursions into Mexico, both of which failed.  The first was an attack on Santa Fe, 
begun 12 June 1841, launched in the belief that local civilians would prefer to be part of 
the Republic of Texas rather than Mexico.  The Texans were intercepted and disarmed by 
Mexican Regulars, then sent to Mexico City for imprisonment.  The Mexican response 
was to attack San Antonio, capturing the city on 5 March 1842 and again on 11 
September 1842, in each case taking prisoners before withdrawing across the Rio 
Grande.  The second Texan attack was undertaken by three hundred volunteers who 
ignored Sam Houston’s order to remain north of the Rio Grande.  Anticipating plunder, 
they attacked the city of Mier, where they were captured by two thousand Mexican 
troops on 25 December 1842.  The captives marched to Perote, where they spent two 
years performing forced labor.  These prisoners viewed themselves as prisoners of war, 
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as they had been organized by the Texan government, but they were considered bandits 
by the Mexican government.  “Since no declared war existed, they hardly viewed the 
Texans as prisoners of war…The observance of international law then becomes a matter 
of perspective.”10  The prisoners attempted a mass escape on 11 February 1843, of the 
176 recaptured, seventeen were executed as a warning to the remaining prisoners.11  
Within the Texas legislature, several motions were made for an attack to free the 
prisoners at Perote, but the prisoners were held until September of 1844, when British 
and American diplomats requested their release.12  Once freed, many of the Texan 
prisoners became Texas Rangers, and volunteered their service during the Mexican War.  
In every theater of the war, Texas volunteers, especially Texas Rangers, earned a 
notorious reputation for brutality to prisoners and civilians.13   
 Prior to the declaration of war, Taylor took interest in the issue of POWs.  On 24 
April 1846, he sent a party of dragoons to observe Mexican movements near the Rio 
Grande.  Commanded by Captain T. B. Thornton, the unit was ambushed and 
approximately fifty soldiers surrendered.  The American prisoners were immediately sent 
to Matamoras, where they received exceptional treatment before being sent to the interior 
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of Mexico.  Generals Pedro de Ampudia and Mariano Arista housed and fed the officers 
of Thornton’s command, who reported great satisfaction with the accommodations.14    
 After the battles of Palo Alto on 8 May and Resaca de la Palma on 9 May 1846, 
Taylor was able to exchange sufficient prisoners to obtain the release of Thornton’s 
command.  Before the exchange, the wounded among Taylor’s prisoners were sent to 
Matamoras, after the exchange, the remaining prisoners were released upon parole.  A 
few of the highest-ranking officers refused to give their parole, and were sent to New 
Orleans to be held for the duration of the war.  Taylor requested instructions for handling 
prisoners who refused to give paroles, and asked that they be well-treated, as freed 
Americans reported excellent conditions in the hands of the Mexicans.15  Secretary of 
War William L. Marcy commended Taylor for his decision to parole the POWs, and 
conveyed the approval of President Polk as well.16   
 As Taylor moved deeper into Mexico, Polk began to view prisoners of war as a 
way to “conciliate the inhabitants, and to let them see that peace is within their reach the 
moment their rulers will consent to do us justice.”17  Through Marcy, Polk ordered 
Taylor to counteract the attempts of Mexican newspapers to “prejudice and exasperate 
the minds of the people against us,” by practicing kindness toward the populace and 
captured enemy troops.18  Polk also ordered Taylor to interact with Mexican officer 
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POWs as much as possible, and to convey the wish of the U.S. government to begin 
peace negotiations, but not to actually open any negotiations.  He was to inform the 
Mexican commanders of the willingness of the United States to create an “honorable 
peace, whenever such shall be their wish.”19   
Taylor acknowledged the president’s wishes, but complained that the use of 
volunteers made conciliatory efforts difficult, because these uncontrollable troops 
continually committed excesses against the enemy citizens and property.20  Exasperated 
by the atrocities committed by Texans, he eventually requested that no more Texan 
troops be sent to augment his force in northern Mexico.21  Mark Nackman notes, “In the 
field, the Texans who went on expeditions in search of Mexican guerrilla parties almost 
never took prisoners. Having hunted them down they simply shot them on the spot.”22  
Rangers routinely abused and murdered Mexican civilians, even citizens serving as 
guides and interpreters were not safe from the Texas cavalry units.23   
 During negotiations with Ampudia regarding the surrender of the city of 
Monterey, Taylor demanded that the town’s garrison surrender as POWs.  The garrison 
was to be paroled and sent to the interior of Mexico to await exchange, which would 
increase the balance of prisoners in favor of the United States without the necessity of 
feeding and protecting the prisoners.24  Mexico, which did not hold a significant number 
of American captives, could not exchange the Monterey defenders.  To avoid an 
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American attack upon the lightly defended city, Ampudia agreed to Taylor’s demands.25  
A few weeks after the surrender of Monterey, Taylor discovered that a few Americans 
POWs had been moved to San Luis de Potosi, and requested that the men be released and 
returned to American lines for exchange against an equal number of the men paroled at 
Monterey.  General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna quickly acceded to the request, and 
provided money and supplies for the men to travel from to Monterey.26  After the Battle 
of Buena Vista, Taylor again negotiated a battlefield exchange, receiving Americans 
captured both before and during the battle in exchange for a mass parole of Mexican 
POWs.27
Scott utilized Mexican prisoners primarily for exchange, and sought to use them 
as a means to end the captivity of any Americans held by the enemy.  For example, after 
the battle at Cerro Gordo on 18 April 1847, approximately three thousand prisoners were 
held for one day before being paroled.28  Following American victories at Contreras on 
19 August 1847 and Churubusco on 20 August 1847, Scott again held approximately 
three thousand prisoners.29  Of these prisoners, most of the Mexican officers gave their 
parole not to fight against the United States for the duration of the war, and were 
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garrison to retire to the interior without giving paroles, and that they were not considered 
POWs.  Ripley, War with Mexico, 1: 237-46. 
26 Taylor to Santa Anna, 5 November 1846, and Santa Anna to Taylor, 10 November 
1846, H. Doc. 60, 437-8. 
27 Ripley, War With Mexico, 1: 379-80. 
28 Hackenburg, Pennsylvania in the War, 40.  Other estimates place the number captured 
at Cerro Gordo as high as 6,000 POWs, see J. Jacob Oswandel, Notes of the Mexican 
War, 1846-47-48 (Philadelphia: n.p. 1885), 129; Miller, Mexican War Journal, 4; 
Kendall, Dispatches, 212.  Cress notes that the official U.S. count was 199 officers and 
2,837 enlisted men taken prisoner., and that another 1,000 POWs probably escaped U.S. 
custody before they could be processed.   
29 Miller, Shamrock and Sword, 92.  Miller’s number of prisoners is supported by other 
sources, such as Kendall, Dispatches, 332, 343-44. 
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released.  Most of the enlisted soldiers, including those wounded in the battles, were 
immediately released, although a small number were held as POWs and confined in 
several locations, to await exchange for the approximately two hundred American POWs 
held in Mexico City, many initially captured in the northern theater of the war.  The 
American prisoners had been well fed and housed, but they had also been subjected to 
public ridicule by being paraded through the streets of the capital.30  Despite the large 
American advantage in captured troops, and the thousands of paroled Mexican soldiers 
awaiting exchange, some American soldiers had been held back from exchange.   
The number of prisoners taken rose rapidly in the autumn of 1847, during the 
battles for Mexico City.  At Molino del Rey on 8 September 1847, the Second 
Pennsylvania Regiment was unavailable for battlefield duty because it had been detailed 
to guard two thousand Mexican POWs during the battle.31  In the battle, another seven 
hundred prisoners were taken.  At Chapultepec Castle on 13 September 1847, more than 
eight hundred Mexican soldiers were captured.  Like those taken the previous month, 
most of these prisoners were released after an oath not to bear arms for the duration of the 
war.32  Once American POWs were released, Scott, like Taylor, typically paroled enemy 
prisoners en masse.  The last POWs taken by the United States during the war were 
captured with the fall of Mexico City, where Scott’s forces captured almost one thousand 
more prisoners.33
                                                 
30 Miller, Mexican War Journal, 52. 
31 Hackenburg, Pennsylvania in the War, 54.  
32 Miller, Shamrock and Sword, 114.  Kendall puts the number captured at nearly one 
thousand men, including fifty-three officers.  See Kendall, Dispatches, 372-76. 
33 Kendall lists the ranks and numbers of prisoners taken, including 5 generals, 3 
colonels, and 100 lower grade officers, with 800 enlisted personnel, Kendall, Dispatches, 
387-88. 
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Despite the practical difficulties associated with the upkeep and security of 
prisoners, on 31 May 1847 Scott was ordered to end his policy of complete paroles, and 
to detain officers of the Mexican Army, either in Mexico or the United States.34  Scott’s 
orders to keep POWs in captivity may have been provoked by reports of the American 
POWs kept in Mexico City in violation of previous exchange agreements.  During the 
assault upon Mexico City, captured Mexican privates were not paroled, they were instead 
sent to Tampico, while officers were confined at Toluca.35  The decision to retain POWs 
in captivity upset some Mexican leaders.  Archbishop Manuel Posada y Gardu repeatedly 
asked Winfield Scott to parole all Mexican prisoners of war, but Scott pointed out that 
many prisoners taken at Veracruz and Cerro Gordo had rejoined the Mexican Army in 
violation of their parole.   
 Scott’s biographer Arthur Smith believed Mexicans violated their paroles under 
orders from their political leadership, and that many of the parole violators did not 
understand the legal meaning of their paroles.36  Henry Halleck noted in 1861 that the 
Mexican government attempted to annul the paroles of captured Mexican troops, and to 
force paroled soldiers to reenter the ranks.  In response, Scott threatened to hang any 
soldier retaken after violating his parole.37  Regardless of the reasoning behind parole 
violations, Scott did release five hundred POWs on 22 December 1847, after asking 
Posada to use the Catholic Church to guarantee the paroles.  Scott wished the church to 
                                                 
34 W. L. Marcy to Winfield Scott, 21 April 1848, H. Doc. 60, 1233.  Marcy cites a 
previous letter, from himself to Scott, in which the president ordered Scott to end the 
parole of Mexican officers. 
35 Ripley, War with Mexico, 2:160-61. 
36 Arthur D. Howden Smith, Old Fuss and Feathers: The Life and Exploits of Lt.-General 
Winfield Scott (New York: Greystone Press, 1937), 271. 
37 Henry W. Halleck, International Law; or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in 
Peace and War  (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1861), 438-39. 
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refuse absolution to any parole-breakers, and also wished to use an oath of the church to 
enforce the paroles.38  Posada entered the prisons to explain the purpose and rules of 
paroles to the POWs, and personally administered the parole oaths to the prisoners.39  
The last Mexican POWs were released on 1 June 1848, when Major General Butler 
issued General Order Number 116, freeing all prisoners.40   
 The major exception to the general release of forces fighting for the Mexican 
Army involved a group of deserters from the U.S. Army.  Desertion was a major problem 
during the war, and a larger percentage of U.S. regular forces deserted in the Mexican 
War than in any other conflict.  Out of approximately 40,000 regulars, 5,331 deserted, 
with a particularly high number of immigrants among the ranks of the deserters.41  With 
such high desertion rates, the army was forced to address the issue in such a way as to 
discourage further desertion.  One way the U.S. discouraged desertion was to severely 
punish captured deserters.  Another way was to prosecute Mexican citizens who 
encouraged American soldiers to defect or at least leave their present service.  One 
example occurred on 19 June 1847, when Martin Tritschler, of Puebla, was executed 
after a military court found him guilty of “persuading or endeavouring to procure soldiers 
to desert the Army of the United States.”42
Hundreds of immigrant deserters were enticed to join the Mexican Army, and 
were organized into a unit called the San Patricio Battalion.  The San Patricios 
                                                 
38 Miller, Shamrock and Sword, 122. 
39 Ibid., Bauer, The Mexican War, 336-37. 
40 Miller, Shamrock and Sword, 128. 
41 Peter F. Stevens, The Rogue’s March (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1999), 2-3.  In 
particular, the Irish were viewed as likely deserters.  Approximately 20% of Irish soldiers 
deserted during the war. 
42 General Orders No. 187, Puebla, 24 June 1847, found in Vol. 22, Entry 134, RG 94, 
National Archives. 
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participated in a number of engagements, but were most notable during the advance upon 
Mexico City.  The San Patricios are an important part of POW policy because their 
situation was similar to that of the “Irish Traitors” of the War of 1812.  However, in the 
Mexican War, the United States found itself in the position occupied by Great Britain 
during the War of 1812.  Mexico argued that the San Patricios had taken service with the 
Mexican government, and that they were entitled to the legal status of prisoners of war.  
The Irish sailors taken to Great Britain as traitors three decades earlier were arrested on 
the basis of their nationality rather than their previous service, while the San Patricios 
deserted the United States Army during wartime, and enlisted in the service of an enemy 
government.  As such, they were subject to a much harsher sentence than were the Irish 
sailors of the War of 1812.  The San Patricios who deserted after the declaration of war 
faced the ultimate punishment, over seventy were executed after military trials in August 
1847.  Those who deserted prior to the declaration of war were branded on the cheek or 
hand and released. 
 The campaigns to invade and conquer California and New Mexico were 
undertaken with little oversight from the War Department.  In each location, a small 
American force moved in and established limited control over the territory.  Each area 
was difficult to completely subdue, as each contained guerrillas who fought against 
American occupation.  American commanders were forced to improvise POW policies 
for each location, with vastly different results.  In California, captured guerrillas were 
well-treated.  After early successes, American troops in Los Angeles were forced to 
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retreat.43  Prior to withdrawal, American and Californian commanders drafted an 
agreement to exchange all POWs, and excuse any past behavior by freed prisoners.  After 
fighting resumed in the area, Californian guerrillas surrendered to John C. Fremont, on 
16 January 1847, under an agreement that all POWs on both sides would again be 
released, and all Californians would be protected by the American government and 
subjected to no punishment for resisting the occupation. 
 In New Mexico, guerilla resistance quickly followed the arrival of American 
troops.  Prisoners captured in most locales were sent to Santa Fe for confinement and 
trial.  American commanders in New Mexico considered guerrilla attacks to be murder.  
A revolt in Taos in 1847 led to the capture of dozens of guerrillas by American forces.  
American commanders accused fourteen of the prisoners of murder, and ordered their 
immediate execution.  The remainder were delivered to civilian authorities and placed on 
trial for a variety of crimes against the newly-constituted government.  Most of the 
prisoners were convicted and executed in March, 1847.44
 Neither Scott nor Taylor had enough logistical support to maintain a large 
population of prisoners, nor could either spare the manpower to conduct prisoners to the 
United States to be held for the duration of the war.  Thus the decision to release 
prisoners on parole was probably made for reasons of expediency, and not for 
humanitarian purposes.  However, Philip Berry argued in 1849 that Scott’s decision to 
offer paroles was made “in consideration of the degree to which they [the Mexican 
                                                 
43 Werner H. Marti, Messenger of Destiny: The California Adventures, 1846-1847 of 
Archibald H. Gillespie (San Francisco: John Howell Books, 1960), 82-83. 
44 James A. Crutchfield, Tragedy at Taos: The Revolt of 1847 (Plano, TX: Republic of 
Texas Press, 1995), 129-32, 135-47. 
 
 102
prisoners] evinced those very qualities which rendered them formidable.”45  Berry’s 
statement shows that at the time of the war and immediately after, Scott’s decision was 
viewed as a sign of chivalry rather than necessity.  In contrast, Robert Ripley criticized 
Scott’s decision to parole Mexican prisoners, particularly after the Battle of Cerro Gordo.  
Ripley argued in 1849 that Scott could have captured and held the entire Mexican Army 
after the battle.46   
 From a prisoner of war standpoint, the Mexican War is significant because of the 
large number of enemy troops captured in an offensive war, fought almost entirely upon 
foreign territory.  The decision to allow mass paroles of thousands of enemy troops was 
an exceptional solution to the problem of caring for the POWs, provided the enemy 
soldiers could be trusted to uphold their paroles.  For the most part, Mexican troops did 
follow the regulations of parole, although some instances of oathbreaking must certainly 
have occurred.  For all of the practical benefits of paroling captured enemies, it was also 
a decision brought about by necessity.  The army simply could not provide for thousands 
of nonproductive, uncooperative prisoners.  If a few of the released POWs rejoined 
Mexican forces in the field, they were a small minority, and facing them again upon the 
battlefield was a small price to pay for depriving the enemy of the bulk of the paroled 
prisoners.   
 Prisoner of war operations in the Mexican War did not have a strong impact on 
the practices of the American Civil War (1861-65) despite the fact that many of the 
commanders on both sides of the war served in Mexico.  The lack of any sustained period 
of captivity for most Mexican prisoners meant that most American officers had no 
                                                 
45 Philip Berry, A Review of the Mexican War (Columbia, SC: A. S. Johnston, 1849), 35. 
46 Ripley, War with Mexico, 2: 82. 
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practical experience in dealing with prisoners.  Even Major General Henry Halleck, who 
drew upon many examples from the Mexican War in his 1861 work International Law, 
mentioned the war only once in his chapter on prisoners, noting that Mexican efforts to 
return paroled prisoners to the battlefield was a violation of the laws of war.  Halleck 
reinforced the arguments of Grotius and Vattel by providing concrete examples of proper 
and improper behavior toward POWs.47  In the Civil War, policies would again be 
improvised for the capture and maintenance of prisoners, with disastrous results. 
                                                 
47 Halleck, International Law, 438-39. 
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CHAPTER V 
BROTHER AGAINST BROTHER:  THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 
 In the American Civil War (1861-1865), both sides pursued improvised policies 
toward their captives, with similar results.  Expecting a short, almost bloodless fight, 
neither the Union nor the Confederacy planned for the capture of tens of thousands of 
enemies.  The result was an impromptu system of parole and exchange that was quickly 
overwhelmed by the influx of hundreds of thousands of prisoners.  In 1863, both 
governments began stashing prisoners in massive prison compounds for safekeeping, 
with little attention given to the welfare of the prisoners.  Exchanges were formally ended 
in May of 1863 after each side made allegations of mistreatment and retaliatory threats.  
Each of these factors illustrated the danger of improvising POW policy to govern the 
maintenance of hundreds of thousands of prisoners during a total war.   
At the same time that exchanges ended, the federal government issued a new set 
of regulations, the Lieber Code, which included instructions to field commanders for the 
proper treatment of captured enemies.  The Code formed the basis for later international 
agreements, but had very little practical effect on the conditions faced by prisoners during 
the Civil War.  Throughout 1863 and 1864, the number of prisoners held by each side 
rapidly swelled, as did the mortality rates among the prison population.  Massive 
concentration camps were created on both sides, for the incarceration of prisoners for the 
duration of the war.  These camps had poor shelter, inadequate food supplies, and little 
medical assistance.  By the end of the war, over 674,000 prisoners had been taken, and 
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over 400,000 incarcerated, of whom 56,000 died while in captivity, a mortality 
percentage much greater than that faced by soldiers on the battlefield.1  
 Unlike earlier American conflicts, the Civil War has produced a large body of 
work dealing with prisoners and POW policy.  Of particular note is the Official Records 
of the Union and Confederate Armies, an attempt by Congress to compile the history of 
the war.  The entire set is comprised of 127 volumes, of which 8 volumes, the entire 
second series, are devoted to prisoners of war.  These volumes contain a record of letters, 
pronouncements, and orders organized chronologically, and seek to draw together as 
much information about prisoners as was then possible.  No discussion of Civil War 
POWs would be complete without a thorough consultation of the Official Records.  
Because the records were not edited for accuracy, they often contain only excerpts of 
specific documents, thus it is important to include other sources.2
 Prisoners of War and Military Prisons, an early attempt to assess POW 
operations by both sides, was written by Asa B. Isham, Henry M. Davidson, and Henry 
B. Furness, all former members of the Union Army.  Their work sharply criticized 
Confederate authorities for the suffering of Union prisoners, and accused them of 
deliberately mistreating prisoners.  They substantially inflated casualty figures for Union 
prisoners and argued that almost 39 percent of Union POWs died in captivity.  In 
contrast, they minimized deaths in Union POW compounds, claiming that a mere 6 
                                                 
1 Of the 674,000 prisoners taken, 462,634 were Confederates and 211,411 were federals.  
247,769 Confederates were paroled on the battlefield, as were 16,688 federals, leaving 
214,865 Confederates and 194,743 federals held in captivity.  Lonnie R. Speer, Portals to 
Hell: Military Prisons of the Civil War (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1997), 
341. 
2 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Armies, 127 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880-
1901).  (Hereafter cited as OR, all references are to series 2 unless otherwise noted) 
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percent of Confederate prisoners died in captivity.3  The work is useful because it 
combines a number of prisoners’ diaries and journals to create a broad picture of prison 
life in the South. 
 A more balanced approach was William Best Hesseltine’s 1930 Civil War 
Prisons: A Study in War Psychology, published in 1930.  Hesseltine compared the 
experiences of Union and Confederate prisoners using the Official Records and a 
collection of personal narratives.  He argued that neither the North nor the South 
deliberately mistreated prisoners.  Rather, the high mortality rates were caused by the 
lack of exchanges during 1863 and 1864, which resulted in overcrowding and an inability 
to supply thousands of prisoners.  While Hesseltine did not blame either government for 
high mortality rates, he did argue that the Northern prisons were carefully constructed 
and well-run, while the Southern prisons were “the result of a series of accidents.”4   
 Hesseltine’s work remained the only comprehensive study of Civil War prisons 
until the publication of Lonnie Speer’s Portals to Hell in 1997.  Speer found that the 
death rates in prisons on both sides were roughly equivalent, and that neither side 
planned adequately for prisoners.  Speer considered Civil War prisoners primarily as 
victims of their captors, in particular as instruments of retaliation.5  He argued that 
conditions were so awful in the prisons that “to have been killed on the battlefield might 
have been more humane.”6   
                                                 
3 Asa B. Isham, Henry M. Davidson, and Henry B. Furness, Prisoners of War and 
Military Prisons (Cincinnati, OH: Lyman & Cushing, 1890), 475-76. 
4 William Best Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons: A Study in War Psychology (Columbus: 
Ohio State University Press, 1930), ix. 
5 Speer, Portals, xviii-xix. 
6 Ibid., xix. 
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In 2005, Charles W. Sanders, Jr. argued that the Union and Confederate 
leadership systematically mistreated captives during the war and then fabricated 
explanations for their behavior after the war.  In his view, revisionist historians have 
refused to assign blame for the “darkest chapter of that conflict.”7  Sanders equated 
neglect with malign intent toward captives and assumed that Presidents Lincoln and 
Davis were aware of prison conditions.  Further, he believed that they not only had the 
power to solve POW problems unilaterally, but that they should have placed a higher 
priority upon the maintenance of prisoners than upon the supply of troops in the field. 
 A recent trend in Civil War POW historiography is the study of individual 
prisons.  The Confederate prison at Andersonville has been the subject of dozens of 
works since the end of the war, most either vilifying the camp and its commanders as the 
worst example of POW mistreatment in the history of American warfare, or attempting to 
defend the overseers of the prison as victims of circumstance who did the best they could 
with meager resources.8  Other prison camps, Union and Confederate, remained largely 
neglected until the 1980s and 1990s, when numerous histories of specific camps 
emerged.9
                                                 
7 Charles W. Sanders, Jr., While in the Hands of the Enemy: Military Prisons of the Civil 
War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005), 5. 
8 R. Randolph Stevenson, The Southern Side; or, Andersonville Prison (Baltimore: 
Turnbull Brothers, 1876); Ovid L. Futch, History of Andersonville Prison (Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 1968); Peggy Sheppard, Andersonville, Georgia, U.S.A. 
(Leslie, GA: Sheppard Publications, 1973); Joseph P. Cangemi and Casimir J. Kowalski, 
ed., Andersonville Prison: Lessons in Organizational Failure (Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 1992); William Marvel, Andersonville: The Last Depot (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1994).   
9 Louis A. Brown, The Salisbury Prison: A Case Study of Confederate Military Prisons, 
1861-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980); Willliam S. Peterson, 
“A History of Camp Butler, 1861-1866,” Illinois Historical Journal 82 (Summer 1989): 
74-92; Sandra V. Parker, Richmond’s Civil War Prisons (Lynchburg, VA: H. E. Howard, 
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 The works discussing POW policy over the course of American history see the 
Civil War system in many ways.  Lewis and Mewha viewed the Civil War as a large-
scale missed opportunity, because both the Union and the Confederacy were desperately 
short of manpower, yet neither created a comprehensive system to utilize the potential 
labor represented by thousands of idle prisoners of war.10  Richard Garrett concluded that 
both sides took inadequate measures to secure the safety and well-being of prisoners, but 
neither side deliberately inflicted harm upon its captives.11  Howard Levie and A. J. 
Barker each argued that the only substantial result of the war with regard to international 
law and prisoners of war was the creation of the Lieber Code, which served as the basis 
for later international agreements, but had very little impact upon the treatment of POWs 
during the war.12
 At the outbreak of hostilities, neither side had a formal process for holding 
prisoners, and the Union was undecided whether to consider Confederates to be POWs at 
all.  The situation was analogous to that faced by Great Britain during the Revolutionary 
War, and like Britain, the federal government maintained that the enemy represented a 
rebellion against a legitimate government.  This position could only be maintained if the 
war was quickly ended, and after the federal losses in the summer of 1861, the 
Confederates held more prisoners than did the Union.  Any harsh treatment meted out to 
                                                                                                                                                 
1990); William O. Bryant, Cahaba Prison and the Sultana Disaster (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 1990); George Levy, To Die in Chicago: Confederate 
Prisoners at Camp Douglas, 1862-1865 (Evanston, IL: Evanston Publishing Co., 1994);  
Benjamin F. Booth, Dark Days of the Rebellion, ed. Steve Meyer (Garrison, IA: Meyer 
Publishing, 1995); Michael Horigan, Elmira: Death Camp of the North (Mechanicsburg, 
PA: Stackpole Books, 2002); Bryan Temple, The Union Prison at Fort Delaware: A 
Perfect Hell on Earth (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2003). 
10 Lewis and Mewha, Prisoner of War Utilization, 27-42. 
11 Garrett, P. O. W., 81-97. 
12 Levie, Prisoners of War, 7-8; Barker, Prisoners of War, 12-15. 
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Confederate prisoners could lead to retaliation against Union troops.  The situation 
dictated that captured Confederates be treated as POWs, but because no formal policy 
existed governing the treatment of prisoners, Union field commanders improvised ways 
to maintain and guard prisoners until the War Department could clarify the situation. 
 Initially, the federal government placed captured Confederates in military 
fortifications along the East Coast.  The most common destinations were Fort Delaware, 
Fort McHenry, and Point Lookout, Maryland.  As the number of captives grew, the 
federal government took steps to create a POW bureaucracy.  On 23 October 1861, 
Lieutenant Colonel William Hoffman was named to the wartime post of commissary 
general of prisoners and placed under the supervision of Quartermaster General 
Montgomery C. Meigs, within the Quartermaster’s Department.13  Hoffman remained in 
the position for most of the war, and was a vital part of the decision-making process for 
Union POW policies.  On 17 June 1862, Hoffman was removed from Meigs’ department, 
and placed under the direct supervision of Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, while 
retaining the same title and function within the military establishment.14  Hoffman 
centralized POW operations, established regulations for prison camps, and decided where 
prisoners should be held within the Union.  Virtually all POW correspondence went 
through Hoffman’s office, including exchange negotiations, prisoner lists, camp reports, 
and subsistence orders. 
Captured federal troops were initially held in Richmond and Charleston in a series 
of improvised prisons, mainly empty tobacco warehouses and other confiscated 
buildings.  The Confederate counterpart of Hoffman was Brigadier General John H. 
                                                 
13 WD, Special Orders, No. 284, 23 October 1861, OR, 3:121. 
14 WD, General Orders, No. 67, 17 June 1862, OR, 4:30. 
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Winder.  Winder was named provost marshal of Richmond on 21 June 1861, a position 
that included control over the federal captives sent to the city’s prisons.  Winder’s role 
expanded with the growth of the Confederate prison system, he was the de facto 
commissary general for prisoners, though the post was not formally created until 21 
November 1864.  Winder held this position until his death on 7 February 1865 during an 
inspection of the prison camp at Florence, South Carolina.15
 The Union moved more rapidly than the Confederacy to create facilities to hold 
prisoners for protracted periods.  In 1862, the Union converted a series of Volunteer 
muster camps into prison compounds, most located in the Midwest.  The largest of these 
compounds were Camps Alton and Douglas, Illinois; Camp Morton, Indiana; and Camp 
Chase, Ohio.  Two additional locations were designated for federal prisoners paroled by 
the Confederacy and returned to Union lines; Camp Parole, Maryland and Benton 
Barracks in St. Louis.  The Union prisoners remained at these camps under the 
supervision of the federal government until exchanged and returned to their regiments. 
 Despite negotiations to exchange prisoners and a rising number of captures by 
both sides, some commanders issued orders that prisoners not be taken.  On 30 August 
1862, Captain Joseph P. Reavis protested that two Confederate prisoners had been 
removed from a guardhouse for execution, by order of Colonel Albert Sigel.  Reavis 
noted, “General, I know that we have orders from you to take no prisoners, but the spot 
where they are taken in my judgment is the place where you intended to have them 
executed; not after being placed under guard . . . taken forcibly from the guard-tent and 
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mercilessly murdered.”16  An investigation found that Sigel had ordered no quarter given 
to Confederate irregulars who conducted raids into Union territory, commonly called 
“bushwhackers,” but had not ordered the execution of prisoners once taken.17  Hoffman 
did not clarify the Union definition of legal prisoners of war until 4 December 1862, 
when he informed prison commandants that all enemy soldiers taken in arms were 
POWs, and that unarmed Confederate deserters, while not formally POWs, should be 
held for investigation as possible spies.18  Prior to that time, field commanders made 
decisions independent of the War Department to define who was a prisoner and how they 
should be treated. 
 On 11 February 1862, Stanton designated Major General John E. Wool, the 
commander of Fort Monroe, to negotiate with Confederate Major General Benjamin C. 
Huger, commander at Norfolk, for the exchange of prisoners.  Wool promptly notified 
Huger of his appointment, and Huger designated Brigadier General Howell Cobb to serve 
as the Confederate negotiator.19  Wool and Cobb met on 23 February, and quickly agreed 
that all prisoners on both sides should be exchanged, man-for-man, using the equivalency 
system adopted during the War of 1812.  Any excess prisoners held by either side were to 
be released on parole.  Cobb considered the matter finished, and the Confederacy 
immediately began to forward paroled prisoners to the front lines for the purpose of 
exchange.  Wool, however, claimed that because no exchange cartel had been signed, the 
                                                 
16 Joseph P. Reavis to John Schofield, 30 August 1862, OR, 4:473. 
17 J. M. Glover to John Schofield, 18 September 1862, OR, 4:532-39 contains the report 
of the investigators.  No federal officer was punished for the incident. 
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National Archives.  Peter Zinn was commandant of Camp Chase, Ohio. 
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agreement was in principle, not a practical plan to forward POWs for exchange.  He 
stated that his orders had been changed just days after the agreement, and that the federal 
government would agree to exchanges, but would not parole excess prisoners.  The 
reason for the shift was simple: the balance of prisoners dramatically shifted with the 
capture of Fort Donelson and nearly fifteen thousand Confederates on 16 February 1862.  
Suddenly, the federal government had a surplus of prisoners that it did not want to 
release.  Cobb was justifiably angry, but had no means to compel the Union to live up to 
the agreement. 
 The two sides met again in June of 1862, to negotiate a formal exchange cartel 
that would serve for the remainder of the war, rather than a single agreement to exchange 
prisoners on hand.  The negotiations were significant because they constituted a de facto 
recognition of the Confederate government as a sovereign power, something the Union 
had resisted for a year.  The federal government sent Major General John A. Dix; the 
Confederacy sent Major General Daniel H. Hill.  After several weeks of debate, a formal 
cartel was signed on 22 July 1862 that governed the future exchange of prisoners.   
 The cartel consisted of six articles designed to create a simple, functional 
exchange system.  The document did not formally recognize the Confederacy as a 
belligerent, instead, it referred to Dix and Hill as “having been commissioned by the 
authorities they respectively represent.”20  The cartel stipulated that all prisoners, 
including those taken as privateers, would be exchanged either man-for-man or according 
to a system of rank equivalencies.  The equivalencies were identical to the system 
included in the Cartel of May 1813, used during the War of 1812.  In addition, prisoners 
                                                 
20 John A. Dix to Edwin M. Stanton, 23 July 1862, OR, 4: 266-68.  Dix’s letter to Stanton 
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from different branches of services could be exchanged for one another, and privateers 
could be exchanged for any other military personnel.  All prisoners were to be paroled 
within ten days of capture and delivered to pre-determined exchange points.  Paroled 
prisoners could not serve in any military capacity until properly exchanged, including 
garrison, police, guard, and constabulary duties. 
 If each side had followed the provisions of the cartel throughout the war, the 
situation of POWs during the war might have been radically different.  There would have 
been no need for the massive prison compounds, no allegations of deliberate 
mistreatment of thousands of prisoners.  The cartel included a key provision, that “the 
stipulations and provisions above mentioned to be of binding obligation during the 
continuance of the war, it matters not which party may have the surplus of prisoners.”21  
This provision proved inconvenient to each side at various times, and over the course of 
the war, both the Union and the Confederacy moved to suspend all exchanges, but 
gradually the prisons in the North and the South became virtually empty.  From July of 
1862 until May of 1863, approximately twenty thousand Confederate and twelve 
thousand Union prisoners were exchanged.22
 When the Union began to enlist African-American regiments at the end of 1862, 
the Confederate response was outrage.  President Jefferson Davis, fearing a general slave 
insurrection, announced that white officers commanding black troops were subject to trial 
and execution for inciting a servile insurrection.23  Any black troops taken prisoner were 
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contained within WD, C.S.A., General Orders, No. 111, 24 December 1862, OR, 5:905-
08. 
 
 114
to be delivered to state control, and punished according to the state laws for slaves caught 
bearing arms.24  Field commanders issued orders that no quarter be offered to black 
troops or their white officers, including the message of Lieutenant General Edmund 
Kirby Smith, dated 13 June 1863, “I have been unofficially informed, that some of your 
troops have captured negroes in arms, I hope this may not be so, and your subordinates 
who may have been in command of capturing parties may have recognized the propriety 
of giving no quarter to armed negroes and their officers, in this way we may be relieved 
from a disagreeable dilemma.”25
 On 30 July 1863, President Abraham Lincoln announced that any soldier of the 
United States executed by the enemy in violation of the laws of war would result in the 
execution of a Confederate prisoner of equal rank.  For any black troops placed into 
slavery, an equal number of Confederates would be placed at hard labor.26  Lincoln 
sought to use the threat of retaliation to ensure that all Union troops were treated equally  
as prisoners of war.  Union threats of retaliation did not have the intended effect, and 
captured black troops faced execution or slavery at the hands of Confederates, depending 
upon the whim of the Confederate commander.  On 25 September 1864, Major General 
Ethan Allen Hitchcock was informed that wounded black troops at the Battle of Olustee 
were executed on the field by “Georgia Regulars.”27  On 16 October 1864, Confederate 
slaveowners were informed that 575 members of the United States Colored Troops 
(U.S.C.T.), many former slaves, were employed on fortifications near Mobile, and that 
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former owners could report to the city to claim their slaves.28  On 12 October, Major 
General Benjamin Butler notified Colonel Robert Ould, Confederate commissioner of 
exchange, that 110 Confederate officers and men would be employed constructing a 
canal at Dutch Gap until an equal number of U.S.C.T. troops were removed from 
construction parties building fortifications at Fort Gilmer.29  On 19 October 1864, Lee 
defended the practice of reenslaving captured U.S.C.T. soldiers, informing Lieutenant 
General Ulysses S. Grant that only soldiers who were slaves prior to joining the Union 
Army were required to work on fortifications.  Grant responded by ordering Butler to 
remove the Confederate prisoners from the Dutch Gap Canal, but threatening to retaliate 
for any future mistreatment of Union prisoners, regardless of color or previous 
servitude.30  In January of 1865, O. O. Poppleton notified Butler that 569 black soldiers 
captured by Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest had been sent to Mobile and forced to 
work on the city’s defenses.31
 On a number of occasions, individuals offered specific mass exchanges to 
alleviate the suffering of prisoners without raising the issue of the exchange cartel.  On 7 
December 1863, Major General Henry Halleck offered to exchange all federal POWs 
held in Richmond jails for their equivalents in federal hands.  Lee refused the offer on 12 
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December, on the grounds that it did not precisely follow the system of the cartel.32  In 
September of 1864, Major General William T. Sherman refused the offer of Lieutenant 
General John Bell Hood to “release to him the prisoners at Andersonville in exchange for 
the soldiers taken from Hood in the Georgia campaign,” even though Sherman would 
receive 30,000 federal prisoners in exchange for a fraction of that number of 
Confederates.33   
 Exchange was certainly an important consideration to the prisoners on each side.  
Rumors of possible exchanges circulated through every prison camp on a daily basis.  
Prior to 1863, POWs had a good chance of parole and eventual exchange, and this fact is 
reflected in prisoner narratives.  When prisoner exchanges virtually ceased, the hope of 
exchange did not die, rather the rumors continued unabated, if unsubstantiated.34
 The Confederacy held the balance of prisoners for the first two years of the war, 
but the situation radically changed with the surrender of Vicksburg, Mississippi on 4 July 
1863 with over 29,000 prisoners.  When reduced to privates by the table of equivalencies, 
the capture of Vicksburg included 42,300 privates.  Most of the prisoners were paroled 
rather than being sent to prison camps in the North.35  Ould requested on 20 October 
1863 that all prisoners be exchanged according to the provisions of the exchange cartel, 
and claimed that Sullivan A. Meredith, the federal commissioner of exchange, had 
                                                 
32 Henry W. Halleck to Robert E. Lee, 7 December 1863; Robert E. Lee to Henry W. 
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verbally agreed to do so.  Meredith claimed to have made no such agreement, and 
countered that the Confederacy had declared thousands of prisoners exchanged without 
sending equivalent numbers back to federal lines.36  The Confederacy held Union POWs 
in the fall of 1863, but did not send them for exchange. 
 When Stanton, Hoffman, Meredith, and Hitchcock refused Ould’s request to 
exchange the Vicksburg prisoners, Ould opted to unilaterally declare the men exchanged 
and eligible to return to Confederate service.  He announced that the men were 
considered exchanged because the Confederacy had delivered captured federal troops to 
City Point and had not received any prisoners in return.  In response to Ould’s 
announcement, Hitchcock urged Stanton to suspend all deliveries of Confederate 
prisoners until the Confederacy delivered enough Union prisoners to match the 
Vicksburg captures.37  The cartel had effectively stopped functioning two months earlier, 
but the Vicksburg surrender certainly exacerbated the situation.  Benjamin Butler 
responded to Ould’s statement by declaring “The Cartel is entirely annulled.”38  Each 
government expected perfect adherence by the enemy, and threatened retaliation for any 
breach of the cartel, but both sides violated the spirit and the wording of the cartel when 
it suited their purpose. 
 The decision to halt exchanges, from the perspective of Stanton, was a simple 
one, given that released Confederate prisoners were typically healthy enough to return to 
duty, while exchanged federal prisoners tended to be incapable of rendering service for 
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months after returning from confinement.  In the words of Charles Alfred Humphreys, a 
chaplain of the 2nd Maryland Cavalry, “Stanton was inflexible in adherence to his 
principle that in dealing with this question, something should not be given for nothing.”39  
To support ending all exchanges, Hoffman sent Hitchcock a list of federal POWs on 
parole in the North.  If every federal prisoner in a Northern parole camp was declared 
exchanged, the Confederacy would still owe the Union 33,596 prisoners when reduced to 
privates by the system of equivalencies.40  According to Hoffman’s calculations, this 
number was roughly equivalent to the number of Union prisoners being held in 
Confederate prisons.41  Unfortunately, by ending exchanges, the Union ensured that tens 
of thousands of prisoners would face prolonged captivity, as neither side was willing to 
parole enemy troops if exchange was unlikely.  
 Some individuals in both the Union and the Confederacy viewed POWs as a 
potential source of new recruits for their own military forces.  While international law did 
not allow captors to force POWs to enlist, there was no legal provision against voluntary 
enlistment.  Of course, any prisoner that switched allegiance in the conflict was subject to 
trial and execution for desertion if recaptured.  Thousands of prisoners decided to switch 
sides rather than remaining in captivity.  On 10 July 1862, Stanton ordered Robert 
Murray, U.S. marshal in New York City, to visit the city prisons and survey the captives, 
to determine if any were willing to shift allegiances.42  However, by 25 February 1863, 
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Stanton had changed his stance, and he informed Hoffman that Confederate prisoners, 
even if willing to take an oath of allegiance, were not to be enlisted into federal ranks.43  
 Throughout the summer of 1863, federal policies regarding the recruitment of 
Confederate POWs wavered.  In spite Stanton’s policy forbidding the recruitment of 
prisoners, approximately six hundred Confederate POWs were enlisted into federal 
service from the prison population at Fort Delaware from May to August, 1863.  Many of 
these were detailed for service on the western frontier, to free troops for service against 
the Confederacy.  Stanton made an important exception to his orders for prisoners who 
had been conscripted into Confederate service.  On 20 June 1863, Stanton gave 
permission for Major Generals Ambrose Burnside, John M. Schofield, and Andrew 
Johnson to accept Confederate prisoners conscripted from the Tennessee region into 
federal service.44  Hoffman announced on 2 August 1863 that enlisted men in the 
Confederate Army who claimed to have been impressed could be inducted into Union 
service if the examining officer believed the prisoner to be reliable.45  Stanton again 
ordered on 26 August 1863 that no Confederate prisoners be enlisted, but within three 
days, granted special permission for Major General William S. Rosecrans to enlist 
prisoners.46
 Stanton faced pressure from state authorities as well as field commanders for the 
recruitment of prisoners.  Governor Oliver P. Morton of Indiana asked permission to 
enlist two hundred Irish POWs held at Camp Morton.  Stanton acceded to the request, 
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authorizing Morton to free the prisoners and enlist them in the Thirty-Fifth Indiana 
Regiment.47  One year later, Lincoln authorized the recruitment of foreign-born prisoners 
held at Rock Island, Illinois, for service in Pennsylvania regiments.48  Such recruitment 
contradicted the wishes of Grant, who advised that if such men were to be allowed into 
service, they should all be placed into a single regiment detailed for frontier service.49   
In all, over six thousand Confederate soldiers took the oath of allegiance and 
switched sides during the war.  These men, officially known as “United States 
Volunteers,” were formed into six regiments and were commonly referred to as 
“Galvanized Yankees.”  These regiments saw service at more than fifty outposts along 
the western frontier, from St. Louis to San Francisco.  They reopened the Overland Trail 
to the Pacific Coast, which had been closed by Native American raids in 1864, and 
guarded stagecoach and wagon trains moving through hostile areas, and in the process 
fought dozens of engagements against Native American tribes. 50
 The Confederate government also sought to enlist federal POWs, although it did 
so with less success.  The Confederacy did not have the alternative of frontier duty for 
enlisted prisoners, and thus federal troops who volunteered risked trial for desertion if 
recaptured.  Confederate Secretary of War James A. Seddon was skeptical of the 
recruitment of federal prisoners, stating that “the Yankees are not to be trusted so far, or 
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at all.”51  On 8 November 1864, 349 POWs enlisted from Camp Lawton, Georgia.52  On 
16 January 1865, Colonel J. G. O’Neil of the Tenth Tennessee Regiment was authorized 
to enlist federal POWs for Confederate service.  On 24 January, 192 prisoners enlisted, 
followed on 28 February by the enlistment of 138 prisoners.53  The federal troops that did 
enlist in Confederate service deserted in high numbers, and most reported joining the 
enemy ranks out of desperation.54  Dee Brown estimated that between 1,500 and 2,000 
federal POWs enlisted into Confederate ranks, but found that most surrendered to Union 
troops as quickly as possible, and they did not represent a significant source of manpower 
to the Confederacy.55   The actual number of Union POW recruits into Confederate 
service was much higher, given that 2,169 federal prisoners joined the Confederate ranks 
from a single prison.56  Most Union prisoners who entered Confederate service deserted 
at the first opportunity to enter Union lines, or surrendered to federal units as quickly as 
possible.  As these desperate ex-prisoners entered Union lines, the war was rapidly 
ending, and the conditions of captivity were becoming known to Union authorities, who 
declined to persecute the individuals involved. 
 On 24 April 1863, the War Department issued the most important and detailed 
provisions for POW treatment in American history.  General Orders No. 100, also known 
as the “Lieber Code” after its creator, Francis Lieber, consisted of 157 articles, 
                                                 
51 Samuel Jones to Braxton Bragg, 13 September 1864, OR, 7:821-22. 
52 D. W. Vowles to Commanding Officer, C.S.A. Military Prison, Camp Lawton, 8 
November 1864, OR, 7: 1113-14. 
53 WD, C.S.A., Special Orders, No. 8, 16 January 1865, Volume 19, Entry 106, RG 249. 
54 Isham, et al., Prisoners of War, 365-66.   
55 Brown, Galvanized Yankees, 211-17. 
56 “Register of Federal POWs who enlisted in CSA, Salisbury, NC,” Volume 1, Entry 
136, RG 249.  The inside cover notes that recruiting was done by “Irish Catholic of 
Yorke’s Louisiana Brig.” 
 
 122
“Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field.”57  Lieber, 
a professor of history and political economy at Columbia College, had prepared a 
summary of international law regarding guerrilla warfare and forwarded it to Halleck, 
general in chief of the army, on 1 August 1862.58  Impressed with the brevity and clarity 
of Lieber’s work, Halleck ordered five thousand copies of the sixteen-page pamphlet 
printed for distribution throughout the officer corps.  On 13 November 1862, Lieber 
suggested the president create a committee to codify the laws of war, with Halleck as 
chairman.  Lieber recommended the committee define who should be considered a 
prisoner of war, and how prisoners should be treated by federal forces.  On 17 December, 
Halleck invited Lieber to Washington to serve on a special board, chaired by 
Commissioner of Exchange Hitchcock, charged “to propose amendments or changes in 
the Rules and Articles of War and a code of regulations for the government of Armies in 
the field as authorized by the laws and usages of War.”59
 Of the 157 articles of the Lieber Code, 38 are devoted to the capture, 
maintenance, and release of prisoners of war.  Lieber defined a prisoner of war as “a 
public enemy armed or attached to the hostile army for active aid, who has fallen into the 
arms of the captor, either fighting or wounded, on the field or in the hospital, by 
individual surrender, or by capitulation.”60  This included all soldiers, any individual 
rising en masse with the occupation of enemy territory, any citizen accompanying the 
army, and any partisan fighting detached from the main body of the army.  Lieber defined 
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guerrilla activities as outside the laws of war.  Any individuals who fought without being 
part of an organized army, without sharing continuously in the war, and occasionally 
returning to their homes or pretending to be civilians, were not entitled to the privileges 
of prisoners of war.61  All prisoners of war were to be treated equally, according to rank, 
and could not be divided by class, race, or condition.  Further, the code specifically 
forbade the enslavement of any member of any prisoners of war.  No unit of troops had 
the right to announce it would give no quarter, although any unit that gave no quarter in 
practice could expect none in return.62  Once prisoners were taken, they were the 
property of the capturing government, not the capturing units or individuals.  They could 
be placed in confinement, but must be treated with dignity and respect, fed plain, 
wholesome food, and provided with adequate medical care.  In exchange, the government 
could require prisoners to labor for the government benefit, according to their rank and 
condition.  Regarding prisoners who enlisted with the enemy, the Lieber code was clear: 
any member of the U.S. military who enlisted in enemy service and was recaptured was 
subject to trial for desertion.63   
 The Lieber Code did not supersede previous exchange agreements, nor did it 
unilaterally destroy the exchange cartel.  Halleck noted in a letter to Hitchcock, that the 
Code, “Simply announces general principles which apply only in the absence of special 
agreements.”64  Paroles given by troops captured after the issuance of General Orders 
No. 100 that were not in accordance with the provisions of the exchange cartel were 
considered null and void, even if they followed the instructions provided by the Lieber 
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Code.  Halleck ordered Hitchcock to release any federal troops on parole in the North 
that had been paroled by the Confederates, on the grounds that their parole was illegal, 
and therefore they were not prisoners of war.65  This action infuriated Ould, who asked 
that all prisoners on both sides be released from their paroles, and cited General Orders 
No. 100, Article 131 as justification.66
 The Code was not a simple series of orders, it was a persuasive argument for how 
wars should be fought, noting that war was not an excuse for immoral behavior.  It was 
realistic without being rigid, it prohibited certain activities, including cruelty, maiming, 
torture, and poisoning, but allowed for military necessity and retaliation.  Unlike earlier 
works on international law and the laws of war, the Lieber Code was created specifically 
to govern armies in the field.  Richard Shelly Hartigan argued “Never before had a 
government set down in clear, explicit, formal terms not only the rights and obligations 
of its own army, but of its enemy’s army and civil population as well.”67   
 The impact of the Lieber Code reached far beyond to the American Civil War.  It 
was adopted almost unchanged by the British, French, and Prussian governments in the 
decade after the Civil War.  The code also served as the basis for international attempts to 
codify the laws of war at the Brussels Conference of 1874; the Institute for International 
Law’s manual of the laws of land warfare; and at the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
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1907.68  Within the American military, the code governed army operations during the 
Spanish-American War and influenced doctrine in the 1914 Field Service Regulations.69
 The Confederate prison camps for federal POWs were most characterized by two 
locations.  The first was a system of prisons in and around Richmond, in particular on 
Belle Isle and at Libby Prison.  Despite their close proximity, the two prisons were vastly 
different.  Libby was primarily reserved for Union officers, who received more food, 
larger living spaces, and better shelter.  One enlisted prisoner noted, “Libby has a hard 
name, but it was the most comfortable of the six Confederate prisons of which I saw the 
interior.”70  Another observed, “Being an officer, I suffered but little in comparison with 
what was endured by the rank and file.”71  Many others commented that the treatment 
was markedly different between officers and enlisted men, some claimed it was due to 
the stratification of Southern society, others argued that the conditions within the camps 
were dependent upon the whims of the commanding officers of the prison.72
 Without doubt, the prison most associated with the Civil War today was Camp 
Sumter, located near Andersonville, Georgia.  Andersonville, as the prison was 
commonly known, was the largest of the Southern emergency camps, created to house 
prisoners a great distance from the battle front, thus preventing any rescue attempts such 
as the cavalry raids on Richmond designed to free the prisoners at Libby.  Andersonville 
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was a great distance from any major rail hub, in the interior of the state, thus supplying 
the camp was extremely difficult.  While Andersonville was not the only camp to 
experience massive supply shortages and high mortality rates, it was certainly the largest 
Confederate prison camp, and the conditions at Andersonville rivaled those at any other 
camp.   
 The prison compound at Camp Sumter was authorized in February of 1864, and 
received its first prisoners on 24 February.  Designated to relieve overcrowding in 
Richmond’s facilities, it was slated to hold ten thousand prisoners.  Initially, the camp 
consisted of a rough-hewn stockade wall enclosing seventeen acres, with guard platforms 
spaced around the wall.  A “dead-line” was marked by a line of posts topped with a four-
inch wide plank, twelve feet inside the stockade.  Any prisoner that crossed the dead-line 
was likely to be shot without warning.  The only water supply for the prisoners was a 
slow-flowing creek that ran through the center of the stockade.  No shelter was provided 
for any of the prisoners, beyond what they could improvise from materials they carried at 
the time of capture.  As such, some prisoners slept within tents, some in holes covered by 
canvas, and some exposed to the elements. 
 The Andersonville prisoners resorted to desperate measures to survive their 
captivity.  A gang of prisoners, commonly called the “Raiders” in prisoner journals, 
preyed upon their fellow captives, robbing new arrivals of any cash or valuables that 
could be bartered with guards, stealing clothing, blankets, and food from other prisoners.  
On 11 July 1864, a different group of prisoners organized a posse and captured the 
leaders of the Raiders.  They were put on trial by their fellow POWs, found guilty of 
murder and robbery, and hanged for their crimes on a gallows provided by the prison 
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commandant, Captain Henry Wirz.  The condemned “were buried away from their fellow 
prisoners as a further mark of shame.”73  The rest of the Raiders were forced to “run the 
gauntlet” between two lines of prisoners who rained down blows with clubs and fists 
upon them.74
 By August of 1864, Andersonville had received more than 35,000 prisoners, 
reaching a daily occupancy of 33,114 on 8 August 1864.75  Over 100 prisoners died 
every day, with an all-time high of 127 deaths on 23 August 1864. 76  Rations for the 
prisoners, always in short supply, were never issued for more than 11,000 prisoners on a 
single day.77  The typical ration was unbolted corn meal, which contributed to an 
extremely high rate of dysentery and chronic diarrhea within the POW population.  
Prisoners were susceptible to virtually any form of communicable disease, as well as 
dietary disorders such as scurvy.  Medical facilities at Camp Sumter were virtually 
nonexistent, a trip to the hospital was a virtual death-warrant as 75 percent of prisoners 
admitted to the camp hospital died while patients.78  Of the approximately 45,000 
prisoners confined at Andersonville, 12,912 died in confinement.79
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 The possibility of exchanging the prisoners at Andersonville arose repeatedly.  
The prisoners sent numberous requests to Stanton, Lincoln, and state governors.  
Civilians petitioned for the release of the Andersonville prisoners, urging the federal 
government, “Fear not to make concessions, and to submit even to some degree of 
wrong, that you may achieve the God-like work of giving deliverance to the captives.”80  
Sherman refused Hood’s offer to exchange the entire population of Andersonville for the 
few thousand Confederate troops captured in the fighting around Atlanta, on the grounds 
that the exchange would overburden his logistics and delay the end of the war.  The 
Union was certainly aware of the situation in Andersonville, as Sherman received regular 
reports from prisoners who escaped the camp and reached his lines.81   
 As Sherman moved through the South in his “march to the sea,” Camp Sumter 
authorities became concerned that the Union troops would undertake a raid to free the 
prisoners at Andersonville.  On 27 July 1864, Confederate Commissary General of 
Prisons Winder ordered artillery officers manning the batteries outside Camp Sumter 
“upon receiving notice that the enemy has approached within seven miles of this post, 
open upon the stockade with grapeshot, without reference to the situation beyond these 
lines of defense.”82  Winder ordered the murder of thousands of prisoners rather than 
allowing their recapture by Union forces, a clear violation of the laws and customs of 
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civilized warfare as understood by both sides.  After Winder’s death, his replacement as 
commissary general of prisoners, Colonel Henry Forno, issued a similar order for all 
prison camps in Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia on 15 February 1865.  Forno’s order, 
written to prevent a general uprising among prisoners, was legal because it was to be 
executed only in the event of a mutiny, it did not order camp commanders to kill 
prisoners in response to an external threat.83
 The Union first created a uniform set of regulations for POW compounds on 7 
July 1862.  The initial regulations called for prisoners to receive rations equivalent to 
those given Union Army troops in the field.  The daily ration was to include bread, fresh 
beef or pork, beans or rice, potatoes, molasses, salt, sugar, coffee, and tea.  A general 
prisoner fund was created for each camp, for the improvement of camp life, and was 
financed by withholding from rations all that could be spared without inconvenience to 
the prisoners and selling the surplus.  The fund could be used for table furniture, cooking 
implements, cleaning supplies, and construction materials.  Prisoners could only be 
paroled or released by direction of the Commissary General of Prisoners, under the 
supervision of the War Department.84
 On 20 April 1863 the regulations were revised, requiring camp surgeons to submit 
semi-monthly reports of POW deaths, including the name, rank, and unit of the dead 
prisoner.  A statement of the prison fund from each camp was required on a monthly 
basis, including expenditures from the fund.  According to the new regulations, the Union 
Army issued clothing to POWs as necessary.  Any army clothing was acceptable, with all 
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buttons and trim removed so prisoners would not be mistaken for Union troops.  Clothing 
could be sent to POWs from family and friends, as long as it was gray or butternut in 
color.  The regulations reiterated that no paroles or releases were allowed without the 
authorization of the Secretary of War. 
 Through 1864, the federal government maintained prisoners at dozens of 
locations of varying sizes to facilitate exchanges.85  On 3 May 1864, field commanders 
were informed that all prisoners should be forwarded from temporary depots to a few 
permanent depots as quickly as possible.  The principal depots were designated to be: 
Point Lookout, Maryland; Fort Delaware; Johnsons’ Island, Ohio; Camp Chase, Ohio; 
Camp Morton, Indiana; Camp Douglas, Illinois; and Rock Island, Illinois.  All other 
locations were regarded as temporary depots.  The War Department reiterated that it held 
all authority for paroles and exchanges.86   
On 1 June 1864, Hoffman directed camp commanders to reduce the rations in 
Northern camps to match those in Confederate prisons, and to stop allowing friends or 
relatives to send food to prisoners confined in the North.  The daily caloric intake 
dropped in Northern prisons by over 30 percent.87  He also ordered that only one suit of 
clothing was allowed for each prisoner, to be made of inferior quality.88  Some 
Confederate prisoners saw the reduction as a malicious attack upon their welfare, as one 
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noted, “Every means was used to prevent our friends outside or at our homes from 
knowing our real condition.”89   
 As in the Confederacy, the Union prisons segregated officers and enlisted 
personnel.  The primary camp for officers was Johnsons’ Island, where prisoners reported 
fairly pleasant conditions, with ample diet, extensive privileges, and a generally 
comfortable environment.  Indeed, William W. Ward reported that he gained a 
considerable amount of weight while imprisoned.90  Most complaints revolved around 
the use of black troops as prison guards and the boredom of camp life.  Rather than 
discussing survival, escape, or exchange, many officers’ accounts focus upon financial 
issues, particularly the fear of having insufficient funds to maintain a luxurious 
existence.91
 While officers enjoyed a high standard of living in captivity, poor conditions for 
enlisted prisoners were certainly not limited to the South.  The North had more resources 
and a greater capacity to house and feed Confederate prisoners, yet the overall mortality 
rate in Union prison camps was virtually identical to that in Confederate camps.  The 
War Department received regular updates from the commanders and surgeons of prison 
camps.  On 19 August 1863, Stanton received a report from the commander of Fort 
Delaware that 180 Confederates had died from 1 July until 19 August, out of a population 
of approximately 10,000 prisoners.  The report included a statement made by four 
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Confederate surgeons held in the prison, who regarded the mortality rate as low for the 
size of the prison.  The camp commander offered that “From my own observation, I 
consider the prisoners of war at this post in as good condition as it could be possible to 
keep them at any other place.”92   
 In December of 1863, Stanton requested Dr. Montrose A. Pallen to inspect the 
largest federal prison camps.  Pallen reported that prisoners in all locations were living in 
tents without sufficient blankets to offset the cold of winter, but also observed that 
prisoners received the same quantity and quality of rations as those provided to federal 
troops, including fresh bread each day and fresh beef five days per week.  Pallen 
surmised that the high mortality rates in camp were not due to federal negligence, but 
because that many Confederate prisoners were in very poor condition prior to their 
arrival in camps and that most had not been inoculated against smallpox, which had 
struck at each of the camps.93
 The location most often compared to Camp Sumter was Camp Elmira, located in 
upstate New York.  Each camp was opened in 1864, was extremely overcrowded, and 
had an abnormally high mortality rate.  Elmira was initially constructed as a training 
depot for Union troops.  However, on 23 May 1864, Colonel Seth Eastman informed 
Adjutant General E. D. Townsend that the location was ideal for a prison camp, as it was 
built to house 3,000 recruits comfortably, but was not in use.  William Hoffman ordered 
Eastman to prepare for as many as 10,000 Confederate POWs, but Eastman assumed the 
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number would never exceed 5,000.94  From July 1864 until July 1865, a total of 12,263 
enlisted Confederate POWs were sent to Elmira.  The greatest number reported at Elmira 
was in August, 1864, when prison returns contained 9,480 names.  2,951 prisoners died at 
Elmira, for a total mortality rate of 24 percent, the highest rate of any Union prison camp, 
though lower than the mortality rate at Andersonville.95  Much of the misery at Elmira 
was blamed on two major factors: the water supply, which was provided by a small pond 
that also served as a latrine-sink, and the weather, as thousands of captives were exposed 
to the elements without adequate clothing, blankets, or shelter.  Prison life at Elmira was 
tightly regimented, as one former captive stated, “Daily life at Elmira followed a routine 
as regular as clockwork.”96  This statement was a far cry from the mass chaos associated 
with Andersonville, where no effort was made to regulate the daily activities of prisoners, 
but the lack of shelter and a clean water supply paralleled the conditions there. 
 As the war came to a close, the Union moved quickly to free all federal prisoners 
still held in Southern camps.  Prisoners assumed that the surrender of the Army of 
Northern Virginia would mean a quick end to the war, but prisoners in the Trans-
Mississippi region faced the possibility of months of further confinement.  Prisoners at 
Camp Ford, Texas were not informed of the end of the war, their captors simply left the 
walls of the camp after notifying the POWs that they had been exchanged.97  One final 
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disaster remained for the prisoners fortunate enough to survive Andersonville and other 
Southern prison camps.  On 26 April 1865, the river steamer Sultana, built to carry less 
than 400 passengers, headed up the Mississippi River bearing over 2,000 former Union 
prisoners.  At 2:00 AM on 27 April 1865, the steamer exploded, killing 1,900 passengers, 
almost all former prisoners.98
 The Union moved less quickly to free Confederate prisoners, but on 21 July 1865, 
Hoffman ordered that all Confederate prisoners be released from federal parole camps 
and returned to their home states, with the exception of prisoners caught with Jefferson 
Davis and those held for special reasons, such as conviction of a crime committed while a 
prisoner.99  All freed prisoners swore the Oath of Allegiance to the United States before 
they were released, and gave their parole to be of good behavior and commit no act of 
hostility toward the United States.  After release, all prisoners were transported to the 
point nearest their homes accessible by rail or steamboat.100  By 20 October 1865, federal 
rosters listed only fifteen prisoners still in confinement.  The number included four 
privates too sick to travel, a convicted spy, Davis and two personal aides, Confederate 
Secretary of the Navy Stephen A. Mallory, and Henry Wirz.  All other prisoners had been 
released and returned home, without punishment for serving in the Confederate military 
forces.101   
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 Of those prisoners, only Wirz was placed on trial for his acts during the war.  His 
trial was one of the first war crimes trials in history.  Despised by the federal prisoners in 
his charge, Wirz was accused of murdering Union captives and indicted for murder and 
conspiracy to commit murder.  After a trial of two months, he was found guilty on ten of 
the thirteen counts the indictment.  The court named Davis, Seddon, and Cobb as co-
conspirators in the deliberate attempt to mistreat Union prisoners, but none of them were 
brought to trial.  Wirz was executed on 10 November 1865, after pleas for leniency or a 
pardon were denied.  Days after the execution, it was discovered that the most damning 
testimony of the trial was fabricated.  The government’s star witness of the trial, Felix de 
la Baume, was given a written commendation from the trial commission for his 
testimony, and rewarded with a clerkship in the Department of the Interior.  On 26 
November 1865 the New York Tribune identified De la Baume as Felix Oeser, a deserter 
from the Seventh New York.  Oeser lost his clerkship, and admitted his testimony had 
been perjured.102   
The Wirz family has argued for decades that Wirz was a scapegoat for the horrors 
of Andersonville, and that he did his best to save as many prisoners as possible from 
conditions beyond his control.  Wirz was the only member of the Andersonville 
command structure to be held accountable for the deaths of Union prisoners despite his 
defense that he was not the highest ranking authority at the prison, and that he acted 
under orders from Winder.103  Joseph Cangemi and Casimir Kowalski argued that 
postwar propaganda surrounding Andersonville, including the testimony given at Wirz’s 
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trial, provided a justification for harsh Reconstruction policies, and that the Northern 
public believed a deliberate effort to destroy Union POWs existed at Camp Sumter.104
 The Civil War illustrated the pitfalls of improvised POW policies during a total 
war.  As the pace of captures rose in 1862 and 1863, diplomatic breakdowns forced each 
belligerent to create holding facilities for thousands of prisoners almost overnight.  Due 
to the lack of planning, and the low priority given to prisoner welfare, these prison camps 
proved wholly inadequate to the task of maintaining the prisoners.  General Orders 100 
established a set of regulations for the capture and confinement of prisoners that 
governed military forces in the field for decades after the war and helped establish 
international agreements regarding POW treatment, greatly improving the lot of prisoners 
in conflicts around the world.  Unfortunately the Lieber Code was issued too late to solve 
the problems encountered during the Civil War.  The horrors of the Civil War prison 
camps, particularly Andersonville and Elmira, left a lasting impression upon the 
American military and the American public, and served as an example of what could 
happen if POW policy continued to be improvised in future wars.  In the conflicts after 
the Civil War, military commanders devoted at least some forethought to the problem of 
prisoners of war, and sought to avoid the mistakes made by both sides during the war.  
Similarly, diplomatic efforts in the period after the Civil War sought to establish the 
precise rights of prisoners of war, and the responsibilities of capturing powers.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
AMERICA BECOMES A WORLD POWER, 1865-1919 
 
 
 The period from 1865 to 1919 was punctuated by several international attempts to 
codify the laws of war, as well as conflicts involving the deployment of U.S. forces 
overseas.  The foundation of the Red Cross in 1864, the Declaration of Brussels in 1874, 
and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 all served to alleviate the conditions faced 
by prisoners of war around the globe.  The Spanish-American War in 1898 demonstrated 
the ability of the United States to capture and maintain thousands of prisoners in a 
humane fashion, if only for a short period of time.  The Philippine War (1899-1902) 
showed the practical difficulties of applying a single code of conduct to guerrilla warfare 
in a wide variety of environments, and illustrated that American POW practices did not 
always follow the prescribed policies for the treatment of enemy prisoners. 
 In 1917, the United States joined the fighting more than two years into the 
conflict, when millions of prisoners already had been taken by all belligerents.  U.S. 
officials were familiar with the plight of prisoners throughout Europe, as they had 
accepted the role of protecting power for all of the major combatant nations, overseeing 
the needs of prisoners held by both sides of the conflict.  The War Department made 
virtually no effort to plan for the capture and maintenance of enemy troops, and thus was 
almost completely unprepared for the influx of prisoners with the entry of American 
troops into combat.  As it had since the Revolutionary War, the army improvised a POW 
program, with the result that prisoners were inadequately sheltered and fed, and no effort 
was made to utilize the labor of prisoners held by American forces until after the end of 
the war. 
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 Delegates from sixteen nations met in August of 1864 to form a charitable society 
dedicated to alleviating the hardships of war for sick and wounded soldiers, regardless of 
nationality, resulting in the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross.  
The mission of the Red Cross gradually expanded throughout the nineteenth century, by 
1870 it included aiding prisoners of war held in the Franco-Prussian War, by providing 
supplies and medical personnel to prison camps on each side of the conflict.1  The 
influence of the Red Cross spread quickly in Europe, but in the United States it did not 
become a factor in prisoner of war affairs until World War I.2   
 Delegates at an international conference in Brussels in 1874 drafted a declaration 
of the laws of war to apply to all signatory states.  Although most of the signatories did 
not ratify the Declaration of Brussels, it was an important attempt to codify acceptable 
behavior in wartime, particularly toward prisoners of war, and served as “an obvious 
progenitor of the 1899 Hague II Regulations and of the 1907 Hague IV Regulations.”3  
The Declaration of Brussels depended heavily upon the Lieber Code, leaving unchanged 
many of the provisions regarding prisoners, specifically that prisoners were in the power 
of the enemy government, not the individual captors; prisoners could be forced to labor 
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but not on military works; and prisoners should be given food and clothing equivalent to 
those issued by the military of their captors.4
 International delegates again attempted to codify the laws of war at The Hague in 
1899.  Representatives of twenty-four nations adopted the Convention with Respect to 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land.  Eight years later, forty-three nations sent 
representatives to another conference at The Hague to create a uniform code of conduct 
for military forces during war.  Each convention devoted seventeen articles to the 
treatment of prisoners of war, specifying how prisoners were to be captured and kept by 
belligerents.  The provisions applying to prisoners did not differ significantly between the 
two conventions, with the exception that the 1907 Convention, which superseded the 
1899 Convention for all signatories, specifically stated that it would apply “only if all the 
belligerents are parties to the Convention.”5  Italy, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and the 
Ottoman Empire, all participants in World War I, did not sign the 1907 Convention, thus 
the Convention was not legally binding upon the belligerents of the war.   
 The Hague Conventions restated the principles of the Declaration of Brussels 
regarding captives.  The hostile government possessed prisoners of war, not the 
individuals or units that captured them, and were to be humanely treated.  Their captors 
could utilize their labor, but not in support of military operations.6  Prisoners could not 
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be legally transferred to the control of another government, a point that caused a great 
deal of contention between the American Expeditionary Forces and the Allied 
Governments during World War I.  Article 14 of each document obligated all belligerents 
to create a bureau of information for prisoners of war upon the commencement of 
hostilities, to collect information from various governmental agencies and maintain an 
individual return for each prisoner.  In a notable attempt to provide comfort to prisoners, 
these bureaus were to be given free postage and allowed to send and receive letters and 
parcels across battlefield lines, for the improvement of the condition of prisoners.  Relief 
societies such as the Red Cross could assist these bureaus in their efforts to ameliorate 
the conditions of captivity faced by all prisoners of war.  Each convention explicitly 
stated that prisoners must be repatriated as quickly as possible after the conclusion of 
peace.   
 The United States incorporated the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907 
into the U.S. rules of land warfare and army’s field regulations, but did little to actually 
plan for the confinement of captured enemies.  In 1913, as the threat of war loomed in 
Europe, the War College Division of the General Staff prepared a proposed general order 
for the treatment of prisoners, ready to be issued if the United States entered a conflict in 
Europe.7  The order was never issued, primarily due to military operations along the 
Mexican border, where hundreds of Mexican nationals had been taken captive.  These 
captives were referred to by the War Department as “interned prisoners,” not prisoners of 
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war, any new regulations regarding POWs might create political problems for the 
American government by suggesting that a state of war existed with Mexico.8
 The United States declared war upon Spain on 25 April 1898.  Fighting followed 
in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, requiring the deployment of American forces 
around the globe in a variety of environments.  Combat operations against Spain lasted 
for only three months, but American forces captured over forty thousand Spanish 
prisoners, most taken during the surrenders of Santiago, Manila, and Puerto Rico.  The 
war was a departure from the improvised system of the Civil War, for two reasons.  First, 
General Orders No. 100, issued in 1863, remained the guiding instructions for the capture 
and maintenance of enemy prisoners.  Second, prior to combat operations, American 
commanders made plans to utilize prisoners captured in Cuba and Puerto Rico for the 
construction of roads in support of American combat operations.   
 Major General Nelson A. Miles, the commanding general of the army during the 
war, planned to besiege to Santiago, on the southern coast of Cuba, and then march the 
army north, using Spanish prisoners taken at Santiago to build a road across the island.  
Miles expected that a separate campaign against Puerto Rico would add thirty thousand 
Spanish captives to the labor force, and allow construction to proceed at a rate of five 
miles per day.9  Miles’ plan was the first time U.S. forces had planned to use POWs prior 
to their capture. 
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 Most of the works examining the Spanish-American War do not discuss 
prisoners, or mention only the capture of prisoners taken at capitulation of Santiago.  
Prisoners taken at other locations are often completely ignored.10  Secondary works 
dedicated to the Philippine War primarily describe prisoners of war as victims of 
atrocities perpetrated by both sides.11  Most treat the war as a single conflict, rather than 
a series of individual campaigns to pacify various regions of the Philippine Archipelago.  
Stuart Miller argued that American soldiers murdered prisoners of war and civilians 
alike, attempting to frighten the population into submission, and were supported in their 
actions by commanding officers and the War Department.12  David Bain blamed most of 
the reported atrocities on volunteer soldiers from the West, “who came to their adulthood 
on the American frontier.”13  Andrew Birtle noted that only a small percentage of 
Filipinos taken prisoner underwent any form of mental or physical abuse, but also argued 
that summary executions were common if Filipinos were captured immediately after the 
murder of an American.14  Brian Linn argued that the war varied greatly by location, and 
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cannot be treated as a single conflict, but rather must be examined on a local basis.15  He 
stated that most atrocities were committed by small groups engaged in counterinsurgency 
operations, and that senior officers, while aware of the actions of subordinates, did not 
actively pursue claims of American troops having violated the laws of war.16
 The historiography of prisoners of war in general gives the Spanish-American 
War and Philippine War almost no consideration.  Lewis and Mewha argued that the only 
significance of the Spanish-American War regarding prisoners was the plan to utilize 
prisoner labor in Cuba and Puerto Rico.  They summarized the Philippine War in two 
paragraphs, concluding that all prisoners taken in the Philippines were treated with 
humanity and kindness, they made no mention of atrocities.17  Barker, Fooks, Garrett, 
and Levie made no mention of the war. 
 The Spanish-American War was of such short duration that even prisoners held in 
captivity until the end did not face significant hardships, and the number of prisoners 
held for more than one month was extremely low.  Of the forty thousand Spanish 
prisoners taken during the war, more than half were taken in the capitulation of Santiago.  
The surrender of the city included a provision that the prisoners would be immediately 
transported to Spain.  The capture of Manila, with fourteen thousand prisoners, included 
equally lenient treatment and only a brief period of captivity.  Less than two thousand 
Spanish prisoners were held in the United States, all were naval personnel captured at 
sea.  Because the United States had no official ambitions to annex Cuba, no effort was 
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made to pacify the Cuban population or bring the countryside under American control.18  
In the Philippines, the decision to annex the islands, rather than grant them independence, 
led to three years of guerrilla warfare, thus prisoners taken in the Philippine War faced a 
much different experience. 
 Although the first combat of the war occurred in Manila Bay on 1 May 1898, the 
first capture of prisoners did not occur until June, during the siege of Santiago.  The siege 
was complicated by the presence of a Spanish squadron, commanded by Admiral Pascual 
de Cervera.  American naval forces blockaded Santiago on 27 May, and on 3 June, 
Lieutenant Richmond Hobson led an attempt to trap the Spanish fleet by sinking the USS 
Merrimac, an aged collier, in the entrance to the Santiago harbor.  Hobson’s efforts 
failed, and he and his volunteer crew were captured by Cervera’s forces, the only 
American prisoners taken by Spanish forces during the war.19
U.S. Marines landed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on 10 June, and an American 
army of more than sixteen thousand troops, commanded by Major General William R. 
Shafter, landed at Daiquiri, near Santiago, on 22 June.  By 1 July, American forces 
surrounded Santiago and had captured 120 Spanish prisoners at the battle El Caney.  
These prisoners reported surprise at the lenient treatment they received; they had 
expected no quarter from American forces.20  Several of the Spanish prisoners were 
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exchanged for Hobson and his crew on 6 July, twenty-seven wounded captives were sent 
to Santiago on parole.21  Shafter later stated, “I have every reason to believe the return of 
the Spanish prisoners produced a good impression on their comrades.”22
On 3 July, the Spanish squadron at Santiago emerged from the harbor and sought 
to escape the American blockade.  Every ship under Cervera’s command was sunk or set 
aflame, and Americans took 1,813 prisoners from the Spanish vessels.  Captured Spanish 
officers, including Cervera, were delivered to the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, 
Maryland.  Enlisted prisoners of war were interned at the Navy Yard at Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire.23  Included in the prisoners sent to Portsmouth were several volunteers of the 
irregular forces of the Spanish Army, captured by marines near Guantanamo.  Prisoners 
taken by the navy and marines were held by the navy until the end of the war, and were 
not transferred to the control of the army, as was the practice in previous and subsequent 
wars.24
 While U.S. authorities shipped Spanish naval prisoners to America for 
confinement, an army under Shafter besieged Santaigo.  Shafter requested that General 
José Toral, the Spanish commander of the Santiago military district, surrender the city to 
prevent further bloodshed in a futile defense.  Toral requested instructions from the 
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governor of Cuba, General Ramon Blanco, and the question of surrender was referred to 
the Spanish government in Madrid.  On 14 July, General Miles notified Secretary of War 
Russell A. Alger of the terms of the proposed Santiago surrender.  On 17 July, Toral 
surrendered the city, as well as all the troops within his military district, some as far as 
100 miles from the city.  Almost twenty-three thousand troops surrendered, in exchange 
for shipment to Spain at the expense of the United States.   
 On 20 July, the Quartermaster’s Department opened bidding for a contract to 
transport the Spanish prisoners and their families to Spain.  Of the ten bids received, only 
two were deemed to be responsible companies capable of fulfilling the contract.  The 
Spanish Trans-Atlantic Company won the contract, and was paid $55.00 per 
commissioned officer and $20.00 per enlisted person for transport.  The first ship left 
Santiago on 9 August, the last left Guantanamo on 17 September.  All told, 22,864 
individuals were delivered to Spain on sixteen transports, including 22,137 troops and 
727 non-combatants, at a total cost of $513,860.25  Prisoners awaiting transport were 
provided with ample rations and medical supplies, prompting one soldier to write a letter 
of thanks to his captors as he boarded the transport home.26
 In keeping with the principle created at Santiago, on 27 July the State 
Department, at the request of Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, used the British 
government as an intermediary to offer the release of all the Spanish prisoners taken with 
the destruction of Cervera’s fleet.  If the Spanish government would send a neutral ship 
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to Portsmouth to carry the sailors, they would be allowed to give their parole and return 
to Spain for the remainder of the war.  Spain refused the offer on the grounds the Spanish 
military code “prescribed [a] penalty for prisoners of war obtaining release by giving 
parole not to bear arms against [the] enemy,” and the sailors remained in captivity.27
 On 12 August, diplomats met in Washington, D.C., and signed a peace protocol 
that ended all hostilities between Spain and the United States in all theaters of the war.  
Although formal peace treaty negotiations did not open until October, President William 
McKinley ordered that Spanish prisoners held in the United States be repatriated to Spain 
as quickly as possible.  On 31 August, Cervera was informed that he was to make 
arrangements for the transportation of all Spanish prisoners in the custody of the War 
Department and the Navy Department to Spain, which he did in a single shipment.28  Not 
all of the prisoners desired to return to Spain; some requested the opportunity to remain 
in Cuba.29
 Word of the 12 August cease-fire did not reach the Philippines in time to prevent 
an American assault upon Manila on 13 August.  After a brief engagement, the city 
capitulated, and fourteen thousand Spanish defenders became prisoners of war.30  These 
prisoners remained in their barracks in Manila, and could move about the city at will 
while awaiting repatriation to Spain.  Few chose to leave their barracks area, preferring to 
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remain in close quarters rather than mingle with the hostile Filipino population.  The 
prisoners returned to Spain as quickly as transportation could be arranged.31   
 The Treaty of Paris ending the conflict ceded possession of the Philippine Islands 
to the United States.  In February of 1899, a war began between the occupying American 
forces and Filipino natives in the area surrounding Manila.  The war expanded into an 
insurgency that occurred simultaneously in dozens of locations.  As a result, American 
practices regarding prisoners taken in the war were haphazard, and often devised entirely 
by local commanders, regardless of official policies.  “Instructions for the Government of 
the Armies in the Field” (General Orders 100) remained the governing policy for 
American commanders in their relations with Filipino natives.  Portions of the 
instructions were reprinted regularly, to keep officers well informed of the regulations 
regarding enemy prisoners and the civilian population.32   
 The Filipino insurgents were not bound by General Orders 100, however, and 
General Emilio Aguinaldo issued “Instructions to the Brave Soldiers of Sandatahan of 
Manila” on 9 January 1899, including an order to respect the lives and property of all 
civilians and to preserve the life of any soldiers who surrendered.33  Antonio Luna issued 
a contrary order on 7 February, calling for insurgents to offer no quarter to American 
troops, but on 5 June, he was assassinated by troops commanded by Aguinaldo.34  In 
turn,  Aguinaldo was informed in November 1899 that he would be held personally 
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responsible for the behavior of units under his command.35  Despite the regulations 
issued by American commanders and by Aguinaldo, reports of atrocities were common 
throughout the war, often involving the execution of prisoners by both sides.   
 American soldiers captured thousands of Filipinos in the fighting near Manila in 
1899, and the city jails quickly began to fill to capacity.  The provost marshal of Manila 
reported that 4,149 prisoners were held on 10 March 1900, and almost one third of the 
prisoners were sick, including 697 suffering from beriberi.36  On 1 April 1900, President 
William McKinley ordered the release of thousands of prisoners if they swore an oath of 
allegiance to the U.S. government.37  Prominent guerrilla leaders who refused to swear 
the oath were sent to Guam for the remainder of hostilities.38   
 On 20 December 1900, Major General Arthur MacArthur announced that any 
guerrillas or civilian supporters captured by U.S. forces would be held for the duration of 
hostilities, but would not be granted POW status.  Rather, they would be regarded as 
criminals punishable by the government for aiding the insurgency.  Any guerrillas who 
voluntarily surrendered would be simply disarmed and paroled, and would face no 
repercussions from the U.S. military.39  It is important to emphasize that according to 
Articles 32, 52, and 82 of General Orders 100, MacArthur could regard insurgents as 
criminals rather than POWs, and the insurgents were no longer protected by the laws of 
war.  Between 5 May 1900 and 30 June 1901, MacArthur reported 1,026 contacts with 
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insurgents.  In the same period, 6,572 insurgents were captured in the field, and 23,095 
voluntarily surrendered.  Perhaps more importantly, 15,693 rifles were captured or 
surrendered in the same time period.40  MacArthur’s pronouncement complicated the 
POW situation in the Philippines, as the provost marshals received custody of all civil 
prisoners as well as POWs.  U.S. military courts tried thousands of prisoners in 1901 and 
1902 for a variety of offenses, however, by definition, POWs cannot be tried simply for 
being members of an opposing military force, they may only be placed on trial for 
offenses against the laws of war.  By placing insurgents on trial, the army demonstrated 
that they were no longer considered POWs.  Any guerrillas who did not continuously 
participate in the war could expect to be treated as common criminals.41   
 The number of prisoners held by the United States rose gradually until 1 March 
1901, when MacArthur issued a notice to the people of the Philippines that the delivery 
of any serviceable rifle or revolver would be rewarded by the release of one prisoner, 
chosen by the person delivering the weapon.42  To alleviate overcrowding, a prison was 
established at Olongapo on 7 March 1901, but the surrender of weapons proved so 
successful in reducing the prison population that the prison at Olongapo was discontinued 
after only seven weeks in operation.43 On 28 March, U.S. forces captured Aguinaldo, and 
brought him to Manila as a prisoner.  MacArthur believed that the capture of Aguinaldo 
was the primary reason behind an increased rate of surrenders, particularly among 
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insurgent leaders.  He also hailed the surrender of Manuel Tinio as an important step in 
the pacification of the archipelago.  To signal the importance of Tinio’s surrender, on 19 
April 1901, MacArthur ordered that 1,000 prisoners in Manila jails be offered the oath of 
allegiance in exchange for their release.  As other insurrectionary leaders surrendered, 
MacArthur ordered similar mass paroles, effectively emptying the Manila prisons as 
resistance flagged.44  By 31 May 1901, the provost marshal of Manila reported only 
1,240 prisoners remained in the city.45  The release of prisoners in exchange for weapons 
demonstrated to rebels that peaceful actions brought tangible rewards from the 
occupation forces.  The decision to release large numbers of prisoners immediately after 
the surrender of guerrilla leaders proved that the American military did not seek to punish 
individual guerrillas, it only sought to pacify the insurrection, primarily by targeting 
leaders and holding them in captivity. 
 Sporadic guerrilla resistance continued through the spring of 1902, when the last 
insurgent commanders surrendered.  On 16 April, Miguel Malvar and his remaining 
followers surrendered, ending resistance to American rule on the island of Luzon.  
Eleven days later, resistance on Samar ceased with the surrender of the remaining 
guerrillas on the island.  On 16 June, military governance in the Philippines officially 
ended and was replaced by civilian government.46  To conciliate the inhabitants of the 
archipelago, President Theodore Roosevelt issued a proclamation of peace and amnesty 
for all inhabitants of the islands except those convicted of murder, arson, and rape.47
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 The nature of the fighting in the Philippines, separate conflicts in remote locales 
by independent commands, prevented the existence of a single American POW practice, 
even with the policies established by General Orders 100.  In particular, the treatment of 
prisoners at the time of capture varied greatly.  In 1902, a Senate investigation revealed a 
disturbing trend of prisoner abuse by American troops and native allies.  Because 
American forces often could not distinguish between guerrillas and the civilian 
population, captured insurgents became an invaluable source of information regarding 
the populace.  The most notorious form of abuse reported by American veterans was the 
so-called “water cure,” when a prisoner’s mouth was pried open and gallons of water 
poured down his throat.  The water cure produced a sensation of drowning or 
strangulation, and it was augmented by punching or kicking the victim’s distended 
abdomen to expel the water.48  Few prisoners subjected to the water cure could resist 
surrendering information after suffering its effects.  Senate testimony provided by 
enlisted personnel contained numerous references to the use of the water cure in many 
locations, testimony provided by officers invariably denied having witnessed, ordered, or 
condoned such methods explicitly forbidden by Article 80 of General Orders 100.49   
 In most locations, once U.S. interrogators determined that prisoners had no 
further intelligence value, they were held in guardhouses or outposts, usually in small 
numbers.  American soldiers reported a high number of escape attempts, often 
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accompanied by reports that a prisoner had been shot.50  American commanders made no 
attempt to create a central POW enclosure or a series of large camps, and invariably 
placed prisoners in existing installations.  The treatment meted out to prisoners varied 
greatly by location, but most American veterans who had observed prisoner treatment 
claimed that Filipino prisoners received rations, medical care, and lodging equivalent to 
that given U.S. troops, with the exception that the prisoners often received more rice and 
less meat, their customary diet.51
Secretary of War Elihu Root contended that the United States fought with 
tremendous restraint in the Philippines, and that reports of the mistreatment of prisoners 
were isolated incidents, not a generally accepted behavior of American troops.52  
Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes echoed Root’s sentiments, but argued that American 
conduct became progressively more severe throughout the war, in response to the 
uncivilized behavior of Filipino insurgents.  Major Cornelius Gardener noted that 
American troops looked down upon Filipino natives as an inferior race, stating “Almost 
without exception soldiers, and also many officers, refer to the natives in their presence 
as ‘niggers’ and the natives are beginning to understand what the word ‘nigger’ 
means.”53  Filipinos were also unfavorably compared to Mexicans, and deemed too cruel 
and untrustworthy to serve as officers over native troops.54
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 American military and civilian leaders quickly put aside or forgot the lessons of 
the Spanish-American War and the Philippine War with regard to prisoners of war.  The 
conflict with Spain was too short to have a major impact upon American POW policy, 
and the only true legacy of the war was the decision by the Department of the Navy to 
intern German naval personnel taken during World War I in the United States, rather than 
shipping them to France where German and Austrian soldiers were held captive.  U.S. 
military officers deemed the guerrilla warfare lessons of the Philippine War to be 
irrelevant to the conventional warfare of World War I, but questions regarding the legal 
status of guerrilla prisoners again arose during the Vietnam War.  In each conflict, 
American officers justified mistreatment of prisoners, particularly in the pursuit of 
intelligence-gathering, by arguing that guerrillas were not protected by international law.  
The international developments of the late nineteenth century had some impact upon the 
belligerents in World War I, and although the Hague Convention of 1907 was not legally 
binding, most of the belligerents voluntarily promised to comply with the POW 
provisions.  However, differing interpretations of the convention’s articles insured that 
the status of POWs in international law was far from settled by the experiences of World 
War I.  To some observers, the Hague Conventions were too lenient toward prisoners, as 
illustrated by J. M. Spaight in 1911: “Today the prisoner of war is a spoilt darling; he is 
treated with a solictude for his wants and feelings which borders on sentimentalism.  He 
is better treated than the modern criminal, who is infinitely better off, under the modern 
prison system, than a soldier on campaign.”55
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 Although the historiography of World War I is voluminous, historians have given 
little attention to the role played by prisoners of war, particularly given the number of 
prisoners taken in the war.  By the time the United States entered the war, the Central 
Powers held almost three million Allied prisoners, with more than half in Germany, and 
the Allies held more than two million, most of them in Russia.56  Immediately after the 
armistice was signed, Carl P. Dennett, an American Red Cross commissioner, published 
Prisoners of the Great War, accusing Germany of failing to provide even the most basic 
necessities for prisoners to survive captivity.  Dennett argued that American prisoners in 
Germany avoided the hardships suffered by prisoners of other nationalities because the 
United States maintained an interest in German camp conditions and took more prisoners 
than it lost, only  the fear of retaliation led Germany to keep the American prisoners in 
good health.57  Dennett’s work remained largely unchallenged for decades, until the 
publication of Richard Speed’s Prisoners, Diplomats, and the Great War.  He argued that 
the United States had several years’ advance warning and captured comparatively few 
prisoners, yet still struggled to adequately maintain its captives.  According to Speed, if 
the war had continued for even a few more months, the American prison capacity would 
have been overwhelmed, with disastrous consequences.58
 Lewis and Mewha observed that the widespread use of prisoner labor for the first 
time was the primary development of POW practice during World War I.  They argued 
that prisoners reacted favorably to the treatment they received from the United States, 
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even though they were compelled to labor.59  Barker argued that the most important 
consequence of the war was a number of bilateral agreements signed during the war that 
related to prisoner treatment, and contributed to the Geneva Convention of 1929.60  
Likewise, Levie considered World War I important because it demonstrated the 
inadequacy of international law, and provoked efforts to ameliorate the conditions faced 
by prisoners of war.61  Garrett’s discussion of World War I did not mention German 
prisoners held by the AEF.  In discussing the Western Front he examined only the British 
perspective.62   
 World War I commenced in Europe in August of 1914.  Within two months, 
almost three hundred thousand prisoners were taken.  By 1 February 1915, almost one 
million men were in captivity, the vast majority of whom were Russian troops held by the 
Central Powers.63  None of the belligerents were prepared for the huge influx of 
prisoners, and all were forced to improvise housing and security facilities for their 
captives.  Diplomatic problems complicated the practical difficulties of feeding and 
housing prisoners, while each government professed a desire to uphold obligations 
contained within the Hague Conventions, they interpreted the obligations differently.  
Particularly troublesome were Articles 14 and 16, requiring the establishment of bureaus 
of information regarding prisoners.  The British created a Prisoner of War Information 
Bureau in August of 1914, and the French, Germans, and Austro-Hungarians opened 
agencies in September.  Nominally, each fulfilled the requirements of international law, 
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but they differed over what type of inquires were legitimate (government or private), and 
whether prisoner lists should include the location of confinement.  Soon, disagreements 
arose over the interpretation of virtually every aspect of the convention.  Each 
government felt obliged to protect its own prisoners held by the enemy, however, no 
government had a means to assess the conditions of its own soldiers held as prisoners.  
Each side soon fell prey to rumors about the mistreatment of prisoners by the enemy, and 
threats of retaliation soon followed. 
 The major powers of each side asked the United States, as a neutral nation, to 
serve as a protecting power.  For the first three years of the war, the United States 
maintained relations with both sides, inspecting prison camps throughout Europe and 
distributing relief to prisoners regardless of nationality.  The cost of American relief 
operations was charged to the benefiting power, and reports of inspections were provided 
to each belligerent, in the hope of reducing retaliation.  In January of 1915, the State 
Department offered to create a regular schedule of inspections throughout Europe, on the 
condition that each belligerent provide a statement of their POW policy to the enemy and 
that American representatives have access to prisoners at each location.  The prisoners 
would be allowed to send written statements to their governments regarding the 
conditions of their captivity.  The inspections began in April, with inspectors ordered to 
report the size and location of camps, the general conditions of captivity, and the specific 
needs of prisoners at each camp.  The inspectors were explicitly told to avoid critical 
commentary while writing inspection reports to avoid exacerbating diplomatic tensions 
between the belligerents.64  American inspectors performed more than six hundred 
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inspections, and were generally regarded as even-handed in their evaluations of camp 
conditions.  When the United States entered the war on 6 April 1917, Switzerland 
assumed the role of protecting power and carried out the inspections of POW camps for 
the remainder of the war. 
 Three factors complicated American policy during the war.  First, the United 
States entered the war in 1917, after conflict ravaged Europe for almost three years.  
Although American inspectors were familiar with the practices of European powers 
regarding prisoners, the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) still had to create an 
entire prisoner of war system, as the Hague Conventions did not allow the transfer of 
prisoners between belligerents.  American troops held any prisoners captured by 
American forces, under the direction of the provost marshal general, whose department 
existed only as a wartime institution.65  Second, the United States joined Britain, France, 
and Russia in a coalition, but was not an ally.  The British and French governments had 
announced their intention to follow the Hague Conventions in 1914, the United States 
was naturally expected to do so as well.  However, because the conventions were not 
legally binding, American and German practices toward each others’ prisoners were also 
governed by the treaty of amity and commerce signed by Prussia and the United States in 
1785 that included the provision that prisoners in any future conflict would be held in the 
United States or Prussia, not a third country.  Third, because this was the largest overseas 
deployment to date for American forces, any prisoners maintained in Europe would only 
add to the logistical strain already imposed upon American planners. 
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 The AEF’s leaders set their first priorities as training and deploying units to 
Europe, and therefore the capture and maintenance of prisoners was not a high priority in 
the first months of American involvement in the war.  On 5 July 1917, the War 
Department outlined the functions of the AEF general staff, giving the provost marshal 
was given the duty of guarding POWs and maintaining records of their confinement, 
among many other duties.66  A prisoner of war information bureau was created on 30 
November, and the duties of the provost marshal were more explicitly detailed on 10 
December.  However, American forces held very few prisoners at the end of 1917, and 
regulations for the treatment of captured enemies were not issued until 1918.67  The 
regulations established two primary functions for prisoners: as sources of intelligence and 
as sources of labor.  After capturing prisoners, AEF officers forwarded them to division 
enclosures, where an intelligence officer chose prisoners for detailed interrogations.68  
All remaining POWs transferred to a central enclosure and they joined labor companies 
for employment on construction and repair work.69  All prisoners received the same 
rations, bedding, fuel, and medical services as U.S. troops, including mandatory 
vaccinations.70  Once assigned to a labor company, POWs worked six days per week at a 
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rate of twenty centimes per day.71  The initial regulations conformed to the requirements 
of the Hague Convention of 1907, although the treaty was not expressly mentioned in 
POW manuals until the July versions were issued.72
 The manual established a table of organization for 50,000 prisoners, a remarkably 
accurate prediction given that the AEF captured 48,280 prisoners during the war.73  In 
addition to outlining the functions of staff officers within the Bureau of Prisoners of War, 
the manual specified that all prisoners would be disarmed, searched, and forwarded to 
division headquarters, where they filled out identification cards and awaited 
interrogation.  After initial questioning at the division level, prisoners were sent to a 
corps enclosure, searched again, and consolidated into an army enclosure.  After a final 
search, the prisoners were sent to the Central Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 1 
(CPWE-1).  Eventually, eight central enclosures were created, to deal with the influx of 
thousands of prisoners each week during the final offensive on the Western Front.  As 
labor companies were filled, they departed the central enclosure and shifted to labor 
camps behind the AEF lines.  Initially, labor companies contained 400 men, but in 1919, 
each company was expanded by 50 prisoners.  Eventually, 122 labor companies were 
created, each composed of 450 prisoners.74   
 On 3 January 1918, the secretary of state asked the War Department if prisoners 
would be shipped to the United States.  The State Department feared that any attempt to 
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remove German prisoners from Europe would be met with retaliation upon American 
soldiers.  An earlier shift of German prisoners from Britain to France had provoked 
Germany to threaten to ship British prisoners to Turkey or Bulgaria.  The War 
Department requested that the State Department open negotiations with Germany 
regarding the disposition of prisoners of war, in the meantime, all prisoners captured by 
the AEF would be held in Europe by American guards.75  On 23 January, the AEF 
General Staff asked the provost marshal general, Colonel William H. Allaire, what 
preparations had been made for the maintenance of prisoners.  He responded that his 
department had yet to create a prisoner of war section.  On 23 February, Pershing ordered 
the commanding general of the Services of Supply to select a camp location for German 
prisoners near the supply depot at Gievres, where they would be put to work.76
 While the General Staff was negotiating with the French for control of German 
prisoners, intending to utilize them for AEF labor needs, the secretary of war ordered that 
all German prisoners held by the AEF should be transferred to the United States, on the 
grounds that the treaty of amity and commerce required internment in the continental 
United States.77  Prisoners would fill labor shortages in agriculture created by the 
induction of millions of men into military service.  The AEF General Staff requested that 
the secretary reconsider his plan, as the French and British governments would almost 
                                                 
75 United States Army, Army in the World War, 15:329-30. 
76 Ibid, 15:330.  No captured German troops were shipped from Europe to the United 
States, only the crews of German warships in American ports at the outbreak of war were 
interned in the continental United States.  These 1,356 naval officers and men were 
joined by 2,300 merchant sailors and 2,300 alien enemies in four internment camps, none 
provided a significant source of labor for the government, William B. Glidden, 
“Internment Camps in America, 1917-1920,” Military Affairs 37 (December 1973): 137-
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77 “Method of Handling Prisoners of War by the Provost Marshal General, A. E. F.,” no 
date, Box 282, Entry 66, RG 120. 
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certainly protest the action, and the secretary relented, with the provision that no 
prisoners taken by the AEF be transferred to allied control.  The State Department had 
initially agreed with the secretary of war regarding internment locales then relented and 
agreed that in the absence of any German diplomatic complaints, prisoners could be held 
in France by the AEF.  Officers, who were exempt from labor requirements, were not 
mentioned in the War Department’s instructions.  The French government recommended 
that officer prisoners be shipped to the United States because they required guards and 
maintenance and did not contribute to the labor supply, but they were never transferred 
out of France.78  In practice, the only German POWs transferred to the United States 
were sailors captured at sea, who were sent to Britain for interrogation and then 
forwarded to the United States for internment.79
 The first American camp for prisoners in Europe was not established until 28 
April 1918, and it held accommodations for only 150 prisoners, but on 14 May, the 
general staff requested that all captures made by American forces be maintained in 
American custody.  The primary reason for the request was the fact that American 
prisoners were held in Germany, and the AEF wished to keep German prisoners to ensure 
the proper treatment of Americans.80  The French government agreed, and promised to 
forward any prisoners taken by American units to the American prison enclosure at 
Gievres, but on 31 July, the provost marshal general pointed out that almost no prisoners 
                                                 
78 United States Army, Army in the World War, 15:332. 
79 William S. Sims to Josephus Daniels, 30 March 1918; “Disposal of Prisoners of War 
Captured by the United States Naval Forces in European Waters,” 5 April 1918; and 
Josephus Daniels, “Instructions Concerning the Disposition of Prisoners of War Captured 
by U.S. Naval Forces in European or Other Waters,” 9 May 1918, all in Box 378, Entry 
464B, RG 45; Glidden, “Internment Camps,” 140. 
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captured by the AEF had actually been forwarded.  On August 7, the French army began 
the transfer of thousands of German prisoners to American custody.81
 The majority of German prisoners held by the AEF were sent first to CPWE-1.  
The compound was initially a temporary installation near Tours, in August of 1918, a 
permanent facility opened at St. Pierre des Corps.82  From June of 1918 until April of 
1919, 37,716 German POWs were processed at the facility.  Some 32,000 were assigned 
to labor companies, the remainder were retained in the camp or forwarded to the Officer 
Prisoner of War Enclosure as appropriate.83  The camp consisted of eight separate 
enclosures, each a self-contained POW camp with barracks, mess-halls, and infirmaries.  
Camp conditions were excellent for the prisoners, they received ample rations, fresh 
clothing, and thorough medical care.  The diet varied by location, each labor company 
drew up weekly menus for the German POWs.  A sampling of labor company menus for 
March 1919 showed that prisoners at every location received coffee, bread, meat, and 
vegetables on a daily basis.84  Each enlisted prisoner was required to work nine hours per 
day, six days per week.  When not working, the prisoners were given recreational 
opportunities, including sports, games, reading material, and musical instruments.85   
 Officers were forwarded from CPWE-1 to a separate prison facility near 
Richelieu.  They did not perform labor, and received a monthly allowance for the 
                                                 
81 Ibid., 331. 
82 “History of Central Prisoner of War Enclosure No. 1,” 2, Box 290, Entry 68,  RG 120. 
83 Ibid., 3. 
84 “Prisoner of War Labor Company No. 6 Menu for Week from March 9-15, 1919,” “P. 
W. L. Co. No. 5 Menus from March 31st, 1919 to April 6th, 1919,” “Menu for week of 
March 16, 1919, P. W. L. Co. #27,” “Menu of the week March 16th to 22nd 1919, P. W. L. 
Co. 26,” “P. W. L. Co. #8, Bill of Fare,” all in Box 444, Entry 72, RG 120. 
85 “History of Central Prisoner of War Enclosure No. 1,” 4-5. 
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purchase of supplies beyond their daily rations.86  They were assigned orderlies and 
cooks from the enlisted POW population.  Every captured officer was held in a single 
compound, described as “a huge country estate. . . . surrounded entirely by a stone wall 
ten feet high.”  While enlisted prisoners performed manual labor, officers diverted 
themselves with dramatic productions, musical performances, and the opportunity to take 
college courses.87  The officers enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle, including unsupervised 
nature walks, tailored clothing, and the opportunity to send telegrams to their families.88  
Unlike enlisted POWs, officers were allowed to consume alcoholic beverages, supplied 
by camp canteens.89  The officer POWs took full advantage of their privileges, including 
running up tremendous debts at the camp canteen for credit purchases, eventually 
prompting the camp commandant to require cash for all sales.90  Officers on nature walks 
reportedly broke tree limbs, uprooted saplings, and urinated and defecated in the chateau 
park, resulting in the cancellation of all walks outside the enclosure.91
AEF headquarters received weekly reports from CPWE-1 detailing any POW 
deaths, transfers, or escapes.  These reports often contained detailed information on 
individual prisoners, but the reports often proved a bureaucratic hassle rather than a 
                                                 
86 Office of the Provost Marshal General, “History of Officer Prisoners of War 
Enclosure,” 10, Box 290, Entry 68, RG 120. 
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of 880 officer prisoners on 5 March 1919, attended by 44 noncommissioned officers and 
453 privates, “Officers POW Enclosure (Richelieu),” Box 285, Entry 66, RG 120. 
88 Basil D. Spalding, “Prison Order No. 1,” 24 December 1918; Basil D. Spalding, 
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useful tool.  Field units reported the capture of thousands of prisoners that CPWE-1 did 
not receive, particularly after heavy activity in the American sector of the front.  Almost 
one thousand prisoners were reported missing in a single report on 3 October 1918, by 
November, seventeen thousand prisoners were in captivity but had not been individually 
processed.  The American POW infrastructure proved incapable of keeping updated 
reports on prisoners as the rate of captures increased, greatly hindering the utilization of 
prisoner labor.92
 The labor system for prisoners held by the AEF developed slowly, but by the end 
of the war, prisoners were employed in salvage work, construction of roads and camps, 
lumber production, sanitary maintenance, and freight handling.93  Once the armistice was 
signed, the type and hours of work for POWs expanded.  Prisoners could be required to 
work at night or on tasks previously considered too dangerous for compulsory labor, such 
as the disposal of high explosives.94  Within the labor companies, prisoners received 
exceptional treatment.  They were given rations and supplies identical in quantity and 
quality to those issued to U.S. troops.  Every captive was inoculated against various 
diseases, and received the same medical and dental care as that furnished American 
soldiers.  Laborers were paid a daily wage in canteen script that could be spent on luxury 
items.  Prisoners could send two letters per week, subject to censorship by American 
officers, and could receive an unlimited number of letters and packages.95   
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Perhaps the most important use of prisoners during World War I, for both sides, 
was as a source of intelligence. 96  Local raids to capture prisoners were common along 
the Western Front, as prisoners were brought into Allied lines, they were briefly 
questioned and forwarded to divisional headquarters.  At each level, interrogators asked 
POWs for biographical information for identification purposes, followed by questions 
about unit strength, morale, and enemy intentions.  Interrogators inquired about the 
specific location of machine gun emplacements, divisional headquarters, and artillery 
batteries.  They inquired about any divisional movements, as well as which companies 
were in the trenches at the time of capture.  As each interrogation was completed, 
individual reports were forwarded to corps headquarters.  American commanders did not 
expect extensive intelligence from individual soldiers, but hoped to gain useful 
information from the aggregate data collected from the combined interrogation reports.  
As reports corroborated one another, AEF headquarters was able to obtain a fairly 
accurate estimate of enemy strength, morale, and intentions.  Most prisoners refused to 
willingly provide useful information to American interrogators, but few realized the 
potential intelligence value of even small details gleaned by their captors. 
In September of 1918, Captain Charles A. Willoughby proposed that interrogators 
should focus primarily upon identifying characteristics of a prisoner’s uniform and 
speech patterns, rather than upon the information actually presented by the prisoner.  He 
noted that most German army corps recruited territorially, thus a prisoner’s dialect could 
serve as a way to test the veracity of many of his statements.  By learning which German 
                                                 
96 “Questions Asked German Prisoners,” Box 433, Entry 64, RG 120 contains a list of 
standard interrogation questions used by the Second Division.  Box 432, Entry 64, RG 
120 contains hundreds of interrogation reports from various divisions in the First Army. 
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units were in the vicinity, American commanders could anticipate enemy actions 
regardless of the statements made by prisoners, who were often found to be lying about 
troop movements or units in the area.97
 The United States repatriated its prisoners before any Allied nation, but it did not 
do so immediately after the end of hostilities.  The Hague Convention declared that “after 
the conclusion of peace, the repatriation of prisoners shall be carried out as quickly as 
possible,” but the Allies did not rush to return their captives.98  In contrast, the armistice 
of 11 November 1918 required Germany to begin the repatriation of Allied POWs 
immediately, without reciprocity.  Even after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 
June of 1919, repatriation of German prisoners was delayed for months.  On 7 
September, the AEF began sending German POWs home, a process that required only 
seventeen days.99  All officers traveled through Gievres en route to Germany, enlisted 
personnel were collected at Is-sur-Tille for repatriation.100
 The POW experience in World War I demonstrated that the Hague Conventions 
of 1899 and 1907, while mitigating the conditions faced by prisoners, were not sufficient 
and required substantial revisions.  In particular, the international regulations governing 
the treatment of prisoners needed specific guidelines for the signatories to guarantee 
equal treatment of prisoners.  World War I was especially important to the evolution of 
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98 Speed, Prisoners, 179. 
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American POW policy because it was the first time that the War Department performed a 
thorough postwar assessment of its POW practices.  The commanders of each central 
enclosure and labor company submitted reports to the adjutant general detailing the 
history of their POW organizations, and these reports became the basis for American 
practices in World War II.  They also served as examples of a functional system of camp 
and labor organization for American officers to follow in the next world war.101
                                                 
101 “History of Central Prisoner of War Enclosure No. 1;” “Prisoner of War Enclosure, 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
AMERICA BECOMES A SUPERPOWER: WORLD WAR II 
 
 The United States captured more POWs during World War II than in every other 
American conflict combined, more than seven million German, Italian, and Japanese 
prisoners.1  Most American POW policies during the war concerned German prisoners.  
This was almost certainly a question of numbers, as the vast majority of all captures were 
German soldiers.  The War Department utilized prisoner of war labor on a wider scale 
than ever before, primarily in POW camps established throughout the continental United 
States.  The POW experience of the war changed markedly at the end of the war.  The 
majority of captures were made in the final months of the war in Europe, as Allied forces 
rapidly advanced into Germany.  The capture of millions of German soldiers 
overwhelmed American planners, with the result that European prison camps served 
primarily as short-term holding pens for prisoners awaiting repatriation or transfer to 
labor facilities, and did not follow the labor-first guidelines of American camps in the 
United States. 
 Much of the historiography of American POW operations during the war has 
focused upon three key issues: utilizing enemy labor, efforts for politically reeducating 
prisoners, and allegations of deliberately mistreating captives.  George Lewis and John 
Mewha provided the most extensive discussion of the POW labor program, devoting ten 
chapters to all aspects of POW labor during the war.  They argued that the labor program 
was vital to the American economy, and that it was the first successful application of 
                                                 
1 HQ EUCOM to the Provost Marshal General Department, 18 March 1949, Box 88, 
Entry 452, RG 389 presents the total number of prisoners handled by U.S. forces as 
7,200,000. 
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enemy prisoner labor in American history.  In particular, they noted that Americans 
employed prisoners in the harvest of dozens of different crops and in hundreds of 
industrial applications.2  Their discussion of the labor utilization of prisoners makes 
virtually no mention of the opposition of labor unions to the use of prisoner labor in non-
agricultural work.   
 Judith Gansberg’s Stalag U.S.A. focused primarily upon the American 
reeducation program for German prisoners established in 1944.  The program, discussed 
in greater detail below, was designed to train bureaucrats for the postwar administration 
of Germany.  Gansberg relied primarily upon interviews with the commanders of the 
Special Projects Division (SPD) of the provost marshal general’s office, the unit created 
to supervise the education program, and she considered the effort a complete success.  
Ron Robin also examined the SPD, but in The Barbed Wire College, he argued that the 
program produced an “intellectual backlash” among the prisoners selected for 
administrative training, and led the trainees to resist indoctrination efforts while 
maintaining a façade of accepting American ideals.  Robin demonstrated that the internal 
records of the SPD showed very little progress in reeducating prisoners, but the records 
were later modified to suggest that it was an unmitigated success.3  The War for the 
German Mind, by Arthur L. Smith, Jr., argued that American reeducation programs must 
be viewed as part of a larger Allied reeducation effort, in which each nation sought to 
influence postwar Germany through repatriated POWs.  He believed that American and 
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British efforts aimed primarily to instill democratic principles in the German mind, but 
the Soviet program was designed to turn Germany into a communist nation.4
 The most comprehensive discussion of German prisoners held by the United 
States is Nazi Prisoners of War in America, by Arnold Krammer.  Krammer argued that 
German prisoners in America received better treatment as captives than as soldiers in 
Europe.  He demonstrated that German POWs humanized the war for millions of 
Americans and served as a vital source of emergency labor.  Krammer devoted particular 
attention to the political ideology which dominated many of the POW camps in the 
United States, with fanatic Nazi prisoners terrifying their comrades into resisting 
American camp commanders.  He considered the decision to remove the most fervent 
Nazis from camps and intern them separately as the turning point in the German POW 
experience in America.5   
 Perhaps the most controversial work in the historiography of POWs during World 
War II was James Bacque’s Other Losses, published in 1989.  Bacque accused General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower of conspiring to murder over one million German POWs at the 
end of the war through starvation and neglect.  Bacque based his accusation upon a single 
question presented in his interview of Colonel Philip S. Lauben, who subsequently 
retracted his statement as a misunderstanding.6  The accusations provoked a conference, 
hosted by the Eisenhower Center at the University of New Orleans, where several papers 
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effectively dismantled Bacque’s thesis.  In particular, other scholars criticized Bacque for 
deliberately misreading documents discussing the transfer of prisoners from various army 
commands, and the release of prisoners without formal processing.  In each case, Bacque 
assumed that the prisoners, listed as “other losses” on official records, had died in 
captivity, despite ample evidence that they had simply been moved from one Allied army 
command to another, or transferred to a different nation’s control, a practice forbidden by 
the Hague Convention, but allowed by the Geneva Convention of 1929, and thus legal 
during World War II.7
 A major trend in World War II POW historiography has been a series of regional 
studies, primarily focusing upon German camps in the United States.  Some focus upon 
the events at a single camp, such as John Hammond Moore’s The Faustball Tunnel, or 
the experiences of a single prisoner such as Reinhold Pabel’s Enemies are Human.8  
Others examine a number of camps in a single state such as Allan Kent Powell’s 
Splinters of a Nation or David Fiedler’s The Enemy Among Us.9  Lewis H. Carlson’s We 
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Were Each Others’ Prisoners, a collection of interviews of former American and German 
prisoners, compared captivity on opposite sides of the Atlantic Ocean, and found a high 
degree of similarity in the experiences of prisoners held by each side.10  These detailed 
studies are excellent sources of information on specific camps or individuals, but rarely 
provide more than a cursory examination of the broad picture of American prisoner of 
war policy.11   
 In the aftermath of World War I, dozens of nations sought to prevent or mitigate 
future wars through treaties and voluntary arms limitations.  In 1922, for instance, the 
Washington Naval Conference limited naval construction and precluded a naval arms 
race similar to the one experienced prior to World War I.  The Locarno Pact of 1925 
secured Germany’s western frontier, defined by the Versailles Treaty, to head off any 
future conflict.  In 1928, sixty-five nations signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, renouncing 
war as a means of settling disputes.  In 1929, a conference at Geneva created a new set of 
international regulations governing the capture and maintenance of prisoners of war, 
replacing the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. 
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 The Geneva Convention of 1929, which was in effect during World War II, 
included the provision that it applied to all signatories whether or not their enemy had 
signed the convention.  According to the convention, all captured enemies needed to be 
moved from the battlefield as quickly as possible, and thereafter given rations and 
accommodations equal to those supplied to the captor’s own forces.  It sought to address 
all aspects of prisoner maintenance, including creating a prisoner of war information 
bureau, establishing camp inspections by a neutral nation, and specifying what forms of 
labor could be required of prisoners.  According to the convention, all captives must be 
evacuated from the battlefield as quickly as possible, and thereafter be given the same 
living accommodations and rations as those supplied to the detaining power’s own 
troops.  The Geneva Convention forbade the use of POW labor on any project directly 
connected to war operations, including the transport of material to combat units.  Officers 
could not be compelled to work, and non-commissioned officers could be assigned only 
supervisory work.  No dangerous or degrading labor assignments could be given to 
prisoners of war.12  Of the major belligerents of World War II, only the USSR and Japan 
did not sign the Convention.  The USSR announced in 1941 that it would adhere to the 
Hague Convention of 1907 regarding prisoners.  Japan indicated in 1942 it would follow 
the major provisions of the Convention. 
 When World War II began in Europe in 1939, the United States maintained its 
neutrality.  As in World War I, each of the belligerents created POW systems long before 
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American entry into the war.13  Although the United States formally declared war against 
Japan on 8 December 1941 and against Italy and Germany on 11 December 1941, enemy 
captives remained relatively few throughout 1942.  In August, the United States agreed to 
the transfer of fifty thousand prisoners from British prisons, but by the end of the year, 
the United States held less than two thousand.14  Thirty thousand prisoners arrived in 
May of 1943, most shipped from the North African theater, followed by fifty thousand 
prisoners in August.  The number of prisoners in the United States rose rapidly after the 
Allies invaded Normandy.  From July until November of 1944, almost two hundred 
thousand prisoners were shipped to the United States.  In all, almost four hundred 
thousand German prisoners were sent to the United States during the war.15  As Allied 
forces closed on Germany, the number of German captives rose more rapidly than 
American logistics could handle.  American planners expected sixty thousand prisoners 
in the first three months of combat after the Normandy landings, but by 1 September, 
almost two hundred thousand were in captivity.16  Shipments of prisoners to the United 
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States overwhelmed the transportation network, immediately after the surrender of 
Germany,  all transportation of German POWs to America halted.17
There are no exact figures available for the number of German prisoners taken by 
the United States, although most estimates place the number between three and five 
million.  This lack of specific numbers is partly due to the fact that many German 
prisoners were captured, disarmed, and immediately released at the end of the war rather 
than processed into POW camps.18  The provost marshal general’s office stated in 1947 
that the peak number of prisoners in U.S. custody was reached in June 1945, when almost 
three million POWs were in captivity in Europe.  This number did not include prisoners 
shipped to the United States for confinement, prisoners transferred to other nations, or 
captives disarmed and released from custody.19  German prisoners accounted for the 
majority of American captures, and dominated wartime POW planning.  Compared to 
millions of captured Germans, barely fifty thousand Italian prisoners were taken by 
American forces, most during the North African campaign.20   
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Initially, there was little difference in the treatment of German and Italian 
prisoners.  The first large groups of each came from combat in North Africa, and they 
arrived at the same time in the United States.  American commanders segregated the two 
groups and shipped them to large holding compounds, where they awaited assignment to 
labor camps.  Most of the Italian POWs captured by American forces during the entire 
war came from North Africa, an agreement with Great Britain ensured virtually every 
prisoner taken in the region, German and Italian alike, remained in American custody.21  
The status of Italian prisoners radically changed with the forced resignation of 
Benito Mussolini on 25 July 1943.  An armistice, signed 3 September, ended the state of 
war with the Allies, and on 10 October, Italy declared war upon its former ally, Germany.  
The Allies accepted Italy as a “co-belligerent,” creating a strange situation.  Could the 
Allied powers consider the Italian prisoners they held as prisoners of war?  The armistice 
required Italy to release all captured Allied troops, but did not mention the disposition of 
Italian POWs.  In December of 1943, the American and British governments suggested 
that non-fascist Italian POWs should be allowed to volunteer for non-combatant service 
units, although they would still be legally considered POWs.  Italian Prime Minister 
Pietro Badoglio rejected the idea, but the Allied governments proceeded to implement the 
system over his protests.22  
On 13 March 1944, Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, commander of the 
Army Service Forces, ordered the creation of “Italian Service Units” (ISUs), volunteer 
units of Italian POWs in the United States.  By 31 May, 180 ISUs existed, with over 
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1,000 Italian officers and 33,614 enlisted volunteers.23  The units worked primarily on 
military posts nationwide, usually at tasks not allowed by the Geneva Convention for 
prisoners of war.  These tasks included service at ordnance and supply depots handling 
munitions, salvage and reconditioning work, and loading military supplies at ports for 
shipment overseas.24   
In exchange for service, ISU members received limited parole benefits not 
extended to ordinary prisoners, including the opportunity to work without military 
supervision.  They had more recreational opportunities than German POWs, and at many 
locations ISUs fraternized regularly with civilians.  ISUs stationed near large Italian-
American communities enjoyed home-cooked meals, sightseeing tours, and dances 
attended by American hostesses.25  Dozens of ISU members married American women 
while still prisoners of war, despite a War Department prohibition against the practice.26  
Hundreds more returned to the United States and married Americans after the war, or 
sent for American brides to join them in Italy.  The privileges extended to the ISUs 
created a “coddling” controversy, and some Americans were angered that men captured 
while fighting against the United States enjoyed luxuries not available to American 
troops overseas.27  ISU volunteers received one final privilege over ordinary Italian 
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prisoners: they were designated for the earliest repatriation as a reward for their service.  
Virtually all ISU members returned home by the end of 1945, some non-ISU prisoners 
remained in captivity in the United States until March of 1946.28
Japanese prisoners were taken in much fewer numbers than Europeans, and few 
were shipped out of the Pacific theater of operations for confinement.  The primary 
reason that few of the Japanese prisoners taken in the Pacific were shipped to the United 
States was a September, 1942 agreement that Australia would hold all Japanese prisoners 
who had no significant intelligence value.29  The war was almost over prior to the capture 
of significant numbers of Japanese prisoners, by 20 August 1945, less than twenty 
thousand prisoners had been captured by U.S. forces in the Pacific and only five thousand 
had been sent to the United States for confinement and interrogation.30
John Dower argued that Japanese unwillingness to surrender, combined with 
Allied disinterest in taking prisoners in the Pacific, ensured that very few Japanese 
captives were taken in the Pacific.31  Dower’s thesis is supported by memoirs and 
contemporary accounts of American service personnel.32  Simon P. MacKenzie bolstered 
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Dower’s thesis by stating that American marines executed Japanese prisoners in the 
Pacific rather than burden themselves with prisoner care.33
Allison Gilmore claimed that Japanese prisoners resisted surrender due to 
indoctrination by the Japanese military and expectations of mistreatment after capture.  
Because Japanese commanders assumed their troops would not surrender, enlisted 
soldiers and sailors received no instruction regarding the proper behavior of POWs.  
Consequently during interrogations, Japanese prisoners often proved willing to answer 
questions about morale, strength, and troop placement of enemy forces, because they had 
never been instructed to resist interrogation.  Gilmore demonstrated that the most 
effective propaganda aimed at inducing Japanese soldiers to surrender as designed by 
Japanese prisoners, and that Allied propaganda efforts began having a major impact upon 
Japanese troops in the summer of 1945.34
Ulrich Strauss explored Japanese pre-war indoctrination in-depth, and found that 
most Japanese army recruits believed death was preferable to capture.35  The provost 
marshal general and the Office of Strategic Services operated under the same 
assumption.36  Even as the war drew closer to the Japanese Home Islands, unit cohesion 
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remained strong.  Whereas in North Africa and at Stalingrad, hundreds of thousands of 
prisoners surrendered en masse, in the Pacific theater, surrenders of more than a handful 
of prisoners at a single time remained exceedingly rare.  On the Eastern Front in Europe, 
German and Soviet forces had an approximately equal number of troops killed and 
captured, but the Japanese wartime ratio was over thirty killed for every prisoner who 
surrendered.37  Strauss considered this primarily a function of Japanese unwillingness to 
surrender, not an Allied resistance to taking captives; only one-third of all Japanese 
prisoners surrendered intentionally.  Most of the rest were incapacitated by wounds or 
illness, or became separated from their units and blundered upon Allied forces.  It is 
worth emphasizing that more than half of all Japanese prisoners captured in the war were 
naval personnel plucked from the ocean after surviving the sinking of their ships.38
There simply were not enough prisoners taken in the Pacific theater to have a 
significant impact upon American POW policy.  The 12,194 prisoners captured in the 
Southwest Pacific in 1945 area prior to the surrender of Japan were a far cry from the 
millions of German prisoners captured in North Africa and Europe.  Most Japanese 
prisoners were penned in holding camps scattered throughout the region, and the Allies 
made little effort to utilize their labor.  On 2 September 1945, approximately one hundred 
thousand Japanese prisoners surrendered in the Philippines as part of the surrender of the 
Japanese Empire, but their captivity was brief.  Japanese prisoners were repatriated 
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almost immediately after the end of the war.  Half of all Japanese prisoners were home by 
the end of 1945, and all returned to Japan by the end of 1946.39
 As in World War I, prisoners provided a wealth of intelligence to American 
commanders.  A systematic effort by all belligerents to interrogate prisoners taken in all 
theaters commenced with combat operations in 1942, and continued throughout the war.  
Initially, American interrogators followed British practices when questioning enemy 
prisoners.40  Early interrogations focused upon troop strength, unit movements and 
intentions, enemy morale, and enemy supply situations.  American commanders realized 
that extensive questioning of every prisoner was unrealistic, because the average enlisted 
prisoner had almost no knowledge of planned operations or troop strength.  As such, 
American officers sought to identify prisoners having high rank or detailed knowledge 
who could be separated and subjected to lengthy interrogations.  While the majority of 
prisoners were sent to camps in the United States by sea, prisoners with valuable 
information were airlifted to special interrogation camps, designated in official 
communications only by postal box numbers.  Forts Hunt and Tracy, near Washington, 
D.C., were used for European prisoners.  Japanese prisoners of special interest were 
flown to Byron Hot Springs in California.41  
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By 1944, senior staff at the War and Navy Departments gave American 
interrogators weekly lists of topics of interest, with a particular emphasis upon military 
technology.42  American military engineers desired detailed information about the 
development of jet propulsion, rocket motors, and guided missiles.43  The Army Medical 
Corps requested information on Japanese plans for biological warfare, especially efforts 
to infect water supplies with harmful bacteria.44  Psychological warfare officers studied 
POW interviews for signs that enemy morale was flagging and that surrender demands 
were having an effect.45  In the spring of 1945, as Germany neared collapse, surveys of 
POWs were used to determine the political mindset of Germans regarding the Nazi Party, 
the United States, the Soviet Union, and the likelihood of continued resistance after the 
surrender of Germany.46
German prisoners who identified themselves as anti-Nazi often emerged as 
subjects of special interest for American interrogators.  These prisoners were considered 
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more reliable sources for evaluating the impact of Allied operations upon German 
morale, the effect of bombing campaigns on the civilian population, and the possibility of 
a communist takeover in postwar Germany.  Many of these prisoners supplied 
intelligence voluntarily, in an effort to assist the Allies in the destruction of the Nazi 
regime.  In particular, the prisoners revealed a gradual decline in German troop morale 
after the D-Day invasion of 6 June 1944 and a growing lack of faith in Adolf Hitler’s 
leadership.  They also reported increasing supply shortages due to Allied bombing raids, 
and estimated the extent of damage to major German cities from the aerial campaign.47
 The provost marshal general’s office maintained responsibility for prisoners of 
war, as it had in World War I.  On 5 October 1944, the office issued regulations to all 
POW guard personnel governing every aspect of prisoner operations.  The instructions, 
“Enemy Prisoners of War,” were contained in a War Department technical manual, TM 
19-500, and updated during the remainder of the war.  The manual replaced the earlier 
improvised regulations, which varied by service command.  It ordered all POW guard 
personnel to follow the Geneva Convention, both in spirit and letter.48  The manual only 
explicitly applied to POWs held in the United States, operational theater commanders 
could apply the regulations as they saw fit, although all theater of operations POW camps 
were defined by the manual as temporary.49  In the United States, the manual’s primary 
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consideration for the placement of POW camps was the ability to employ POW labor to 
the maximum extent possible. 
 American commanders segregated POW camps by nationality.  Eventually, 
German POW camps were also separated by political ideology, as American officers 
sought to separate fanatical Nazis from politically neutral or anti-Nazi prisoners.  In 
camps for Japanese prisoners, captives of Korean and Formosan ancestry were separated 
as “a necessary step in preventing violence and possible bloodshed.”50  Prisoners in each 
camp elected spokesmen to serve as liaisons with American authorities and neutral nation 
camp inspectors.51   
In the camps, prisoners expressed surprise at the amount of food, clothing, and 
space they received.  Some perceived the lenient treatment as an American attempt to 
curry favor in the event the Axis powers won the war.  In fact, the Geneva Convention 
caused enemy prisoners to receive more food, clothing, and living space than they were 
accustomed to, in equal quantities to that received by American forces.  As with the 
ISUs, some American civilians complained that German prisoners were “coddled” by the 
government, enjoying luxuries not available to the American public due to wartime 
shortages. In addition to food, clothing, and housing, enemy prisoners received 
exceptional medical care, including monthly medical inspections, immunizations, dental 
care, and psychological counseling.52   
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 The Geneva Convention specified that all prisoners should receive intellectual 
and physical diversions, as much as possible, and American camp commanders soon 
provided sporting equipment, reading materials, and musical instruments to their charges.  
Prisoners formed athletic leagues, bands, choruses, and acting troupes for their own 
entertainment, and often invited American personnel to their performances.   Prisoners 
could pursue higher education if they so desired: several American universities offered 
correspondence courses for prisoners, and in 1944, the German Reich Ministry of 
Education offered high school and university credit for courses taken while held as a 
prisoner of war.53  Prisoners received extensive mail privileges.  Each was allowed to 
send two letters and four post cards per week, subject to military censorship, and could 
receive an unlimited number of letters, post cards, and parcels.54
 German POWs became so comfortable in the United States that they deliberately 
provoked American authorities on many occasions, risking administrative punishment by 
playing pranks.  In one incident, German prisoners painted a swastika on a turtle in 
Florida, and jokingly informed their guard that the turtle was a Nazi sympathizer.  Other 
prisoners painted, carved, and drew swastikas and other German symbols on virtually any 
available surface, continually provoking American personnel while maintaining their 
identity as German soldiers.  Most historians have viewed this behavior as an effort to 
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uphold military discipline among the prisoner population, although Omar Bartov argued 
that this type of behavior represented the prisoners’ devotion to ideology.55
 Political sentiments in the camps often dominated camp life.  Fanatical Nazis 
sought to exert control over fellow prisoners by threatening reprisals against any POW 
who expressed anti-Nazi sentiments.  The provost marshal general’s office attempted to 
separate anti-Nazi prisoners from camp populations and hold them in separate facilities, 
but this effort was often frustrated by the prisoners.  As a rule, ardent Nazi Party 
members held all of the leadership positions within each camp.  They were almost 
invariably chosen as camp spokesmen for communicating with American officials.  
Noncommissioned officer POWs showed the greatest devotion to Nazism, and held the 
highest ranks in most German POW camps.  They often censored or banned books in the 
prison libraries that they considered anti-Nazi, in particular, they targeted books by 
Jewish authors. 
 The German POW population organized “kangaroo courts” as a means of keeping 
control over anti-Nazi prisoners.  These courts, also called “honor courts,” met to 
determine if any prisoners were guilty of treason against the Reich.  Newsweek reported 
one trial in February of 1945, in which Corporal Johann Kunze was tried, convicted, and 
beaten to death by his fellow prisoners.  Kunze’s killing provoked a court-martial of five 
German prisoners, who were convicted of murder and executed in July of 1945.  Kunze’s 
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death was not an isolated incident; murders, assaults, and forced suicides continued even 
after the surrender of Germany.56
 As a result of such Nazi atrocities within the camps, the provost marshal general’s 
office reversed its policy of attempting to segregate anti-Nazi prisoners, and instead 
decided to isolate the most ardent Nazis from the prisoners population.  These fanatical 
adherents to Nazism proved much easier to distinguish, as they seemed eager to prove 
their fervor to captors and comrades alike.  The War Department constructed a special 
maximum-security prison at Alva, Oklahoma, for these intractable prisoners.  
Simultaneously, a campaign to reeducate and “denazify” the camps commenced.  A 
gradual adjustment of camp environments ensued, with the introduction of pro-
democracy reading materials and films, and the creation of the Special Projects Division 
(SPD) to oversee the reeducation effort. 
 Two U.S. Army officers, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Davison and Major 
Maxwell McKnight, commanded the SPD, and assembled a team of intellectuals and 
educators at Fort Kearney, Rhode Island, to direct the denazification effort.  The group 
called itself “the Factory” in official and nonofficial communications, and made great 
efforts to remain secret.  Prisoners deemed sympathetic to the reeducation cause were 
sent to Fort Kearney to assist in the effort to modify the ideology of their fellow 
prisoners.  Once an educational program was created, the SPD expected to provide a 
crash-course in democracy for up to twenty-thousand cooperative German prisoners, in 
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the hope that they would form the nucleus of a new political system in postwar Germany, 
and aid in the occupation efforts.57
One of the SPD’s first projects was to create a national German POW newspaper, 
Der Ruf (The Call).  It was written and published at Fort Kearney for national POW 
distribution.  To avoid the appearance of propaganda, Der Ruf was sold at prisoner 
canteens rather than simply given to the prisoners.  The first issue appeared on 1 March 
1945, and sold eleven thousand copies.  By 15 October, over seventy thousand copies of 
each issue were sold in the camp canteens.  Although sales of the paper steadily 
increased, some prisoners found it disturbing, considering it a propaganda effort by the 
United States to destroy their loyalty to Germany.58  Dozens of camp newspapers were 
created by POWs across the country, and the Factory monitored each for evidence that 
the general mindset of German prisoners was being affected by the SPD’s denazification 
efforts.  The Factory identified a gradual transformation of the editorial practices of many 
camp newspapers, suggesting that prisoners were becoming more receptive to the 
principles of democracy and individual freedom. 
 The Factory included four other sections to influence POW thinking.  The Film 
Section reviewed radio programs and films before they were offered to prisoners.  The 
Translation Section conducted surveys of the German POW population and translated 
pamphlets into German for distribution among the camp populations.  The Camp 
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Administration Section monitored general camp conditions and maintenance, and the 
Review Section analyzed materials submitted by government agencies and the SPD for 
use with the German POWs, such as labor training manuals for certain industries. 
 The existing education system in the POW camps expanded under the SPD, as 
classroom instruction offered a perfect environment for indoctrination.  Many written 
works banned by the German government became available in the camps, and the 
Factory created a series of paperback books, the Bucherreihe Neue Welt (New World 
Bookshelf), incorporating traditional classics of American literature as well as works by 
Jewish authors.  The books, sold through camp canteens, often sold out in a matter of 
hours.  Bored prisoners purchased virtually any printed material, and even textbooks and 
manuals sold quickly at the canteens.  English-speaking prisoners were allowed to 
subscribe to certain American newspapers and magazines, supplementing their exposure 
to American culture and ideals. 
 The enlistment of millions of young men through the massive expansion of the 
armed forces ensured that the possibility of filling wartime production quotas in many 
industries would be virtually impossible.  As working hours in factories producing 
airplanes, munitions, and other war materials increased, the available number of workers 
rapidly declined.  The federal government did not order draft exemptions for essential 
workers until March, 1943, by which time the situation was already on the verge of 
disaster.  A War Manpower Commission (WMC) report in the summer of 1943 noted that 
the United States was running out of laborers for vital industries, and that unemployed 
women represented the last major group eligible for recruitment into the workforce.  
Between July, 1943 and July, 1944, 700,000 women would be required for the 
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workforce, and an additional 200,000 would be needed for the armed forces.59  By 31 
August, 1943, over 100,000 POWs were interned in the United States, most were eligible 
for work details.  While the labor of prisoners certainly could not solve all of the 
manpower problems of the WMC, it became an increasingly important source of 
unskilled labor within certain employment sectors as the war continued.60     
Beyond the obvious difficulties associated with language barriers, the prisoner 
workforce proved frustrating to American employers due to differences in work attitudes 
between American and European laborers.  The extreme efficiency of German laborers 
was often an issue, and employers complained that German output was lower than that of 
American workers because they spent more time perfecting a task.  Thus, the 
workmanship of the Germans was often considered superior to domestic workers, but the 
overall production was lower.61  A report of the WMC noted that, “Efforts to have them 
hasten or short-cut or to be slip-shod in their methods are resented.”  In comparison, the 
Italian attitude was reported as “converse to those of the Germans.  He is singing, happy-
go-lucky.”62   
 Early POW labor contracts were negotiated between camp commanders and 
employers without the official sanction of the WMC, due to an oversight by the War 
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Department authorizing camp commanders to hire out prisoners to local employers.  
These early contracts gave labor unions ample reason to fear the intrusion of prisoner 
labor into domestic markets.  According to a 1943 WMC investigation, prisoners of war 
were being employed in direct competition with free labor, at wages far below the 
prevailing rates in many areas.63  As a result of union protests, an agreement was reached 
with the War Department granting the WMC control over all POW labor contracts for 
labor outside of military installations.  The American Federation of Labor (AFL) 
representative to the Labor-Management Committee of the WMC persisted in his 
complaint that all POW labor was a threat to domestic free labor, with the result that Paul 
McNutt, chairman of the WMC, agreed to bring “all questions involving the type of work 
on which prisoners of war are to be used and the conditions of their employment to the 
Committee for its advice and recommendations.”64  Despite orders to WMC regional 
directors that no POW labor could be used in place of free labor during labor disputes, 
labor unions remained wary of POW labor usage throughout the war.65  Historians Byron 
Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman considered labor unions a major hindrance to the 
successful use of prisoner labor, but also argued that the number of prisoners in the 
United States could not make a significant impact upon wartime labor shortages.66
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 Americans initially employed prisoners on military installations, performing 
mundane tasks related to their own upkeep and basic base maintenance duties.67  Before 
prisoners could begin laboring outside of the prison camps, the War Department and the 
WMC created a complicated system for assigning prisoners to various projects.  Prior to 
receiving any prisoners, an employer applied to the local representative of the WMC for 
a Certificate of Need, which demonstrated that no local supply of free labor was 
available.  The employer was required to prove that prisoner labor would not be 
detrimental to free wages, and would not result in a decline in working conditions.  The 
request was then forwarded to the local military authorities, who met with the 
representatives of the Department of Agriculture to determine the number of prisoners 
needed for a given task.  If the request was approved, an employer entered a contract with 
the War Department for a period of not more than three months.  The employer paid the 
War Department the prevailing wage rate for free labor, and could not rely upon prisoner 
labor as a long-term solution to labor shortages.  Despite all of the drawbacks to the 
system, farmers across the country deluged the WMC with requests for laborers.  The 
War Department responded by altering the system of housing the POWs for the 
convenience of the labor program, establishing a network of branch camps, satellites of 
the main prison camps in the nation.  The camps moved labor closer to the neediest 
agricultural regions in the country, and made the transportation of prisoners to work sites 
practicable.68  Prisoner labor was first committed to aid in the harvesting of agricultural 
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crops, tasks that had previously been performed in large part by migratory workers, most 
of whom were not represented by organized labor.  Prisoner labor was quickly committed 
to agricultural projects throughout the nation.69  Weekly reports to the WMC demonstrate 
that prisoner labor had an immediate impact upon agricultural production, beginning in 
the summer of 1943, primarily in crop harvests and canning operations.70
 The use of prisoners in agriculture, like the earlier use of prisoners on military 
installations, was not met with much organized hostility by American unions.  In one rare 
exception, members of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union called for picketing of cotton 
plants processing cotton picked by POWs.71  Despite their complaints, the use of prisoner 
labor continued to rise in agriculture.  By late 1944, more prisoners were employed in 
agriculture than were directly employed by the military.  Although prisoners had some 
trouble adapting to tasks they had never performed before, particularly in the cultivation 
of cotton, their labor proved essential in the harvesting and production of vital staple 
crops.  In an agricultural capacity, the POW labor program must be considered an 
unqualified success.  
 Farmers were not the only employers suffering from a lack of labor: factories 
were also understaffed, and soon industrial employers began requesting assistance from 
the War Department.  Organized labor was a much more important part of the industrial 
workforce, and could potentially create insurmountable difficulties for the WMC.  The 
first major union opposition to POW labor came in the meatpacking industry.  Initial 
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arguments against the use of prisoners revolved around the possibility of captured 
enemies sabotaging the nation’s food supply.  However, the fundamental issue was not 
the potential adulteration of meat packaged by prisoners, but rather the threat that 
prisoner labor presented to unions.  Prisoners employed in meatpacking were not 
required to pay union dues, even in plants staffed entirely by union members.  In 
December of 1943, members of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, a 
subsidiary of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), argued that the union was owed 
$.25 in weekly dues from each prisoner working at the Seabrook Farms plant.  The plant 
refused to garnish the wages paid to the War Department, and suggested that the union 
request its dues be paid by the Army.  In the ensuing debate, the union representative 
admitted that, “Our real concern is that more prisoners may be brought in from time to 
time until our contract won’t be worth the paper it’s written on, because there will be 
more prisoners than union members.”72  The prisoner labor represented a very real threat 
to the power, and even the existence, of the AFL at Seabrook Farms.  At other plants, 
legal arguments were presented to demand a cessation to prisoner labor.  At the Jerpe 
Commission Company in Omaha, union leaders reported that the company had violated 
Executive Order Number 8802 by “not employing negroes in the freezers or elsewhere in 
[the] establishment.”73  Therefore, according to the union, the company had not 
exhausted all of the free labor sources in the area, and should be excluded from the use of 
prisoners of war.  The War Department worried that prisoners might attempt to sabotage 
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the nation’s food supply while working in the meatpacking industry, but no evidence of 
sabotage occurred at any meatpacking plant employing prisoners.74
 The WMC considered the union position as an example of “being shortsighted 
and taking a position which in the long run may very well boomerang and bring discredit 
on the organized labor movement.”75  In the opinion of regional WMC director Frank 
Rarig, Americans held as prisoners of war would be furious upon returning to the United 
States and learning of union opposition to the use of Axis prisoners’ labor.76  The War 
Department refused to bow before the demands of the union, but was hesitant to provoke 
a larger engagement.  To alleviate the situation, the WMC undertook a recruiting 
campaign to draw workers into the meatpacking industry, allowing prisoners to be 
reassigned to other industrial sectors.  The meatpacking dispute, while not formally 
resolved to the liking of the AFL, heartened unions in other industries. 
 Another major battleground in the fight between organized labor and the War 
Department occurred in the railroad industry.  In the summer of 1943, a series of 
meetings were held between railroad executives, the War Department, and the War 
Manpower Commission.  In the meetings, discussions focused upon whether POWs 
could be legally used in the railroad industry.77  Union opposition to the use of prisoners 
on railroads was immediate, and included a resolution of the Railway Labor Executives’ 
Association of 16 July 1943.  In the resolution, the RLEA, “representing substantially all 
the railway workers of our nation, declare their unqualified opposition to the use of 
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prisoners of war as railroad track workers or in any other line of railroad employment.”78  
In September, the WMC announced that prisoner labor would be used in track 
maintenance operations.  Despite assurances from the WMC that prisoners would only be 
used when other labor was unavailable, and that wages, working conditions, and 
employment opportunities would remain unaffected, labor leaders were furious, and 
argued that the nation’s entire rail network would be opened to sabotage.79  In mid-
October, railway union locals across the nation adopted resolutions that threatened to 
shut down the American railways if prisoners were employed on the railroads in any 
capacity.  That the nation was at war did not stop the unions from issuing this threat, 
despite a War Department assessment that fears of sabotage were without merit.  Unions 
brought legal challenges against the use of prisoners, and union members refused to work 
in conjunction with prisoners.  Again, the unions were successful in halting the use of 
prisoner labor in a vital industry.  Despite massive manpower shortages in the railroad 
industry, the War Department and the WMC agreed that prisoners would not be used for 
railroads except in extreme emergencies. 
 The third sector in which prisoner labor provoked union unrest was the logging 
industry, specifically the production of pulpwood.  In 1943, the pulp and paper industry 
was declared essential to the war effort.  As such, its priority for manpower rose, and the 
question of using prisoner of war labor became pertinent.  The pulpwood industry had 
been hit hard by manpower shortages, particularly in the South.  Despite the pressing 
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need for labor, the International Woodworkers of America protested the use of prisoners 
in forestry.  The union attack upon POW labor centered around the conditions of free 
labor in the industry.  Prisoners, who had to be housed according to the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention, lived in a much more comfortable environment than free laborers 
performing the same work.80  The IWA also argued that prisoners were being used to 
drive the wages of free labor down, despite the lower production of the average prisoner 
when compared to free laborers.  However, in the pulpwood industry, unlike meatpacking 
or the railroads, the WMC and the War Department remained committed to the use of 
prisoners for labor.  The government argued that previous efforts to recruit free labor had 
proven completely inadequate, and thus the production of pulpwood would be 
insufficient to meet the needs of the war effort without additional workers.  Unlike in the 
meatpacking and railroad industries, the unions of the pulpwood industry were less 
unanimous in their condemnation of prisoner labor.  In the South, some civilian 
employees welcomed prisoner labor as the only way to keep companies operating, and 
thus providing civilian jobs.81  Despite the complaints of the IWA, which was affiliated 
with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), the national leadership of the CIO 
was more accepting of prisoner labor in the pulpwood industry than the AFL.  The CIO, 
rather than directly opposing the use of prisoner labor in its entirety, sought to cooperate 
with the government on the issue, and thus influence the ways and locations of prisoner 
use.  However, the CIO still placed first priority on the improvement of free labor 
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conditions within the industry, in the hope that prisoner labor would not prove 
necessary.82
 Finding the executive branch of the federal government unwilling to back down 
in the employment of prisoners, union leaders turned to legislators for assistance.  On 1 
June 1945, Senator Robert La Follette contacted Paul McNutt with the allegation that 
certain employers in Wisconsin had laid off all free labor in favor of German POWs.83  
McNutt promised that any such reports would be immediately investigated by the United 
States Employment Service (USES), and steps would be taken to prevent any repetitions 
in the future.84  Such a preference for POW labor, though uncommon, was not an isolated 
incident.  The USES investigation, launched immediately, showed that no free laborers 
had been laid off to date, but the prisoner allocation for the area should be reduced to 
prevent any future conflicts.85  A more heated argument arose between Frank McNamee, 
acting chairman of the WMC in the summer of 1945, and Congressman Frank W. Boykin 
of Alabama.  Boykin’s assistance was enlisted by both organized labor and the employers 
of the pulpwood industry in Alabama.  Labor unions complained that German and Italian 
POWs were being used in competition with free labor.  Employers complained that they 
were being forced to pay artificially high wages to the War Department for POW labor.  
Despite the dual nature of Boykin’s protests, and his threat to launch a Congressional 
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investigation of the employment practices concerning prisoner labor, the WMC refused 
to alter its policies in the pulpwood industry.  The pulpwood industry was the only major 
war industry in which the WMC successfully stood up to the efforts of organized labor to 
curtail the use of POW labor, and thus it was within the pulpwood industry that prisoners 
made the greatest non-agricultural impact upon the American wartime economy.86   
 Some labor unions took the unprecedented step of condemning all prisoner labor 
within the United States.  The Oklahoma City Building and Construction Trades Council 
called for all building trades councils to “join us in our fight to stir up this nation in 
stopping the use of war prisoners on any type of labor within the continental limits of the 
United States.”  The Council wished to compel the government to deport all POWs to 
Europe, before the surrender of Germany, through the use of an AFL-wide letter writing 
campaign to senators and representatives.87  After the German surrender, calls for the end 
of POW labor increased, despite assurances given by the WMC to employers that POW 
labor would not be withdrawn without advanced notice.88  The CIO Industrial Union 
Council of York, Pennsylvania, condemned the use of “Nazi slave labor to the 
displacement of American labor” in August of 1945.89  In response to repeated calls for 
the end of the POW labor program, the War Department curtailed plans for the shipment 
of more prisoners to the United States as early as September of 1944.  Instead, prisoners 
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captured in Europe were turned over to the governments of France, Belgium, and Holland 
for labor purposes behind the front lines.90
 The prisoner experience in World War II once again demonstrated the 
improvisational nature of American POW policy and practice, as efforts to plan for the 
capture, maintenance, and utilization of enemy prisoners proved wholly inadequate.  
Although the United States managed to feed and shelter its prisoners, American 
commanders greatly underestimated the speed of captures in Europe and were completely 
unprepared to provide more than the most basic necessities for enemy prisoners.  
Millions of POWs remained in holding camps despite massive wartime labor shortages 
because no provisions had been made to transport them to the United States or house 
them upon arrival, much less provide gainful employment.  Even when the War 
Department transported enemy captives to the United States, their utilization was 
opposed by American labor groups, who perceived prisoner labor as a threat rather than a 
wartime measure.  The labor program certainly benefited the United States, but was much 
less successful than the potential represented by millions of enemy prisoners.  Prisoners 
confined in the United States enjoyed a more comfortable existence than prisoners 
elsewhere in the world, but this was primarily due to the high wartime standard of living 
in the United States.  Quite simply, the United States had a higher capacity to treat its 
stateside captives well, and did so.91
 In World War II, the United States did not base its treatment of enemy captives 
upon reciprocity as it had in earlier wars.  Allegations and evidence of enemy 
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mistreatment of American prisoners, including executions, torture, and orders for giving 
no quarter, did not prompt retaliation by the United States.  Instead, American 
investigators gathered evidence from returning POWs regarding their treatment in 
German and Japanese prison camps, to be used at postwar trials of officers and 
government officials accused of violating the laws of war.92  All civilians and prisoners 
of war repatriated from Japanese control filled out a war crimes questionnaire during 
their debriefing sessions.  They reported that Japanese POW camp rules included a death 
penalty for any escaping prisoners, as well as any who assisted them or knew of the 
escape.93  The final death rate of American prisoners in German and Italian camps was 
approximately 4 percent, in Japanese camps, the mortality rate was 27 percent.94
 The use of prisoners for intelligence purposes proved much more successful than 
the interrogation efforts of World War I.  For years after the end of the war, German 
prisoners remained of interest to American intelligence officers.  In particular, any 
German prisoner released by the Soviet Union drew the attention of American 
commanders.  Naval intelligence officers questioned hundreds of prisoners returned to 
the American zone of occupation in the postwar period.  Most of the interrogations 
sought to ascertain the location and production capability of Soviet factories where POW 
labor was being utilized.  As with the wartime interrogations, prisoners often provided 
maps of the area or detailed diagrams of equipment they had observed.  These 
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interrogations were conducted on a voluntary basis, but demonstrated the continued 
utility of former prisoners to American intelligence efforts at the beginning of the Cold 
War era.95
 In the conflicts of the Cold War era, the U.S. military again captured thousands of 
POWs, and again was accused by its own citizens of coddling enemy prisoners.  The 
labor program utilized in World War II was the last American effort to obtain labor from 
enemy captives.  In later conflicts, American commanders ignored the labor potential of 
captives and instead kept them idle in massive prison compounds.  Prisoners during the 
Cold War became tools of propaganda rather than labor.  In the Korean War, fought just 
five years after World War II, American military planners ignored or forgot the lessons of 
World War II, and developed an entirely new system of prisoner confinement, with 
disastrous results. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONTAINING COMMUNISM:  THE COLD WAR 
 During the Cold War (1945-91), the nature of POW practices in the world 
changed radically.  The Geneva Convention Relative to Prisoners of War of 1949 
modified the 1929 Geneva Convention.  The United States presented a draft model for 
the Convention that was adopted without substantial modifications, clarifying certain 
aspects of prisoner treatment that had proven troublesome during World War II.  The new 
Convention shaped American treatment of POWs in the Korean War (1950-53) and the 
Vietnam War (1961-73), both fought in Asia with the goal of containing the spread of 
communism.  In each war, U.S. POW policy primarily consisted of holding enemy 
captives in overcrowded compounds while making almost no effort to utilize POW labor.   
American policy was also heavily influenced by allies, particularly the South Korean and 
South Vietnamese governments, whose goals regarding prisoners of war were often in 
conflict with American wishes. 
In Korea, the repatriation of prisoners became the primary disputed issue during 
armistice negotiations, as the United States adopted a new policy that no forced 
repatriation of prisoners to communist regimes would occur.  The legality of this policy 
has been extensively debated, the practical result was that thousands of North Korean and 
Chinese prisoners did not return to their homes at the end of the conflict.  American 
POWs repatriated after the armistice created a major controversy in the United States by 
reporting that many of their fellow captives actively assisted the enemy while prisoners, 
through radio broadcasts and the creation of written propaganda.   
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In Vietnam, American commanders abdicated responsibility for POW treatment 
by turning virtually all captives over to the care of the South Vietnamese government, 
which made little pretense of following the Geneva Convention.  This decision was 
largely a matter of convenience; it freed American personnel for combat operations.  As 
in Korea, American prisoners, though greatly outnumbered by enemy captives, shaped 
the American public’s perception of the POW issue.  Repatriated Americans reported 
extensive mistreatment by their captors, including the torture and execution of American 
prisoners.   
In each conflict, enemy governments sought to use prisoners taken by U.S. forces 
as propaganda tools by encouraging them to provoke conflicts with American captors.  
These conflicts were publicized as atrocities and used for leverage at diplomatic 
conferences.  At the same time, American prisoners became helpless victims brutalized 
by their captors and coerced into serving a propaganda function for the enemy by signing 
forced confessions of war crimes or denouncing the United States and its allies.   
 The U.S. State Department assumed the lead role in negotiating a new Geneva 
Convention in 1949.  It began by polling diverse federal agencies for recommendations 
about what should be changed, added, or deleted from the 1929 convention.  After 
drafting an initial proposal, American diplomats sought suggestions from foreign nations, 
relying primarily upon France and Great Britain.  American officials feared that the 
Soviet Union might cause significant problems by insisting upon major changes to the 
American draft, such as eliminating the International Committee of the Red Cross 
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(ICRC) from participation at the conference, but the process ran smoothly at the 
international conference, and the new convention superseded the old in 1949.1
 The Geneva Convention of 1949 sought to rectify the primary faults of the 1929 
convention, exposed by the treatment of prisoners during World War II.  Chief among the 
complaints was the use of national rather than absolute standards in regard to prisoner 
maintenance.  The 1929 convention ensured that prisoners received rations equal in 
quantity to those given to garrison troops of the capturing nation.  In 1949, the food 
provision was modified, and required that food rations be sufficient to maintain good 
health and prevent weight loss or nutritional deficiencies.  Further, any prisoners required 
to labor for their captor were entitled to additional rations. 
 The 1949 convention expanded the definition of prisoners of war to include 
individuals who accompanied armed forces without actually being members, such as the 
crews of merchant marine ships and civilian aircraft.  Article 13 expanded the guarantee 
of “humane treatment” made in the 1929 convention by prohibiting “any unlawful act or 
omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a 
prisoner of war in its custody.”  The use of prisoner labor, a pressing issue to any captor, 
presented a serious problem for the delegates, specifically, how to allow the use of 
prisoner labor without contributing to war efforts.  Eventually, the solution adopted was 
to enumerate the classes of work on which prisoners might be compelled to labor.  These 
classes included camp maintenance, agriculture, transportation of non-military goods, 
arts and crafts, domestic service, and industries without a military character.  No 
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prisoners were supposed to be compelled to work at dangerous or unhealthy labor, 
however, prisoners could volunteer for such work if they so desired. 
 The issue of repatriation, an extremely important matter in the armistice 
negotiations in Korea, remained somewhat ambiguous in the 1949 convention.  Sick and 
wounded prisoners could be repatriated or interned in a neutral country prior to the end of 
hostilities.  However, able-bodied prisoners were to be repatriated “without delay” at the 
end of hostilities.  Ironically, at the time of the signing of the 1949 convention, some 
signatories still held German and Japanese prisoners of war.  The retention of prisoners 
for several years after the end of hostilities would clearly violate the 1949 convention.   
 Perhaps the greatest flaw of the 1929 convention was the lack of enforceability of 
its provisions.  Only the threat of retaliation and the condemnation of world opinion 
served to enforce the convention, and neither had proven particularly coercive during 
World War II.  In the 1949 convention, signatories agreed to supplement international 
law with the adoption of domestic legislation providing effective penal sanctions for 
persons committing or ordering grave breaches of the convention, specifically killing, 
torturing, or injuring prisoners, or depriving them of their rights under the convention. 
 Unlike the world wars, in which combat occurred for years prior to American 
intervention, the Korean War (1950-53) surprised the United States and provoked a rapid 
American response.  The United States did not have years to prepare for combat 
operations, but because the war began only five years after the conclusion of World War 
II, it is to be expected that American POW policy would remain consistent between the 
two wars.  In fact, many of the lessons of World War II were ignored as U.S. forces 
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scrambled to first save South Korea and next push back invading communist forces from 
North Korea and China.   
 Works discussing POW history in general have focused upon two primary issues 
when discussing the Korean War, the issue of forced repatriation and the violent 
uprisings in camps.  Barker argued that allowing POWs to run their own camps 
encouraged misbehavior, and allowed communist fanatics to intimidate and control other 
prisoners.  He also believed that American POWs suffered because North Korean and 
Chinese captors did not allow the use of ranks among prisoners in the camps, which 
contributed to a breakdown in prisoners’ discipline and identity.2  Garrett’s discussion of 
the war focuses primarily upon Chinese and North Korean atrocities against UN 
prisoners, and his only mention of UN camps was a brief discussion of the Dodd incident 
and the existence of a non-forced repatriation policy.3  Levie discussed the legality of the 
non-forced repatriation issue, and noted that American policy during World War II was 
to send all prisoners back to their home nations, regardless of prisoner preference.  In 
Korea, the shift to non-forced repatriation prolonged hostilities for one year, it was the 
major point of contention at armistice discussions.  According to Levie, the Geneva 
Convention of 1949 is somewhat ambiguous, all prisoners have a right to repatriation, but 
do not have an irrevocable obligation to accept it under the terms of the convention.4  By 
focusing primarily upon the treatment of U.S. prisoners, the general POW historiography 
ignores the majority of captives taken in the war.  Further, most authors assume a 
continuity of POW treatment by the United States from World War II through the war, 
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despite the fact that the primary goal of World War II policy, the utilization of prisoner 
labor, remained virtually ignored for the entire conflict.   
 Prisoners during the Korean War have generated more discussion in general 
works about the conflict than was typical for earlier wars.  This is undoubtedly due in 
part to the central role of prisoners in armistice negotiations, and the very public 
accusations of atrocities made by both sides.  In 1987, Callum A. MacDonald argued that 
the primary victims of prolonged armistice negotiations were UN POWs, who endured an 
extra year of captivity during the truce talks.  He focused most of his discussion on 
communist confinement practices, but noted that UN POW facilities on Koje-do were 
overcrowded, often operating at double capacity, and understaffed, with only one 
American guard for every 180 prisoners.5  Max Hastings found that the few American 
troops at Koje-do were undisciplined and miserable, and made no effort to maintain 
control of the compounds in the face of communist infiltration.6  William Stueck, like 
Hastings, argued that communists allowed themselves to be captured for the purpose of 
managing prison compounds.7  Stanley Sandler also saw a lack of guards as a 
contributing factor to unrest in UN camps, noting “something approaching pandemonium 
prevailed in the UNC POW camps,” and arguing that prisoners deliberately provoked 
guards to fire into POW compounds as a means of generating anti-American 
propaganda.8  Lee Ballenger’s The Outpost War made an interesting distinction of the 
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capturing behavior of UN forces, noting that most North Koreans and Chinese who were 
taken prisoner deliberately surrendered, they were not taken captive during firefights.  He 
argued that UN troops viewed taking prisoners as problematic, and to avoid paperwork, 
they often turned prisoners over to South Korean troops, knowing the POWs might be 
mistreated or even executed.  The UN Command, coveting prisoners for their intelligence 
value, offered a one week furlough to any troops making captures to counteract this 
behavior.  Offering rewards to combat troops for captures resumed a practice initiated in 
the Pacific Theater of World War II, when soldiers received furloughs and ice cream for 
taking prisoners.9
 Many works have discussed the plight of UN prisoners in North Korea, and 
special emphasis has remained upon American soldiers.  One of the most influential work 
on the behavior of American POWs in North Korea was Eugene Kinkead’s In Every War 
but One, which concluded that American service personnel suffered in communist-run 
camps due to a pronounced lack of discipline and training in the army.10  He claimed that 
one-third of all American POWs collaborated with the enemy, and more than 13 percent 
were guilty of “serious collaboration.”11  Albert Biderman challenged Kinkead’s 
conclusions, calling them distorted, oversimplified, and erroneous.  His March to 
Calumny systematically countered Kinkead’s thesis and observed that the military 
convicted only ten American repatriates for collaboration, a far cry from Kinkead’s 
accusations.  Biderman found that 80 percent of American prisoners fell into a middle 
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category, neither collaborating with nor actively resisting the enemy.12  Philip D. 
Chinnery accused the Soviet Union and China of keeping UN prisoners, especially pilots, 
after the armistice for their intelligence value, and accused North Korea of keeping South 
Korean citizens as slave laborers.13  Raymond B. Lech’s Broken Soldiers relied upon 
transcripts of army interrogations and debriefings of returning American POWs to 
examine their mistreatment in communist camps.  He considered the period of captivity 
as a “methodical and calculated program of torture,” an attempt to destroy individuality 
and retrain the prisoners as “proper thinkers.”14   Lewis H. Carlson used oral interviews 
with surviving American POWs to document the situation in North Korean and Chinese 
camps, and accused the communist captors of deliberately mistreating American 
prisoners, with the result that 40 percent died while in captivity.15
 The army’s official army histories of the Korean War, with one exception, have 
largely ignored the issue of prisoners.  Roy E. Appleman’s South the the Naktong, North 
to the Yalu included a brief mention of enemy captures, and noted that Eighth Army 
commanders discounted the intelligence provided by captured Chinese prisoners, and 
underestimated Chinese troop strength in Korea as a result, but does not discuss the 
internment of prisoners.  James F. Schnabel’s Policy and Direction mentioned surrender 
demands and the number of enemy captures, but did not discuss the fate of prisoners.  
Likewise, Billy C. Mossman’s Ebb and Flow saw POWs largely in terms of intelligence 
value, but provided no discussion of the disposition of captured enemies.  Only Walter G. 
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Hermes provided significant discussion of prisoners, and then only in terms of the 
repatriation issue.  He argued that the major lesson of the war regarding prisoners was 
that they should not be under the control of the army commander, who should not be 
distracted from fighting by administrative matters.16   
 In the Korean War, the United States adopted the leadership of United Nations 
Command (UNC) military forces, and American policy decisions dominated the behavior 
of UN forces toward POWs.  Initially, American forces in Korea received little guidance 
regarding the capture and treatment of enemy prisoners.  On 5 July 1950, General 
Douglas MacArthur ordered all U.S. military personnel to treat captured North Korean 
troops “in accordance with the humanitarian principles applied by and recognized by 
civilized nations involved in armed conflict.”17  Not until 16 August did MacArthur 
clarify that UNC forces would follow the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949, 
and that summary executions were strictly forbidden.18
On 26 September 1950, the United States accepted all responsibility for the 
maintenance of prisoners taken by UN forces.19  UNC forces captured over 150,000 
POWs during the war, of the total captured, 126,000 were taken from October to 
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December of 1950.20  Throughout the war, American commanders placed little emphasis 
on POW affairs, and provided a limited number of trained custodial personnel for the 
guarding and maintenance of prisoners.  By understaffing prison compounds, the U.S. 
leadership allowed the formation of massive underground prisoner organizations.  
Prisoner factions exerted ruthless control over the compounds, enforcing discipline and 
judicial punishments upon any prisoners expressing political sentiments contrary to the 
leaders of the compound.  Each compound soon had a distinct political ideology, some 
were hard-core communist, others were strictly anti-communist.  Interventions in the 
compounds by guard forces were rare, and almost always undertaken to stop violence 
rather than to prevent it.  Camp commanders had virtually no control over camp behavior 
until the last year of the war.21  
 Enemy prisoners were initially unsegregated in the summer of 1950, first in 
temporary camps near Pusan, later in a massive prison complex on the island of Koje-do.  
No effort was made to separate communists from anti-communists, in the same manner 
that German Nazis and anti-Nazis had been separated in World War II.  Despite ample 
evidence that thousands of South Koreans had been forced into North Korean service, 
UN forces made no attempt to free South Korean conscripts who had been captured.  As 
Chinese forces entered the war, they were sent to a more distant prison locale, the island 
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of Cheju-do, approximately one hundred miles southwest of Koje-do.  Here, too, the 
initial practice was to confine all prisoners together, regardless of political leanings.   
South Korean Prime Minister John Myun Chang and President Syngman Rhee 
each requested in the spring of 1951 that South Korean POWs be segregated into separate 
camps, screened by the South Korean government, and released from custody.  General 
Matthew B. Ridgway refused to release any POWs in UNC custody, regardless of 
nationality, but agreed to confine South Koreans in separate camps.22  When Ridgway 
refused to release captive South Koreans, Chang informed UNC that the South Korean 
government could no longer supply subsistence for the 150,000 POWs in South Korea, 
and full responsibility for feeding the prisoners immediately fell to the UNC.23  On 16 
October, Ridgway changed his position on South Korean prisoners, and ordered them to 
be reclassified as civilian internees, eligible for release after screening by South Korean 
authorities.  Although the ICRC was notified of the status change, he allowed no 
publicity of the shift.24   
The South Korean withdrawal of subsistence illustrated a larger problem within 
the UN war effort.  The South Korean government often disagreed with UN POW policy 
during the war, and refused to cooperate on a number of occasions.  Syngman Rhee, in 
particular, proved difficult to accommodate.  If the United States wished to pursue a 
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policy that contrasted Rhee’s desires, it had to do so without the assistance of South 
Korea, even though the primary contingent of guard personnel at the prison compounds 
was supplied by the South Korean army.  This issue culminated in 1953, when Rhee 
forbade neutral observers from entering South Korean territory and orchestrated the 
“escape” of thousands of prisoners under the guard of South Korean troops. 
 Agitation within the POW compounds at Koje-do occurred due to many factors, 
but a major contributor was simple overcrowding, often a problem in POW compounds in 
other wars.  By June of 1951, UNC POW Camp Number One, at Koje-do, consisted of 
thirty-one compounds, some housing as many as eight thousand POWs.  A total of 
approximately 150,000 POWs filled the compounds beyond capacity, and were guarded 
by only six military police companies.25  The first major disturbance began on 19 June 
1951, when officer POWs at Compound Number 72 refused to eat unless they were given 
complete control over all of the POW camps on the eastern end of the island.  The UNC 
responded by deploying guards to withdraw the untouched morning meal.  As the guards 
entered the compound, prisoners threw rocks and debris and rushed the gate.  When 
warning shots did not deter the crowd, South Korean guards opened fire, killing three and 
wounding eight.26  Prison riots became increasingly common in the summer of 1951 and 
spring of 1952.  On 20 March 1952, the Koje-do commandant, Brigadier General Francis 
T. Dodd, noted that demonstrations by POWs were spreading through the compounds, 
and requested permission to deny food to all POWs within compounds holding 
demonstration.  Dodd’s superior, Brigadier General Paul F. Yount, approved the plan, but 
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felt that denial of food might convey propaganda advantages to the POWs more 
significant than any gained from demonstrations, which were already having an effect on 
armistice negotiations underway at Panmunjom.27  The POW uprisings culminated on in 
May when Dodd entered a compound without a military police escort and was taken 
hostage by the prisoners.   
Dodd’s capture by enemy POWs while inspecting the compound illustrated the 
complete lack of control by UN forces.  On 7 May 1952, Dodd approached Compound 
Number 76 at the behest of the camp’s prisoner representative.  As UN guards watched, 
Dodd was seized by a rush of prisoners and quickly dragged into the compound, where 
he was held captive for three days.  The prisoners announced that Dodd would be 
executed unless UN authorities agreed to publicly admit prisoners had been killed in 
POW camps by guard personnel, and to promise better treatment of prisoners in the 
future.  The prisoners further demanded that the UN agree to repatriate all prisoners, by 
force if necessary, and allow visitations to the prison compounds by North Korean and 
Chinese representatives.  Dodd admitted in a signed statement that some prisoners had 
been killed by guards during frequent prison riots, but he had no authority to agree to any 
other prisoner demands.  Dodd’s admission matched that of Brigadier General Charles F. 
Colson, assistant commandant at Koje-do, who assumed command and negotiated for 
Dodd’s release.  Dodd and Colson were both criticized for making any admissions of 
worthy of communist propaganda, including that prisoners had been killed by prison 
guards and that tear gas had been used to quell disturbances.  After three days of 
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negotiations, the prisoners released Dodd without injury, and he and Colson were both 
demoted and sent to the United States.28  Despite all of the riotous behavior, the UNC 
guard component at Koje-do was not increased until 2 January 1952, when Ridgway 
ordered an infantry battalion from the U.S. Eighth Army to provide additional security.29
 General Mark Clark, who replaced Ridgway as the commander of UN forces in 
May of 1952, ordered Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner to reestablish control of the 
prison compounds at Koje-do, by force if necessary.  Boatner requested massive guard 
reinforcements and an engineering battalion.  While the engineers built new prison 
compounds on Koje-do, Boatner led a series of raids upon existing compounds to remove 
contraband, including communist propaganda, national flags, and portraits of Kim Il 
Sung.  On 10 June, Boatner ordered guards to enter Compound 76 and forcibly remove 
the prisoners to a new, more secure compound.  When the prisoners resisted, a melee 
ensued, resulting in the deaths of forty-three prisoners.30  The remaining 6,500 prisoners 
were rounded up, divided into units of 500, and placed into the new compounds.  
Prisoners in other compounds, having witnessed the reduction of Compound 76, proved 
more tractable, and by the end of June, Boatner was in firm control of Koje-do.   
 After regaining control of all POW compounds and dispensing prisoners to 
smaller encampments on the island, Boatner issued a new standard operating procedure 
for POW enclosures on 15 August 1952.  The new regulations forbade prisoners from 
singing outside the compound or at night.  Physical exercise could not include any 
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tactical military training.  No prisoner could approach a fence line of any compound, and 
to keep a closer watch over prisoners, all tent flaps remained open except during 
inclement weather.  The disciplinary measures available to enclosure commanders were 
curtailed in the regulations, dietary punishments were virtually eliminated, and the use of 
tear gas to quell disturbances was strongly discouraged, though not strictly banned.  
Boatner’s insistence that all disobedient prisoners be immediately punished regained 
control of the intransigent prisoners and improved morale among guard personnel on 
Koje-do.31   
 On 31 March 1953, Boatner issued the final standard operating procedure for 
POWs at Koje-do.  Almost three years had elapsed since the first capture of enemy 
prisoners, and the UNC finally issued comprehensive orders for the care and maintenance 
of enemy prisoners.32  The orders modified the regulations used in German POW camps 
during World War II to fit the Korean War.  For the first time, an effort to organize labor 
detachments occurred at Koje-do.  The prisoners formed labor companies of twenty-five 
men, escorted by five guards.  Work projects were determined entirely by enclosure 
commanders, as long as they conformed to the Geneva Convention of 1949.  Boatner 
ordered all camp commanders to “aggressively implement” the work programs, “to 
insure the greatest possible efficiency in the utilization of prisoners of war.”33  In a letter 
written in 1959, Boatner declared the labor program to be an unmitigated failure, despite 
the fact that UNC studies in the spring of 1952 identified ten thousand skilled laborers 
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among the POW population.34  Boatner concluded the labor program failed because 
POWs remained too close to the combat zone, and still considered themselves active in 
the fighting.  As a result, he recommended that all prisoners be confined on Cheju-do if 
hostilities resumed in Korea, or even shipped to Okinawa.35
 Not all of the prisoners’ misbehavior in UNC compounds was initiated by 
communist agitators.36  By December of 1951, anti-communists were in control of two-
thirds of the compounds.  These prisoners vowed to resist repatriation at all costs, 
suggesting that if the United Nations had adopted a policy of forced repatriation, even 
more violence in POW compounds would have occurred.  Anti-communist POWs 
produced innumerable petitions, manifestoes, and testimonials attacking communism and 
the Chinese and North Korean governments.  These statements were signed by thousands 
of prisoners, many including a drop of blood next to their name to indicate their 
commitment against communism.  Many begged to join UN and South Korean forces to 
resume fighting.  For example, Kim Won Sang, a former teacher from Kae Song, begged 
release from Compound Number 74 on Koje-do, stating, “I will sacrifice myself for the 
fatherland and fight against the Reds as long as my life shall last.  Hundreds of Chinese 
officers claimed they had served in the Chinese Nationalist Army prior to the communist 
takeover of China, and had been forced into service in Korea.  Some of the prisoners 
requested release because they were Christians and feared communist oppression, within 
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the POW camps or after repatriation.37  The petitions against forcible repatriation cannot 
be simply accepted at face value.  Because anti-communist POWs controlled a majority 
of the camp compounds, they may not have been spontaneous declarations, they may in 
fact represent a propaganda device encouraged by compound leaders or the South Korean 
government.  Given the number of prisoners who refused repatriation from anti-
communist compounds, however, the petitions also cannot be simply discarded as 
propaganda. 
 The motivation behind compound power struggles varied by location, but 
evidence shows that communist prisoners were motivated primarily by a desire for self-
protection.  Communist prisoners did not seek to ingratiate themselves with their captors 
or obtain special favors and privileges.  Instead, they sought total control over 
compounds to be prepared for any action that might be required of them as events 
unfolded.  They did not consider themselves removed from the fighting, most believed 
the struggle continued in captivity.  Even in communist-controlled compounds, most 
prisoners did not identify ideology as a major determinant of their behavior.38  Many 
joined factions as a result of short-term issues, and remained loyal to their faction 
because their personal safety came to depend upon the success of their clique within the 
compound.  There is no evidence to suggest that they intentionally planned mass escapes 
or even the systematic harassment of UN authorities, rather these became spontaneous 
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group efforts.39  The primary complaint of communist agitators within the compounds 
soon became the UN stance on repatriation.  By the time the UN proposed free choice for 
prisoners regarding repatriation in January of 1952, virtually every compound was firmly 
controlled by either communist or anti-communist factions.  These factions submitted 
entire compounds to indoctrination regarding the repatriation issue, and the influence of 
the indoctrination can be seen in the proportion of prisoners who rejected repatriation 
from each compound.40
 Certain complaints were common to all POW compounds under UN control, 
regardless of the political ideology or nationality of the inhabitants.  Virtually every 
compound complained about the type, amount, and preparation of food provided, the 
regulations of each compound, and specific incidents of mistreatment by guard personnel.  
In addition, Korean POWs complained about clothing issues, especially when they were 
given red uniforms.  The red clothing, associated with convicts, was considered 
dishonorable and infuriated North and South Koreans alike, who shredded their uniforms 
rather than wear them.  Eventually, the camp commandants were informed of the 
significance of red clothing, and a new issue of POW uniforms rectified the error.41   
 The armistice convention to end the Korean War began on 10 July 1951 at 
Kaesong.  The conference soon shifted to Panmunjom, where it lasted more than two 
years before delegates signed an armistice on 27 July 1953.  The primary point of 
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contention in the peace talks was the disposition of prisoners of war.  POWs had never 
been such an important issue at an armistice negotiation.  Typically, the return of 
prisoners after previous wars was included in armistices as an afterthought, and any 
serious discussion of POW repatriation revolved around the rate of return for prisoners or 
the payment of prisoner upkeep.  In Korea, the primary issue was whether or not POWs 
would be forced to accept repatriation if they preferred not to return to their homeland. 
 The communist delegation at Panmunjom maintained that all prisoners must be 
repatriated, by force if necessary.  They based their arguments upon two key articles in 
the Geneva Convention of 1949, Article 7 and Article 118.  Article 7 prohibited any 
POW from renouncing any rights guaranteed by the convention.  Article 118 ensured a 
rapid repatriation of all prisoners from all sides at the end of hostilities.  Because all 
prisoners were guaranteed repatriation, and could not renounce their rights, the 
communist position was for complete repatriation, regardless of the wishes of individual 
prisoners.  The communist delegates insisted that the UNC agree to the release and 
exchange of all prisoners as a precondition to the exchange of any information on 
prisoners held.42
 The UNC delegates argued that the Geneva Convention was created for the 
protection and benefit of individual prisoners, not for the benefit of the prisoners’ original 
nations, and it would be wrong to force POWs to return to communist regimes, where 
experiences after World War II suggested they would be mistreated by their own 
governments.  Although no promises had been made to induce surrender in exchange for 
release in South Korea, psychological warfare officers suggested that any attempt to 
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force repatriation would be met with violence, particularly from Chinese prisoners.43  
The UNC held nearly 150,000 prisoners, while the communists held barely 10,000.  As 
such, a complete repatriation of all prisoners would provide a massive military advantage 
to the enemy, with no guarantee that all UN personnel would be returned.  Rather, the 
UNC recommended a one-for-one exchange of prisoners, with the balance repatriated 
under parole not to participate for the duration of the Korean War.44
 William H. Vatcher, Jr., argued that the communist negotiators had no desire to 
consummate a peace agreement.  By creating a thirty-day cease-fire, they halted UN 
advances, and created a perfect propaganda outlet in the armistice negotiations.45  
Discussion of repatriating POWs began on 11 December 1951, when Rear Admiral 
Ruthven E. Libby recommended equal exchange of prisoners during the negotiations, and 
requested visits to all POW camps by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC).  Communist delegates immediately rejected both suggestions, and substituted a 
recommendation to release all prisoners on both sides en masse.46  Without a mass 
exchange agreement, North Korean and Chinese negotiators initially refused to exchange 
any data about UN prisoners in communist custody.  When lists of prisoners were 
exchanged on 23 December 1951, the UN presented the names of 132,474 POWs, and 
                                                 
43 R. C. Dalquist to Robert A. Gelwick, 23 October 1951, Box 1, Entry 61, RG 333. 
44 Ibid., 23.  See also “UNC Proposal on Agenda Item 4 Presented to the Communists,” 2 
January 1952; “UNC Proposal on Agenda Item 4 Presented to the Communists,” 8 
January 1952; “UNC Proposal on Agenda Item 4 Presented to the Communists,” 28 
January 1952; all in Box 1, Entry 61, RG 333; Matthew B. Ridgway to James A. Van 
Fleet, 30 July 1951, Box 800, Entry EUSAK, RG 500. 
45 William H. Vatcher, Jr., Panmunjom; The story of the Korean military armistice 
negotiations (New York: Praeger, 1958), 118-19. 
46 Libby’s request was followed by a request from Ridgway, also rejected as unnecessary 
by the communist leadership.  Matthew B. Ridgway to Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai, 
21 December 1951; Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai to Matthew B. Ridgway, 24 
December 1951; both in Box 1, Entry 61, RG 333. 
 
 224
received a list of 11,559.  Earlier communist propaganda claimed 65,000 prisoners had 
been taken, but when asked to account for the discrepancy, the communist negotiators 
claimed that over 50,000 prisoners had been directly released at the front.47  According to 
UNC figures, only 177 of those “released at the front” returned to UNC lines.  While 
claiming to have returned 50,000 prisoners, the communists accused the UNC of 
presenting a list missing 44,259 prisoners previously reported to the ICRC.  According to 
the UNC, 37,000 of the “missing” prisoners were civilian internees, not prisoners of war, 
who had been captured during the rapid UN advance in the autumn of 1950.  The 
remainder were prisoners who had provided more than one name, who had escaped, or 
who had died in custody.   
 In April of 1952, the UNC began screening POWs to determine how many would 
refuse repatriation.  Prisoners were interviewed individually, using questions designed to 
encourage a maximum number of returnees.  The first question was simply “Would you 
like to return to China/North Korea?”  Prisoners who answered in the affirmative were 
designated for repatriation, and their interviews were immediately terminated.  Prisoners 
who answered in the negative were then asked if they would forcibly resist repatriation, 
and if they were aware of the potential consequences of refusing repatriation.  At no time 
did UNC interrogators promise to send non-returnees to any specific location.  The final 
question for any remaining POWs was the prisoners’ specific intent if the UNC decided 
to forcibly repatriate him.  If the prisoner did not mention an intent to violently resist, 
commit suicide, or a similar act, he was included on the repatriation list.  After the 
completion of screenings, the UNC delegates presented the communists a figure of 
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seventy thousand prisoners who would accept repatriation.  Communist negotiators found 
this figure completely unacceptable.48
 As discussions at Panmunjom broke down, riots erupted in compounds across 
Koje-do.  Vatcher claimed the communist senior delegate, General Nam Il, orchestrated 
the riots to provide propaganda material and leverage for communist diplomats at the 
armistice negotiations.  The riots cost hundreds of lives by provoking guards to fire upon 
rioting POWs, but allowed Nam Il to accuse the UNC of murdering POWs.  Daily 
meetings did nothing to advance the peace talks, as neither side was willing to 
compromise on their fundamental position regarding repatriation.  In June, the UN re-
screened POWs, hoping to increase the number willing to accept repatriation.  On 13 
July, the UNC announced that re-screening brought the total number of potential 
repatriates up to 83,000, but the communist delegates continued to insist upon full 
repatriation.49  On 8 October 1952, the UNC delegates unilaterally recessed the armistice 
conference, and refused to return until the communist delegates agreed to negotiate in 
good faith.50  The conference remained in recess until 26 April 1953, although liaison 
and staff officers’ meetings continued.  On 22 February 1953, General Mark W. Clark 
requested an immediate exchange of all sick and wounded POWs in a letter to Kim Il 
Sung and Peng Teh-huai.  The communists agreed to Clark’s request on 28 March, and 
from 20 April until 2 May, sick and wounded POWs were repatriated at Panmunjom.  
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The UNC referred to the repatriation as “Operation Little Switch.”  In it, 6,670 
communist POWs were exchanged for 684 UNC personnel.51   
 The debate over the exchange of all remaining POWs continued until 8 June 
1953, when delegates of each side signed the “Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations 
Repatriation Commission” that were eventually annexed to the armistice agreement of 27 
July 1953.  Under the Terms of Reference, each side agreed to turn over any POWs who 
refused repatriation to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC), headed by 
India, that took custody of non-repatriate prisoners for ninety days.  During that time, 
representatives of their home government met with each prisoner and explained their 
rights to repatriation.  If a POW decided to exercise his right to repatriation, his 
application was immediately processed.  If a POW did not accept repatriation after ninety 
days, he was released from POW status as a civilian. 
 South Korean President Syngman Rhee adamantly opposed the armistice 
agreement, and refused permission for NNRC forces to enter South Korea.  He viewed 
the entire armistice as a failure to unify the Korean peninsula, and accused the UNC of 
appeasing the enemy rather than seeking a permanent peace.  On 18 June, Rhee 
orchestrated the mass escape of 26,867 anti-communist North Korean POWs, and 
encouraged the South Korean civilian population to shield the escapees from recapture by 
UNC forces.52  On 20 June, the communist armistice delegates accused General Clark 
and the UNC of negligence, and demanded that steps be taken to recapture the escapees.  
Clark responded by blaming the South Korean government for the breakout, and denied 
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any UNC involvement in the escape.  Although the communist negotiators continued to 
complain, Rhee’s action presented a fait accompli and virtually none of the escaped 
prisoners were recaptured.   
On 27 July, the final version of the armistice was signed, and the NNRC began 
the process of screening the prisoners once more to determine who would refuse 
repatriation.  After ninety days of political harangues, threats, lectures, and appeals to 
patriotism by Chinese and North Korean political officers, 15,000 Chinese and 8,000 
North Korean prisoners refused repatriation.  A study by the U.S. Army study revealed 
that POWs who refused repatriation were typically young, well-educated, and had a brief 
period of service in the military prior to capture.53  The Chinese non-returnees were 
transported to Taiwan, the North Koreans were allowed to settle in South Korea.  In 
comparison, only twenty-two UNC soldiers refused repatriation and remained in North 
Korea.  “Operation Big Switch,” the exchange of direct repatriates, began on 5 August 
and ended on 23 December 1953.  The UNC returned 75,801 prisoners to communist 
control, and received 12,773 in return.54  Both sides accused the other of withholding 
prisoners from exchange and failing to account for missing personnel.55
 As American personnel returned from captivity, a bleak picture of the communist 
POW camps and the behavior of American prisoners emerged.  Although only 21 
American prisoners refused repatriation, hundreds more actively collaborated with their 
captors as a means of gaining better treatment within the camps.  An army investigation 
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concluded that 425 returning prisoners could be tried for their acts of collaboration.56  In 
response to the reports of collaboration, President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued 
Executive Order 10631 on 17 August 1955, prescribing a “Code of Conduct” for 
American service personnel.  Under the code, members of the American military must 
never voluntarily surrender; must continue to resist the enemy while in captivity; must 
maintain discipline and faith in fellow prisoners; and must refuse to give information to 
enemy interrogators.  The code became a fundamental aspect of American military 
training, and is still issued to all American military forces. 
 As the repatriation of POWs commenced, the UNC POW command began a study 
of POW treatment, with the idea of creating a guide for the future handling of Asian 
communist POWs.  The study included a series of lessons learned in the Korean War.  
The most important lesson was that future camp commanders must have a greater 
understanding of communist POWs, including psychology, political organization, and 
responses to captivity.  Also, POW planning must occur prior to the capture of thousands 
of prisoners, thus camp locations should be carefully selected in advance, allowing 
prisoners to be segregated by ideology immediately after capture.  Finally, camp 
commanders must retain firm control of the camp at all costs, punishing POW offenders 
and maintaining strict discipline, by force if necessary.57  The result of the study was a 
new training course for all army personnel undertaking prisoner of war operations.  More 
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comprehensive than any previous course, it required 137 hours of instruction for all POW 
camp personnel.58
 Because Korean and Chinese communist prisoners did not behave in the 
traditional or expected manner of POWs, by essentially waiting for exchange or the end 
of the war, the United States was forced to create new methods of holding captives.  The 
experiences of the Korean War changed American POW policy by establishing a firm 
practice of refusing to forcibly repatriate prisoners.  The United States had little effect 
upon the treatment of American prisoners by the enemy, because the enemy remained 
unconcerned by the fate of its own prisoners beyond their potential propaganda value, 
and thus any threat of retaliation remained empty.  In Vietnam, senior American 
personnel showed few signs of absorbing the lessons of the Korean War when dealing 
with communist prisoners, and instead the United States essentially dodged the issue of 
prisoner maintenance in Vietnam by turning all captives over to South Vietnamese 
government control. 
 In the Vietnam War, American involvement began in an advisory capacity, and 
gradually evolved into full-scale combat operations.  Although U.S. forces were 
responsible for the capture of thousands of prisoners, the United States did not retain 
custody of these prisoners.  Instead, all POWs captured by American forces were turned 
over to the South Vietnamese government for internment by the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam (ARVN).  American personnel served as advisors for the ARVN prison 
compounds, but had no authority to dictate policy to the South Vietnamese government.  
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American advisors urged ARVN camp commanders to follow the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention of 1949, but compliance was spotty at best. 
 The transfer of prisoners from American to South Vietnamese control was 
allowed by the Geneva Convention, although the capturing power still maintained a legal 
responsibility to ensure the proper treatment of its former captives.  In this regard, the 
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) encountered great 
difficulty with the ARVN.  Visits to ARVN prison camps by the ICRC invariably 
resulted in complaints about camp conditions, and the complaints were rarely rectified in 
a timely manner.  Particularly troubling were repeated allegations of torture, 
substantiated by ICRC investigators, that plagued the ARVN prison system.   
 The nature of the Vietnam War complicated the POW situation.  The majority of 
all captures were South Vietnamese rebels, members of the National Liberation Front, 
commonly referred to as “Viet Cong.”  Although thousands of members of the North 
Vietnamese Army (NVA) were captured, the Hanoi government maintained the fiction 
that no North Vietnamese troops were in South Vietnam, and it refused to discuss the 
exchange of prisoners or reciprocal actions regarding POW treatment. 
 In the Vietnam War, the practices of earlier American conflicts had little impact 
upon the treatment of prisoners.  The South Vietnamese government viewed enemy 
combatants as domestic insurgents subject to civil rather than military law.  The North 
Vietnamese government unwittingly contributed to this approach by insisting that no 
North Vietnamese troops were present in South Vietnam, signaling it would not protest 
any mistreatment of captured North Vietnamese Army troops.  Throughout the war, the 
commanders of MACV attempted to mitigate the South Vietnamese approach to POW 
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operations, but allegations of mistreatment, torture, and executions dogged the POW 
program for the duration of the war.  At the same time, MACV commanders had no 
desire to assume responsibility for the maintenance of POWs, which would place 
tremendous strain upon MACV logistics. 
 Most of the works devoted to POW history in general have focused upon the 
conditions faced by American POWs captured by the Viet Cong and the North 
Vietnamese.  Barker described the POW history of the war entirely in terms of 
communist attempts to indoctrinate American prisoners, primarily because he believed 
that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese did not care what happened to their captured 
troops.59  Garrett also focused entirely upon American prisoners and he considered it a 
miracle that any American captives survived the war.  Regarding the treatment of 
prisoners held in South Vietnam, he argued that because the ICRC made frequent 
inspections of camps run by the South Vietnamese government, no major problems were 
present in the compounds for Viet Cong and North Vietnamese prisoners.60  Levie 
believed that the United States complied entirely with the provisions of the Geneva 
Convention of 1949 in Vietnam, and that any mistreatment resulted from the actions of 
an individual, not U.S. policies, and that transgressions were appropriately punished.  In 
contrast, he noted that the Viet Cong refused to apply the provisions of the Geneva 
Convention, and violated it on a number of occasions by executing American prisoners.61  
This dissertation diverges from earlier works by focusing upon the practices of MACV 
and its South Vietnamese allies.  While the treatment of American prisoners held by the 
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enemy is undoubtedly an important topic, it does not define the POW experience for the 
vast majority of captives taken held the war. 
 Most of the secondary works discussing prisoners in Vietnam also focus entirely 
upon the plight of American prisoners.  When authors address the camps for Viet Cong 
or North Vietnamese prisoners, the general assumption is that the United States forced 
South Vietnam to strictly adhere to the provisions of the Geneva Convention.62  Vernon 
E. Davis is the rare exception.  In The Long Road Home he argued that the South 
Vietnamese government hesitated to adhere to the Geneva Convention, and only agreed 
to do so after the promise of financial assistance from the United States.63  He also 
believed that the South Vietnamese government greatly hampered American efforts to 
exchange prisoners, by insisting that only “repentant” prisoners, those who renounced 
their allegiance to the Viet Cong or North Vietnam, should be eligible for release prior to 
the end of the war.64
 As in the Korean War, most enemy prisoners in Vietnam were held in large, 
overcrowded prison camps.  Once again, a massive island prison complex was 
constructed for communist prisoners, this time on the island of Phu Quoc.  Virtually no 
effort was made to utilize POW labor; prisoners were interrogated and dumped into 
wretched conditions.   In the early years of major American involvement, American 
advisors suggested that the government of South Vietnam should plan ahead for the 
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capture of thousands of prisoners.  Repeated American efforts to prompt the construction 
of POW camps failed, POWs were routinely held in civilian jails and prisons through 
1967.65
Unfortunately, as the number of Viet Cong captures rose, the ability of camp 
commanders to feed and maintain their prisoners, much less monitor their activities 
within each compound, declined rapidly.  At the end of 1966, only 1,825 prisoners were 
in custody, of which 949 were Viet Cong and 711 were members of the North 
Vietnamese Army.  By the end of 1967, the total number of prisoners rose to 9,743, 
including 7,221 Viet Cong prisoners.  Over 10,000 prisoners were captured in 1968 and 
1969, straining camp capacities to the breaking point.  Construction of new camps 
proceeded slowly, as the South Vietnamese government placed a low priority upon 
prisoners of war.66  American advisors stressed the need for expanded camp capacity or a 
form of POW release throughout 1969, with few results.  Camp construction on Phu 
Quoc remained stagnant, primarily due to a lack of raw materials.67  This situation 
illustrated the frustration MACV advisors faced:  the inability to force action upon South 
Vietnamese camp commanders. 
 Until 1966, South Vietnam refused to admit it had captured prisoners of war.  
Rather, the government referred to all POWs as “Communist Rebel Prisoners” (CRP), 
and defined CRPs as “all who carry or do not carry arms and belong to the following 
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three categories: intruders from the North, returned from regroupment to the North, or 
joined the VC Armed Forces in the South.”  In short, any enemy combatant, regardless of 
origin or unit was considered a CRP.  Individuals not captured while fighting could be 
detained by the declarations of witnesses, because of their own statements, or simply for 
being in a region controlled by the VC.68  ARVN commanders made no mention of the 
provisions of the Geneva Convention, although ARVN camp personnel were prohibited 
from retaliation upon enemy prisoners or inhumane treatment of them, including 
torture.69  On 29 October 1966, MACV defined prisoners of war for American forces as 
individuals captured while engaging in combat or members of the North Vietnamese 
Armed Forces or the Viet Cong.  Despite fighting as allies, American and South 
Vietnamese units did not even have a consistent definition of prisoners of war, much less 
a coherent policy for their treatment. 
 On 19 October 1965, the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS), on the 
advice of MACV, issued JGS Memo 2537, which provided a standard operating 
procedure for the capture of communist insurgents.  Captured Viet Cong were briefly 
interrogated for tactical intelligence, and promptly evacuated to divisional collection 
points.  At the division level, all captured Viet Cong were given a lengthy interrogation, 
and their POW status was determined.  Those in possession of valuable intelligence were 
sent to either the National Intelligence Center or the Combined Military Intelligence 
Center, depending upon the nature of the intelligence.  Viet Cong with no intelligence 
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value were shipped directly to a POW detention camp.  Captured individuals deemed to 
be civilians by a military tribunal were returned to the place of capture and released.70
 The JGS issued a new standard operating procedure for Viet Cong prison camps 
on 25 May 1966, after consulting with American advisors and deciding that captured 
rebels should be held in camps separate from civil prison facilities.  Viet Cong POWs 
were defined as any rebels captured while openly bearing arms and resisting the ARVN.  
Any Viet Cong who intentionally concealed his or her identity, as well as guerillas 
operating outside the laws of war, were specifically exempted from POW status.  The 
procedures required all Viet Cong prisoners to be searched, interrogated, and 
fingerprinted upon arrival at a prison camp.  All Viet Cong personnel were segregated by 
rank, gender, nationality, language, and political trend.71  While the new procedures 
clearly defined who received POW status, they did not mention the disposition of 
captives exempted from POW status. 
 Each separate POW camp in South Vietnam received a MACV military police 
advisory team of one officer and four enlisted men to assist in supervising the 
confinement of two thousand prisoners.  The Central POW Camp at Phu Quoc, with a 
planned capacity of twenty thousand POWs, received an advisory team of only seven 
officers and twenty-six enlisted men.72  The primary guard force at each enclosure 
consisted of a Quan Canh (QC) company of ARVN soldiers who received virtually no 
training in POW maintenance. 
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The POW advisors were coordinated at MACV headquarters, first by Colonel 
Richard O. Rowland, later by Colonel Charles D. Gooch.  Rowland believed the 
Vietnamese government and ARVN earnestly wished to provide excellent POW care, but 
were hampered by poor logistics.  He appreciated the diplomatic aspect of POW care, 
noting “a signal failure in the PW program would create repercussions that could be 
disastrous.”  He especially feared ARVN might insist upon the United States assuming 
control of POWs if MACV advisors pushed too hard to improve POW conditions.73  The 
American personnel were advisors only, they had no authority to order changes in the 
operation of ARVN POW camps, and they reported that camp commanders often ignored 
their suggestions, particularly in regard to the treatment of Viet Cong prisoners.74   
Once separated into camp compounds, enlisted Viet Cong prisoners selected a 
prisoner representative for communications with camp officials and representatives of the 
ICRC.  The election of representatives was done through secret ballots, but all Viet Cong 
representatives required the approval of the camp commander.  Officer camps 
automatically granted the position to the highest-ranking prisoner in the camp.  The 
representative enjoyed wide latitude in the performance of official duties, but maintained 
no disciplinary power over other POWs.75   
 Camp commanders were warned to prevent acts of opposition by Viet Cong 
prisoners by maintaining an active guard presence in each camp.  Any prisoner 
attempting to organize opposition to camp regulations, or any form of protest whether 
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active or passive, was immediately punished by camp authorities.  Prisoners were 
prohibited from assembling in large groups, displaying propaganda, or chanting 
communist slogans within the camps.  Fraternization between captives and guards or 
civilians was strictly forbidden.  Camp commanders were authorized to use force to break 
up any demonstration of protest, to end POW refusals to work, or to prevent imminent 
riots.76  American commanders expressed concern that Phu Quoc could become another 
Koje-do, with POWs virtually running their own compounds and guard personnel 
powerless to stop major incidents of violence.77
 Enlisted prisoners could be assigned labor duties, including camp maintenance, 
manual labor, transportation duties, and public benefit tasks of a non-military nature 
within the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949.  For the most part, South 
Vietnam exerted little effort to utilize prisoner labor, and virtually all labor details 
remained within the confines of POW camps.78  Camps received insufficient guard 
personnel to maintain control over large working parties, thus most prisoners had no 
opportunity to labor outside of the camps.  Cao Van Vien observed in 1971 that at Phu 
Quoc, “the camp has only accomplished a vegetable planting project with a limited 
scope.”  He blamed a lack of funds, insufficient guard personnel, and a lack of U.S. 
military support for the failure to use prisoner labor.79
 The only exceptions to the general non-use of prisoner labor were two specialized 
vocational programs, the Chieu Hoi and Bien Hoa programs.  Viet Cong prisoners who 
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were South Vietnamese citizens were eligible for a vocational training program that led 
to eventual release and resettlement on government-controlled territory.  The “Chieu 
Hoi,” or “Open Arms,” program sought to create productive, peaceful citizens out of 
former rebels through a program of political indoctrination, and eased some camp 
overcrowding by allowing the release of thousands of Viet Cong POWs.80  Prisoners 
having good conduct and requesting reclassification were screened by camp authorities.  
If camp commanders recommended a change in status, the “returnees” transferred to the 
control of the Ministry of Information for administration and release.  By 1969, even a 
small number of North Vietnamese POWs entered the Chieu Hoi program.81
Adolescent prisoners presented a special problem for South Vietnamese and 
American captors.  As of 7 March 1968, over thirteen hundred prisoners between the 
ages of eleven and eighteen were in custody, including eighty-eight females and forty-
nine members of the NVA.  The government transferred these young POWs to a special 
reeducation program, the Youth Rehabilitation Program at Bien Hoa, which contained a 
basic literacy program and a vocational training center, coupled with intense political 
indoctrination.  Of the sixty-seven teachers at Bien Hoa, twenty-five were for 
indoctrination, ten for literacy, and thirty-two for vocational training, including 
woodworking, tailoring, brick-making, and gardening.82   
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 Female POWs were sent to a single enclosure at Qui Non.  Female prisoners had 
also been taken and segregated during the Korean War.  However, in Vietnam, American 
medical officers reported that a high number of female POWs arrived at their compounds 
pregnant, presenting a new medical difficulty for guard personnel.83  Discipline at Qui 
Nhon remained a problem throughout the war, camp guards resorted to flogging female 
POWs for various offenses, a clear violation of the Geneva Convention.84   
 In 1968, the South Vietnamese government finally decided to completely 
segregate Viet Cong prisoners from civil defendants and North Vietnamese POWS.  To 
accomplish this task, a massive expansion of the prison facilities at Phu Quoc 
commenced.  Further, South Vietnamese authorities removed the five thousand prisoners 
deemed the most “hard-core” communists to the island prison at Con Son.  This action 
followed the precedent created by the separation of fanatical Nazi prisoners during World 
War II and the segregation of ardent communists in the Korean War.85  By creating a 
distinction between civil prisoners and POWs, South Vietnam submitted to an important 
legal issue pressed by MACV advisors, but this shift did not guarantee the Geneva 
Convention would be followed. 
The enemy sought to use POW mistreatment as a propaganda device in the 
Vietnam War in the same manner as the Korean War.  However, in Vietnam, when 
prisoner riots did not provoke violent responses as they had on Koje-do, Viet Cong rebels 
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began attacking prison camps, killing their own prisoners with mortar shells and rocket 
fire, to demonstrate that the South Vietnamese government had not taken adequate 
measures to protect its captives.  The island of Phu Quoc proved a poor choice for the 
prison compound, it was rife with Viet Cong activity.  In 1968 alone,  the prison 
compounds were attacked or shelled thirty-four times.  The prison was successfully 
breached only once, during the Tet Offensive, when 2,665 POWs escaped after an assault 
upon the fence line.  Almost none of the escapees were recaptured; they had hidden 
among the native population of the island.86
In late 1968, an inspection tour by members of the Office of the Provost Marshal 
revealed a number of glaring weaknesses in the Vietnamese POW program.  No prisoner 
of war information center existed, despite the requirement of such a bureau by Article 
122 of the Geneva Convention.  Prior ICRC visits had little effect upon camp conditions, 
despite American pressure to conform to ICRC requirements.  The central camp at Phu 
Quoc remained overcrowded, and almost no effort to utilize POW labor existed.  POW 
discipline remained lax, and guard personnel responded slowly to demonstrations by 
prisoners.  In short, multiple problems remained in the POW system despite American 
efforts to assist the South Vietnamese government.87  By October 1968, Phu Quoc 
operated with 40 percent more POWs than its normal capacity, and the rate of captures 
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continued to climb.  The list of POWs required by Article 122 of the Geneva Convention 
remained incomplete at the end of 1969.88
 A 1970 study conducted by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) 
concluded that American treatment of POWs from the period of capture to delivery to 
ARVN custody complied with the requirements of the Geneva Convention.  American 
soldiers received reminder cards illustrating the major points of the Geneva Convention, 
and processed enemy prisoners quickly but humanely into ARVN control.89  Once POWs 
reached permanent enclosures, the situation changed.  ICRC inspections of Phu Quoc in 
1970 revealed inadequate food supplies, poor medical care, and physical beatings of 
prisoners.  A separate MACV investigation corroborated the ICRC reports, and found 
that no corrective action occurred from February until October of 1970.  If anything, the 
situation of POWs worsened, as camps became more crowded.  The MACV investigator 
concluded that the South Vietnamese government had neither the desire nor the ability to 
improve camp conditions, any improvements required direct U.S. assistance.  He noted 
that the United States had an obligation under Article 12 of the Geneva Convention to 
ensure proper treatment of prisoners captured by U.S. forces, but no facilities to assume 
direct control of the POWs.90  The provost marshal ordered American advisors to notify 
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ARVN camp commanders of any mistreatment of POWS and demand immediate 
corrective action, but the incidents continued unabated.91
 On 11 August 1971, an American embassy investigator reported that beatings in 
the Phu Quoc compounds continued, and that any time an American advisor became 
aware of a beating, the camp commanders transferred the victim to a different compound 
to hide the incident.  Within ARVN, camp personnel were rated exclusively on the 
number of prisoner escapes, no attempt to discipline guards for mistreatment of prisoners 
occurred.  Cao Van Vien, Chief of the JGS, insisted that ICRC delegations falsely 
reported camp conditions, despite the concurrent findings of MACV and embassy 
investigators.92
 Poor responses to ICRC camp visit complaints hurt the war effort, and lowered 
world opinion of the South Vietnamese treatment of POWs.  Few complaints received 
proper attention or follow-up, and changes in POW camp administration rarely occurred 
as the result of an ICRC visit.  ICRC visits to Phu Quoc reported physical evidence of 
torture, including electrocution scars; food inadequacies; and nutritional deficiencies 
among the POW population.93  Proposed ration scales for POWs published on 16 
September 1968 suggested 2,024 calories per day for POWs in East and Southeast Asia, 
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while recommending over 2,400 calories for prisoners from all other regions of the 
world.  Corresponding lower standards for protein, fat, and vitamins also applied to the 
area, and rice comprised virtually the entire proposed ration for East Asian prisoners.94  
The ICRC visits, and subsequent complaints, demonstrated that American advice 
regarding the care of POWs remained unheeded by South Vietnamese camp 
commanders, as ICRC visits to American-run camps during World War II and the Korean 
War typically resulted in no significant complaints about prisoner maintenance. 
 American POW policy in Vietnam was largely driven by an overriding urge to 
free American POWs from enemy control.  The MACV chief of POW operations, 
Colonel Henry Gibson, noted in 1968, “the question of treatment of enemy prisoners of 
war is inexorably interwoven with the treatment of captured Americans by the enemy.”95  
Because the Viet Cong had no discernible central committee authorized to conduct 
exchange negotiations, and the North Vietnamese government refused to regard captured 
American personnel as prisoners of war, arranging the liberation of American captives 
proved exceedingly difficult.  The situation was further complicated by the South 
Vietnamese refusal to release any POWs who refused to swear fealty to the government 
and settle in a location under government control.  In an attempt to free American 
personnel, United States commanders released enemy prisoners unilaterally on a number 
of occasions.  They hoped that North Vietnam and the Viet Cong would feel pressure to 
release an equivalent number of prisoners as a goodwill gesture.  While the “reciprocal 
releases” freed a few American prisoners, they did not lead to a regular exchange cartel 
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or negotiations for repatriation.  Neither the Viet Cong nor the North Vietnamese 
government showed a particular interest in regaining POWs under South Vietnamese 
control.96  Because the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese expressed no concern for their 
prisoners in South Vietnam, any threat of retaliation for the mistreatment of American or 
South Vietnamese captives remained hollow.  The United States made no such threats 
despite evidence that American prisoners received inadequate food and medical care 
while in captivity. 
 Maintaining the precedent established in Korea, the United States insisted that no 
enemy personnel, even if sick or wounded, would be repatriated by force.  To avoid a 
drawn-out armistice negotiation, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker recommended that any 
POW who did not desire repatriation should be reclassified prior to any negotiations, 
effectively pre-empting the question of voluntary repatriation.  General Creighton 
Abrams rejected the suggestion, as it would violate the spirit of the Geneva Convention, 
if not its literal wording.97  On 29 May 1971, the United States announced that 660 
severely wounded and sick prisoners, eligible for immediate repatriation, would be 
screened by the ICRC, and those accepting repatriation sent to North Vietnam.  
Optimistic American planners believed that most American POWs held in North Vietnam 
were eligible for repatriation under the same provisions of the Geneva Convention, and 
that international public pressure could force the return of hundreds of American 
prisoners through the unilateral release of sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners.  
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The ICRC finished its screening procedures in a single day, and announced that only 13 
permanently disabled prisoners had elected to be repatriated.  This outcome prompted 
North Vietnamese propaganda to announce that hundreds of prisoners had been offered 
repatriation by the United States, only to be held back, against their will, in an example 
of American cruelty.98
 At the end of the war, ARVN held 37,540 POWs, including 9,971 NVA and 
26,927 VC.  The NVA prisoners were repatriated to Hanoi by air, but the VC prisoners 
presented a greater problem.  They were South Vietnamese citizens who represented a 
real threat to the government, and only 9,706 had agreed to join the Chieu Hoi program, 
the rest still opposed the Saigon government.99  American diplomats expected North 
Vietnam to make POW exchange a difficult proposition, and did not believe North 
Vietnam would release all of its prisoners within sixty days of the cease-fire.100  In short, 
they believed North Vietnam would not bargain in good faith.  Four key areas of 
contention existed.  First, North Vietnam still claimed in 1972 that no NVA troops 
existed in South Vietnam, thus it might refuse to accept the return of NVA POWs.  
Second, North Vietnam might insist that all 27,000 remaining VC prisoners be freely 
released to settle anywhere in South Vietnam, including VC-controlled areas in the 
countryside.  Third, many NVA POWs might refuse repatriation and VC prisoners might 
refuse to return to VC-controlled areas, effectively refusing repatriation.  Finally, 
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members of the Chieu Hoi program would probably resist forcible return to VC-
controlled areas, and the North Vietnamese might argue they were held back against their 
will.101
 The Vietnam War represented a new approach by the United States to the 
question of how to handle enemy prisoners.  In this war, the American military 
essentially abdicated responsibility for prisoners by turning them over to the South 
Vietnamese government, even knowing that South Vietnam would not adhere to the 
requirements of the Geneva Convention.  In every American war prior to Vietnam,  
guarding and maintaining enemy prisoners had been a thankless task given to poorly 
trained troops unsuited for combat.  In Vietnam, this approach reached its apex, by giving 
custody of prisoners to the South Vietnamese, more American personnel remained 
available for combat duty.  Any mistreatment of POWs could be blamed on the South 
Vietnamese, because American camp personnel maintained only an advisory role and had 
no power to change the day-to-day operations of POW camps. 
 The advisory approach to POW operations in Vietnam certainly lightened the 
burden upon American logistics, but it also ensured that the United States could not 
utilize POW labor, nor could it institute changes to POW policies without the 
acquiescence and active participation of South Vietnam’s authorities.  Most of the time, 
this did not represent a problem, but when American negotiators wished to exchange 
enemy prisoners for American captives, they required permission from the South 
Vietnamese government.  American POW policy prior to Vietnam had been 
improvisational, but in Vietnam, any American improvisation was slowed by the need to 
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convince South Vietnamese camp commanders to change their policies.  This necessity 
resulted in a poorly-functioning system strained to capacity from 1968 until 1973, 
continually beset by ICRC complaints and supply difficulties.   
The American advisory approach to POW operations in coalition warfare has 
continued and, if anything, it has increased after the end of the Cold War.  In the first 
Gulf War, discussed in the next chapter, American commanders planned for the 
construction of two massive POW compounds, where Iraqi prisoners could be rapidly 
interrogated and then transferred to Saudi Arabian custody, again freeing American 
personnel for combat operations.   
The primary legacies of the Cold War, from the standpoint of supervising POWs, 
are twofold.  First, there was been a sustained effort to transfer control and responsibility 
for enemy prisoners to less combat-effective allied troops, who often do not share 
American views on the efficacy of complying with the Geneva Convention.  The 
practical result of massive, overcrowded compounds and little day-to-day control of 
prisoners became evident in Korea and Vietnam.  Second, American commanders 
broadened the definition of POWs to include guerillas and other combatants who do not 
necessarily represent a specific nation.  Further, the expectation that only adult males 
served as combatants certainly altered during the Cold War.  The captives held by the 
United States and its allies included substantial numbers of women and adolescents for 
the first time in American history.  Such non-traditional combatants have played an 
increasing role on the battlefields of the post-Cold War era. 
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CHAPTER IX 
 
CONCLUSION:  POW POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
 
 After the end of the Vietnam War, the United States next deployed large numbers 
of military personnel in 1990-91 with the commencement of Operation Desert Shield.  
Once again, the United States faced an aggressor state, Iraq, in a distant and hostile 
terrain, as part of a coalition of military forces.  As in Korea, the United States adopted a 
leadership role for the coalition forces to develop and implement a POW policy, 
particularly after the start of combat in Operation Desert Storm.  Despite a four-month 
period of deployment and build-up, the United States entered combat unprepared for the 
capture of enemy forces, and improvised ways to maintain Iraqi prisoners for what turned 
out to be the short period of combat.  In 2001, after the 11 September terrorist attacks, the 
United States led a coalition to invade Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the War on Terror.  
The Afghanistan invasion, begun with the intent of dismantling terrorist organizations, 
resulted in revised definitions for who received prisoner of war status.  Subsequent 
interrogations of prisoners taken in Afghanistan led to reports of torture and violations of 
the Geneva Convention by U.S. interrogators.  The Second Gulf War further blurred the 
definition of POWs in the twenty-first century.  Iraqi military and civilian captives were 
housed together in massive prison compounds and mistreated by poorly-trained 
American guards.  The resulting scandal provoked world outrage and fueled insurgents 
combating the U.S. occupation of Iraq.  Conclusions about the nature of American POW 
operations and the future of American POW policy follow the discussion of the First Gulf 
War and the War on Terror. 
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 Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, provoking 
immediate condemnation from other nations and a flurry of United Nations resolutions.  
Iraq’s military occupied Kuwait and appeared to threaten the sovereignty of Saudi 
Arabia, destabilizing the region and disrupting the world’s oil supply.  Eventually, 36 
nations deployed forces to participate in ousting Iraqi forces from Kuwait, including over 
540,000 American troops.  American planners anticipated the capture of thousands of 
Iraqi POWs, but expected to hold them for a period of only one week before transferring 
them to Saudi Arabian control for detainment and eventual repatriation.  To encourage 
surrenders, coalition planes dropped more than 32,000,000 surrender leaflets.  Over 70 
percent of prisoners cited the leaflets as a factor in the decision to surrender and virtually 
all reported that they had seen the leaflets.1  American forces captured over 60,000 Iraqi 
troops, and accepted custody of 8,000 more captured by British and French forces, but 
could not process them rapidly enough to transfer them to Saudi control for several 
weeks.2  All told, coalition forces captured almost 87,000 Iraqi prisoners, most during the 
four days of ground combat.3  Although American commanders dictated policies 
governing the treatment of Iraqi POWs, in practice, after capture, POWs remained an 
afterthought.    
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 Construction of POW facilities in Saudi Arabia never matched demand.  The first 
Iraqi prisoners captured during ground operations arrived at Camp Brooklyn within one 
hour of the completion of the first compound.  As areas were completed, they were 
immediately occupied to capacity by prisoners.  The U.S. Army initially planned to 
construct four camps for POWs, each with a capacity to hold up to twenty-four thousand 
prisoners.  Captures greatly exceeded expectations and overwhelmed transportation 
capacity to transfer prisoners to the enclosures in Saudi Arabia.  Operational commanders 
feared that the rate of capture might hinder the ability of ground forces to rapidly 
advance.4  The Seventh Corps of the U.S. Army captured over seven thousand prisoners 
in the first two days of combat, and U.S. marines reported eight thousand prisoners on the 
first day.  The lack of transportation became so extreme that disarmed prisoners routinely 
traveled to rear areas without a coalition escort.5  Planners selected sites in Saudi Arabia 
where prisoners could be processed, interrogated, and transferred to Saudi control.  As 
prisoners flooded into the camps, they overwhelmed the identification and examination 
system.  Each camp initially processed prisoners at a rate of less than one hundred per 
day, although by the end of combat, the number rose to fifteen hundred per day through 
streamlined procedures.6   
 Despite the problems associated with the capture of eighty thousand Iraqis by 
coalition forces in a ground war lasting only four days, Iraqi prisoners received 
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exceptionally good treatment after capture.  Most underwent a cursory interrogation and 
medical examination prior to transfer into a holding enclosure.7  At the enclosures, the 
prisoners reported that they received better food, clothing, medical supplies, and shelter 
as prisoners of war than provided by their own army.  Perhaps the most telling statistic is 
that only eight Iraqi prisoners died in U.S. custody, all from battle wounds or illnesses 
contracted prior to capture.8  The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
reported that the coalition forces adhered to international law and accepted practices, and 
pronounced, “The treatment of Iraqi prisoners of war by U.S. forces was the best 
compliance with the Geneva Convention by any nation in any conflict in history.”9   
 American prisoners in Iraqi custody received far worse treatment during the 
conflict.  Iraq captured only twenty-three American prisoners, mostly pilots, and twenty-
four other coalition prisoners.10  American repatriates reported physical abuse, 
malnourishment, insufficient protection from attacks, and poor medical care.11  On a 
number of occasions, Iraqi interrogators forced coalition prisoners to appear before 
television cameras for propaganda purposes.  These efforts backfired, provoking 
international condemnation without deterring coalition advances into Iraq.12  Although 
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coalition officials threatened to hold war crimes trials for the mistreatment of prisoners, 
they issued no threats of retaliation upon Iraqi prisoners.13   
The safe return of American prisoners remained a high priority for U.S. 
commanders, the first agenda item at the cease-fire negotiations was the immediate return 
of all coalition prisoners.  Iraq repatriated all of its captives on 4 and 5 March 1991, the 
two days after the signing of the cease-fire agreement.  The armistice made no mention of 
the disposition of Iraqi prisoners.14  The insistence upon returning coalition prisoners 
reflected a legacy of the Vietnam War and included the fear that some prisoners might be 
unaccounted for at the end of hostilities.  One American aviator, Lieutenant Commander 
Michael Scott Speicher, was rumored to have been held back from exchange by Iraq.  In 
January 2001, his status was officially changed from killed in action to missing in action, 
the first such change ever made by the Department of Defense.15
 In keeping with established Cold War policy, the United States vowed to refuse to 
use force to repatriate Iraqi prisoners.  The coalition requested that the ICRC determine 
which prisoners wished to refuse repatriation; a total of over thirteen thousand elected to 
remain in Saudi Arabia.  The repatriation of Iraqi POWs commenced on 6 March 1991, 
virtually all returned to Iraq via Saudi Arabian transportation.  On 22 August, the last 
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Iraqi POW left Saudi Arabian territory, the following day, all remaining prisoners legally 
became refugees and permanent residents of Saudi Arabia.16   
 The U.S. POW effort succeeded in the First Gulf War, despite inadequate 
planning, a shortage of trained personnel, and a lack of facilities, because it had ample 
assistance from the Saudi government in the form of supplies and transportation.17  The 
relationship remained markedly different than the often adversarial relationships 
maintained with the South Korean and South Vietnamese governments of earlier wars.  
The short duration of the war contributed to the ease of prisoner maintenance; facilities 
designed to be temporary in nature proved sufficient for the prisoners’ needs.  In the next 
American conflict in the Middle East, the treatment of military captives radically differed 
from the 1991 experience.  Unlike Operation Desert Storm, which consisted of clear 
operational goals, a long period of preparation, and the careful incorporation of coalition 
forces, the War on Terror, and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, suffered 
from a lack of preparation and foresight regarding POW affairs. 
 On 11 September 2001, members of the Al Qaeda terrorist network hijacked four 
airplanes, eventually steering two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one 
into the Pentagon, and crashing one in rural Pennsylvania.  On 21 September 2001, 
President George W. Bush presented an ultimatum to the Taliban, the radical Islamic 
government of Afghanistan.  In it, he demanded the Taliban deliver Osama bin Laden 
and the leadership of Al Qaeda to American control, release all imprisoned foreign 
nationals, and close all terrorist training camps within the country.  If the Taliban failed 
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to comply, Bush vowed that it would “share their fate.”18  The leadership of the Taliban 
refused to respond to Bush’s ultimatum.  On 7 October 2001, American and British 
forces commenced an invasion of Afghanistan, aided by rebels of the Northern Alliance. 
 As in any conflict, American forces captured enemy combatants, provoking the 
first substantial POW question of the War on Terror:  Should members of Al Qaeda or 
other terrorist networks be considered prisoners of war?  The Geneva Convention of 
1949 is somewhat ambiguous on the subject, although a literal reading of the document 
suggests that members of terrorist organizations do not receive POW status upon 
capture.19  They  typically do not wear identifiable uniforms, operate under the control of 
officers responsible for troop behavior, or adhere to the international laws of war.  
Captured members of Al Qaeda fell outside the definition of POWs and remained in 
captivity in Afghanistan.  The military shipped prisoners with vital intelligence value to 
Camp X-Ray, a prison established in January 2002 at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  In the 
first three months of operation, American forces airlifted over six hundred prisoners to 
Guantanamo for long-term interrogation.20
 Had the Afghan conflict remained solely between the United States and Al Qaeda, 
it is unlikely any controversy would have emerged from Guantanamo.  The invasion of 
Afghanistan provoked resistance from the Taliban and necessitated a further definition of 
enemy captives.  A White House legal counsel recommendation, endorsed by President 
George W. Bush, denied POW status to Taliban captives as well, on the grounds that the 
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Taliban was a “failed state,” despite the Taliban’s de facto control of the nation for years 
prior to the conflict.  Further, because Taliban units reportedly did not follow the Geneva 
Convention, they could expect no quarter from capturing forces.  A clarification, issued 7 
February 2002, announced that the United States would substantially adhere to the 
Convention regarding the maintenance of Taliban captives, but would not accord them 
prisoner of war status.21  Like captured Al Qaeda members, certain Taliban fighters faced 
prolonged captivity in Guantanamo for interrogation purposes.22
 Interrogators at Guantanamo utilized Field Manual 34-52, which included a series 
of guidelines for the interrogation of enemy prisoners.  Written in 1987 and modified in 
1992, the guidelines contained a list of acceptable means of coercing responses from 
prisoners, including sleep and sensory deprivation.  The guidelines expressly forbade 
physical beatings and certain threats or deceptions.23  On 16 April 2003, Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld broadened the acceptable interrogation methods to include 
forced nudity and the use of military dogs for intimidation purposes.24  Physical means of 
intelligence extraction remained illegal, and the new means were intended solely for use 
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at Guantanamo, not as a general shift in prisoner of war interrogation techniques used by 
American forces.   
 The invasion of Iraq commenced on 20 March 2003, ostensibly in a search for 
illegal weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).  The broad coalition support of 1991 
disappeared by 2003.  Although forty-nine nations officially supplied troops or materiel, 
the invasion remained overwhelmingly an American venture.25  Noticeably absent were 
the regional neighbors of Iraq that had participated in the First Gulf War.  American and 
coalition forces quickly invaded Iraq and captured the capital of Baghdad by 9 April.  In 
the process, over eighty thousand Iraqi troops surrendered to American forces.26  Again, 
American planes rained over thirty million surrender leaflets upon Iraqi forces, 
prompting many to surrender at the first sight of coalition troops.27  Hussein fled before 
the advancing forces, and directed an insurgent campaign to harass the occupying forces 
until his capture on 13 December. 
 As in Vietnam and the First Gulf War, the return of American POWs remained of 
paramount importance to American commanders.  Although the Iraqi military captured 
few Americans, press reports on the fate of American POWs riveted the nation.  In 
particular, the story of Private First Class Jessica Lynch, taken prisoner during an ambush 
of a supply convoy, became the symbol of American POWs during the war.  Special 
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operations forces raided the hospital where Lynch was held as a prisoner, and 
successfully freed her from captivity.  In the same operation, they discovered the bodies 
of seven American POWs who died of wounds received in the ambush.  Within hours of 
obtaining her freedom, Lynch’s visage beamed from news broadcasts across the 
country.28  Less than two weeks later, marines rescued seven U.S. prisoners held in 
Tikrit.  The freed prisoners received a heroes’ welcome upon their release.29
 If the status of terrorists and Taliban fighters confounded American legal analysts, 
no such controversy existed regarding Iraqi prisoners.  Iraqi captives received POW 
status immediately, and no government or military official suggested that they should not 
be protected by the Geneva Convention.  Living up to the requirements of the Convention 
proved difficult, as no location in Iraq remained secure from hostile action, and thus 
POWs could not be evacuated from the war zone without removing them from Iraq 
entirely.  No other nation offered to house Iraqi prisoners as Saudi Arabia had done in 
1991, thus they remained an American problem. 
 Without a secure base of operations outside the combat zone, American 
commanders had no convenient area for the internment of captured Iraqi troops.  The 
insurgency ensured that no location within Iraq remained safe from hostile operations.  
Pentagon expectations of a quick war followed by a brief occupation proved unfounded; 
the system of temporary facilities used in 1991 could not be applied.  American 
commanders searched for a rapid solution to the problem of maintaining POWs and 
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decided to use existing Iraqi prison facilities.  The most ill-advised choice, Abu Ghraib, 
was a large prison compound outside of Baghdad.  The use of Abu Ghraib indicated the 
improvised nature of POW operations in the Second Gulf War and a clear lack of 
understanding by American commanders regarding the nature of Abu Ghraib under 
Saddam Hussein’s regime.  The prison deserved its reputation as a hated symbol of the 
regime, holding thousands of political prisoners and the site of unspeakable tortures.30   
 The decision to place POWs in Abu Ghraib and other prison facilities in Iraq 
clearly violated the Geneva Convention.  Article 22 states that prisoner may be placed in 
civil prison facilities only as a temporary expedient, but by October 2004, the Abu 
Ghraib POW population exceeded seven thousand.  To maintain the prisoners, a military 
police (MP) force of only ninety-two reservists manned the prison, resulting in a 
prisoner-to-guard ratio of 75:1.31  The 800th MP Brigade, which provided the personnel 
for Abu Ghraib, had been converted from maintaining criminal prisoners to POWs, but 
received little practical instruction in the proper treatment of POWs.  The unit also 
handled facility security, logistics, and provided supply convoys for the prison.  Insurgent 
forces shelled the prison repeatedly, but the guards’ lack of heavy weapons and vehicles 
prevented a sufficient response to halt the attacks.   
 In the fall of 2003, Abu Ghraib’s population reached eight thousand prisoners, 
many taken from their homes in the middle of the night, not captured on the battlefield.  
Journalist Mark Danner estimated that 70 to 90 percent of Abu Ghraib’s prisoners had 
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been arrested by mistake.32  The line between prisoners of war and civilian detainees 
blurred at Abu Ghraib, because all remained confined together and the entire prison 
population was vulnerable to abusive treatment.  In February 2004, the ICRC released a 
report on the treatment of prisoners of war and other internees in Iraq, and concluded that 
brutality and mistreatment of prisoners constituted a widespread problem in Iraq at the 
hands of both coalition forces and Iraqi police.  Interrogators used prohibited techniques 
to elicit information from prisoners, resulting in deaths and serious injuries to prisoners.33  
The ICRC report, though public, went largely unheeded by American reporters and 
citizens, but comparing the report with ICRC statements from 1991 indicates that 
American and coalition prisoner practices markedly declined in the Second Gulf War. 
 On 29 April 2004, the American public became aware of Abu Ghraib due to a 
CBS broadcast of a series of photographs showing American personnel abusing 
prisoners.34  The pictures included naked prisoners chained together and forced to 
simulate homosexual acts, military dogs menacing terrified captives, and a hooded, 
shrouded figure connected to electrical leads, standing on a box with arms outstretched.  
The photographs, taken by American personnel participating in the abuse, became the 
icons of the Second Gulf War, images of guard personnel completely out of control.  
Bush and Rumsfeld had never authorized physical or sexual abuse in any capacity, yet 
both appeared at Abu Ghraib.  Further, interrogation techniques reserved for Guantanamo 
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detainees, such as the use of nudity and military dogs, had migrated to Iraq without 
official sanction.35
 The abuse revelations from Abu Ghraib did not come as a surprise to the 
Pentagon or the White House.  On 19 January 2004, Lieutenant General Ricardo 
Sanchez, commander of coalition forces in Iraq, had ordered an investigation into the 
treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib.  Investigators led by Major General Antonio M. 
Taguba scrutinized the behavior of the 800th MP Brigade, and found dozens of instances 
of abuse of prisoners by American personnel.36  It also found members of the brigade, the 
same unit that oversaw POW operations in the First Gulf War, were inadequately trained 
for POW treatment.  The brigade’s commander, Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, did 
not provide sufficient oversight for prisoner affairs.37  Taguba recommended that 
Karpinski and several subordinates be relieved of command.38  Criminal investigations of 
enlisted personnel directly involved in the abuse followed the Taguba Report. 
 After the public revelation of the abuses at Abu Ghraib, Sanchez ordered another 
investigation of the allegations.  Lieutenant General Anthony Jones and Major General 
George R. Fay expanded the scope of the Taguba investigations by interviewing 
hundreds of detainees and coalition military personnel.  Their report concluded that at the 
time of the abuse, only six hundred of the Abu Ghraib inmates were prisoners of war, the 
remainder consisted of civilian detainees who did not receive POW status.  In the fall of 
2003, the number of inmates sharply rose as U.S. forces increased captures, straining 
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prison logistics to the breaking point.39  Jones and Fay found that responsibility for the 
abuse rested with “a small group of morally corrupt soldiers and civilians.”  It was 
exacerbated by a failure of leadership and oversight at multiple levels of command, and 
encouraged by civilian and military intelligence agencies seeking to obtain actionable 
intelligence from the prisoners regarding the insurgency.40  A classified portion of the 
report, leaked to the New York Times, indicated that Sanchez authorized the use of 
interrogation techniques at Abu Ghraib that had been specifically intended for 
Guantanamo.41
 In the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib scandal, President Bush offered to demolish 
the prison, but the Iraqi interim government rebuffed the offer as a waste of resources.  
Insurgents remain in U.S. custody in Iraq in 2006, although the government has not 
released the number or location of detainees currently being held.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court ordered that prisoners at Guantanamo were entitled to legally challenge their 
detention by the United States, but the Senate effectively overrode the Supreme Court 
decision by suspending the writ of habeus corpus for prisoners at Guantanamo.42  The 
prisoners are no longer allowed to sue for their own release in U.S. courts.  The 
suspension applied to pending as well as future cases, effectively halting prisoner appeals 
for release.  Military tribunals considered the status of some Taliban and Al Qaeda 
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prisoners, and ordered the release of a few of foreign nationals, but hundreds more 
awaited hearings or were ordered to remain in custody for further interrogation.  As of 
2005, the final disposition of terrorist and Taliban prisoners was uncertain, as the Taliban 
no longer ruled Afghanistan, and thus repatriation to that nation presented both legal and 
ethical problems.  Members of Al Qaeda confined at Guantanamo could not be expected 
to return to Afghanistan in the near future, and yet many have committed no overt act that 
could trigger a civil prosecution in an American court.  They remained in legal limbo, 
awaiting a defined policy that could clarify their fate in the War on Terror. 
American POW policy and practice have been improvisational.  At no time in 
U.S. history has the nation entered a war fully prepared for the number of POWs captured 
in that war.  This was unsurprising, given that the United States has rarely entered a war 
adequately prepared for initial combat, a much greater consideration.43  Circumstances 
have forced American commanders to create new POW systems to meet the needs of 
each conflict while engaged in combat operations.  POWs have never been a major 
priority for the U.S. military, the officers given control of POWs have typically been 
unsuited for combat command, due to age, inexperience, or disposition.  The result has 
been an ongoing scramble to house and feed prisoners in every war, occasionally with 
disastrous results, as seen in Civil War camps, Koje-do, and Abu Ghraib.  At the end of 
each conflict, prisoners have returned home and little effort has been expended to assess 
POW operations, ensuring that the U.S. military remained unprepared for the next 
conflict.  Improvisation does not make the United States unique and historically POWs 
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have remained a low priority for military forces worldwide.  In most wars, the United 
States has maintained its captives in better fashion than its enemies, and has had just 
cause to complain about the treatment of American prisoners. 
 The United States has maintained a keen interest in the treatment of captured 
Americans.  This behavior has been present in every American war, and has been of 
special note after the Civil War, when U.S. forces have captured many more prisoners 
than the enemy in each conflict.  The development of international law regarding 
prisoners has influenced American military practices, and guaranteed that American 
decisions are not made in a vacuum.  For the most part, the War Department and the 
Department of Defense explicitly followed the Hague and Geneva Conventions, although 
some disagreements occurred regarding the proper interpretation of each document, and 
have expected similar compliance from enemies.  When captors of U.S. prisoners openly 
mistreated POWs, the American response  has consistently been the threat of retaliation 
or postwar trials. 
 American POWs practices have changed to suit the needs of each conflict, even 
when policies have remained the same.  The United States has never approached POW 
policy in the same way for two consecutive wars.  There is little evidence in the official 
records or the historiography of POW affairs to suggest that racism significantly 
impacted POW policy, although it almost certainly influenced the decisions of some 
individuals involved in POW practice.  Only during World War II did the United States 
capture significant numbers of prisoners from multiple ethnicities at the same time, and 
the treatment of German, Italian, and Japanese prisoners did not markedly differ.  
Comparisons between wars are difficult, if not impossible, due to the changes in the 
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nature of warfare over time.  One cannot compare the treatment of Iraqi POWs in 2003 
with the treatment of British prisoners in 1813 and hope to make a convincing argument 
that racism is the overriding factor in the difference of treatment for each group. 
 As the United States grew in power and status, its ability to influence 
international law regarding prisoners grew as well.  At the Hague Conventions of 1899 
and 1907, the United States participated as one among many nations.  By 1929, the 
United States was one of the sponsoring powers of the Geneva Conference, pushing for 
an agreement to clarify the laws of prisoner care.  At the 1949 Geneva Conference, the 
United States essentially proposed the new Convention, and gained ratification of the 
new treaty without substantial modifications.  However, some have argued that in the 
period after 1949, the United States has set back POW affairs by not explicitly following 
the Convention and by refusing to accede to the 1977 Protocol establishing new 
standards for POW maintenance, including expanding the definition of POWs.  The legal 
impact of the War on Terror remains to be seen, but the abuse at Abu Ghraib and the 
allegations of mistreatment at Guantanamo have hurt American standing in the 
international community. 
 Despite improvisations, certain principles have guided American conduct toward 
military captives.  At no time has the United States adopted collective punitive measures 
against all prisoners, nor has it ever been declared U.S. policy or obvious practice to 
mistreat POWs.  Even cases of deliberate abuse, such as the situation at Abu Ghraib, 
have been shown to be the actions of a few individuals, not the enforcement of a 
deliberate policy.  If POWs held by the United States have had cause to complain about 
their treatment, it has been due to negligence, not a malign intent.  At times, the principle 
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of thrift has become too influential, resulting in overcrowded prison compounds and a 
driving desire by camp commanders to reduce the public burden represented by 
prisoners.  One early example of economizing POW treatment came during the 
Revolutionary War, when states quartered British prisoners with citizens to save the cost 
of constructing POW encampments.  Another occurred in the War of 1812, when 
marshals leased prison ships rather than constructing new facilities.  In the Civil War, 
combinations of thrift and neglect led to the massively overcrowded prison pens at 
Andersonville, Elmira, and other locations, where prisoners received scant rations and 
little shelter.   
Although the United States has often linked enemy POW treatment to the 
treatment of American prisoners, and thus ceded the initiative regarding prisoners to the 
enemy, rarely has the United States carried out a policy of retaliation upon enemy 
prisoners.  Retaliatory acts occurred during the War of 1812 and the Civil War, but in 
later wars, the common U.S. practice consisted of warning the enemy of retaliation or 
possible war crimes trials for the mistreatment of American prisoners.  Examples of 
retaliatory warnings occurred in the Philippine War and the Vietnam War, in both cases, 
commanders never ordered retaliatory measures.  In the First Gulf War, President George 
Bush warned Iraq that it would be held accountable for the mistreatment of American 
prisoners, yet no war crimes trials occurred even after repatriated prisoners reported 
abuse while in captivity. 
 For those who seek policy implications, this dissertation leads to the following 
conclusions.  POW policies in the future must be clearly established prior to the capture 
of enemy troops, and facilities must be prepared well in advance of the arrival of 
 
 266
prisoners.  A standard operating procedure for the construction of camps, the 
interrogation of captives, and the standards for POW treatment is vital to the future of 
POW operations.  A clear definition of who the United States regards as a prisoner of 
war, currently lacking, remains fundamentally important to the future of American POW 
policy.  Waiting to determine a captive’s status exacerbates any POW situation.  Military 
units tasked with POW affairs require extensive training in both procedures and 
international law regarding prisoners.  If these units are from the Reserves or National 
Guard, they must be specifically devoted to POW operations.  Attempts since 2003 to 
convert MP companies specializing in criminal affairs within the U.S. military and the 
detention of criminal prisoners have resulted in allegations of mistreatment such as those 
from Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.  Expecting the military to make POW affairs a top 
priority is unrealistic, but it is also foolish to assign insufficient personnel to oversee a 
large POW population in a hostile location.  The scandals associated with prisoner abuse 
during the War on Terror and the second invasion of Iraq must serve as an alarm for the 
military leadership of the United States if it wishes to ensure the proper treatment of 
American prisoners in future conflicts.  Continually entering wars unprepared for 
prisoners and improvising policies in the midst of combat can only result in future 
allegations of mistreatment of enemy prisoners and the prospect of international criticism 
for the United States.  Although improvisation has been the legacy of U.S. POW policy, 
it should not remain the standard in the American conflicts of the future. 
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APPENDIX A-1 
 
 
 
EXCHANGE EQUIVALENCIES FOR THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY  
 
WAR, WAR OF 1812, AND CIVIL WAR 
 
 
 American Revolution War of 1812/Civil War 
Private 1 Private 1 Private 
Sergeant 2 Privates 2 Privates 
Lieutenant 6 Privates 4 Privates 
Captain 16 Privates 6 Privates 
Major 28 Privates 8 Privates 
Lieutenant Colonel 72 Privates 10 Privates 
Colonel 100 Privates 15 Privates 
Brigadier General 200 Privates 20 Privates 
Major General 372 Privates 30 Privates 
Lieutenant General 1044 Privates 40 Privates 
Commander in Chief Not included 60 Privates 
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MAJOR UNION POW CAMPS, 1861-65 
 
Camp Name Total Received Deaths Greatest Number 
Present 
Alton, IL 12880 1600 (12.4%) 1891 
Camp Butler, IL Unknown 866 2186 
Camp Chase, OH 25964 2192 (8.4%) 9045 
Camp Douglas, IL 27022 4173 (15.4%) 11702 
Camp Morton, IN 4622 1537 (33.3%) Unknown 
Elmira, NY 12263 2951 (24.1%) 9480 
Fort Delaware, DE 31840 2473 (7.8%) 9174 
Fort McHenry, MD 3283 28 (.9%) 1195 
Johnsons Island, 
OH 
8828 243 (2.8%) 3209 
Louisville, KY 48324 135 (.3%) 6566 
New York City, 
NY 
7381 283 (3.8%) 3346 
Newport News, 
VA 
3551 161 (4.5%) 3339 
New Orleans, LA 4931 770 (15.6%) 2838 
Point Lookout, MD 53015 3432 (6.5%) 19786 
Rock Island, IL  12286 1916 (15.6%) 8392 
Ship Island, MS 5742 153 (2.7%) 4070 
Capitol Prison, DC 14208 51 (.4%) 1009 
Fort Monroe, VA 1641 36 (2.2%) Unknown 
Nashville, TE 34865 518 (1.5%) 7000 
St. Louis, MO 12940 577 (4.5%) 747 
Fort Warren, MA 1693 13 (.8%) 820 
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PRISONERS HELD IN THE UNITED STATES, 1942-46 
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APPENDIX A-4 
 
 
 
PRISONERS HELD IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1965-72 
  
 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Total POWs Held in South
Vietnam
303 1903 9743 21764 32435 37353 35596 37451
Dec-65 Dec-66 Dec-67 Dec-68 Dec-69 Dec-70 Dec-71 Dec-72
 
 
 300
VITA 
 
Paul Joseph Springer 
Department of History 
Texas A&M University 
College Station, TX  77843 
(979) 862-6776 
pspringer@neo.tamu.edu 
 
Education     
 
Texas A&M University  College Station, TX 
 Major:  History  Degree:  Doctor of Philosophy    
GPA: 3.75   Graduation:  May 2006 
 Dissertation:  “American Prisoner of War Policy and Practice from the 
                                    Revolutionary War to the War on Terror,” 2006. 
 
University of Northern Iowa  Cedar Falls, IA 
 Major:  History  Degree:  Master of Arts   
GPA:  3.9   Graduation:  December 1998 
 Thesis:  “German Prisoners of War in American during World War II,” 1998. 
 
Texas A&M University  College Station, TX 
 Major:  Psychology  Degree:  Bachelor of Science  
GPA:  3.2   Graduation:  May 1997 
 
Teaching History 
 
 Blinn College    8/05-5/06 Bryan, TX 
 Position: Lecturer    
Courses Taught: U.S. History I & II 
 
 Texas A&M University  8/00-5/06 College Station, TX 
Position:  Assistant Lecturer  
Courses Taught:  U.S. History I & II; U.S. Military History; Honors U.S. History 
II; Civil War & Reconstruction; History of U.S. Seapower 
 
 Tarrant County College   8/99-5/00 Arlington, TX 
 Position:  Instructor   
Courses Taught:  U.S. History I & II 
 
 Hawkeye Community College 8/98-12/98 Waterloo, IA 
 Position:  Instructor   
Course Taught:  Western Civilization II 
 
  
